Evaluating Warfare Myths about Science and Christianity and How These Myths Promote Scientism

Many people assume that there has been ceaseless conflict between science and Christianity. I argue that the real conflict has been between scientism and religion. Scientism is the view that only the sciences generate knowledge or rational belief. Scientism, as typically articulated, entails the opinion that reliable belief about divinity (theological realism) is impossible. I debunk four historic science–Christianity conflict myths and show how they have promoted scientism. These four science–religion myths function as part of a larger warfare narrative about science and Christianity. This misleading warfare thesis often comes packaged with an alternative anti-theistic “myth” in the anthropological sense—in this case, a worldview-shaping narrative that awakens the imagination to interpret the world in scientistic and non-theistic ways. I call this the scientistic warfare myth and explore its major flaws.

Arguments Against Realism and the Transcendence of Science

Realism is questioned from two sides, the philosophy of science and religion. First, the “underdetermination of theories by data” and the revision of the “miracle argument” make it necessary to revise scientific realism. Second, the claim that a realistic interpretation of belief contradicts its religious character questions the consistency of theological realism. Both discussions show that we have to further develop realism. I propose to consider truth, meaning, experience, and transcendence as creative characteristics of a realistic thought. They enable us to make and receive meaning for facts.

Quine’s Ontology and the Islamic Tradition

Analytic theologians seem to unreservedly prioritise a realist view in the way they approach theological dogmas. I have previously argued that this particular type of realist methodological approach that is adopted by most analytic theologians is inconsistent with the Islamic tradition. I demonstrated that this inconsistency lies between two primary theses which constitute realism and an absolutely transcendent and ineffable God of the Islamic tradition. I had established how each of these theses proved responsible, in different ways, for divesting the Islamic God of His absolute transcendence. In this paper I determine why this is the case. I primarily seek to explicate the underlying reason for why metaphysical (theological) realism proves to be responsible for stripping the Islamic God of His absolute transcendence. This would involve being able to stipulate, somewhat accurately, the precise source of the accentuated inconsistency between metaphysical (theological) realism and the Islamic understanding of an absolutely transcendent and ineffable God. The exact source of this inconsistency, I shall argue, is grounded in Quine’s ontological theses which underlie much of what metaphysical realism imports into the domain of analytic theology.

Quine’s Ontology and the Islamic Tradition

Analytic theologians seem to unreservedly prioritise a realist view in the way they approach theological dogmas. I have previously argued that this particular type of realist methodological approach that is adopted by most analytic theologians is inconsistent with the Islamic tradition. I demonstrated that this inconsistency lies between two primary theses which constitute realism and an absolutely transcendent and ineffable God of the Islamic tradition. I had established how each of these theses proved responsible, in different ways, for divesting the Islamic God of His absolute transcendence. In this paper I determine why this is the case. I primarily seek to explicate the underlying reason for why metaphysical (theological) realism proves to be responsible for stripping the Islamic God of His absolute transcendence. This would involve being able to stipulate, somewhat accurately, the precise source of the accentuated inconsistency between metaphysical (theological) realism and the Islamic understanding of an absolutely transcendent and ineffable God. The exact source of this inconsistency, I shall argue, is grounded in Quine’s ontological theses which underlie much of what metaphysical realism imports into the domain of analytic theology.

Theological realism

Theological realism typically involves three claims: that God exists independently of human beings (an ontological claim); that God can be known (an epistemological claim); and that God may be spoken about truthfully (a semantic claim). It therefore has features analogous to realist interpretations of other regions of discourse such as ethics and science. Theological realism can be distinguished from religious realism in that debate about the former arises from and draws upon the beliefs and doctrines of a particular religious tradition such as Christianity. The issues which arise in the debate about realism in Christian theology have analogues in some other religious traditions. In the philosophical literature, religious realism is usually discussed in abstraction from particular doctrinal claims. Debate about religious realism may, for example, investigate the question as to whether God exists independently of human minds. Atheists agree with religious realists that ‘God exists’ has truth-apt content and can be construed realistically, but, unlike religious realists who believe they have sound arguments for God’s (probable) existence, they deny that it is true: the arguments are not sound, there is no God to be known, and hence religious discourse is systematically erroneous. Theology is concerned with stating the content of Christian beliefs, so theologians who wish to defend a realist interpretation of them are likely to assume and appeal to core doctrines – such as the incarnation – that are philosophically controversial, if not implausible. For example, theologians are likely to want (with the church Fathers) to analyse ‘God exists’ so that it is consistent with its being true that ‘the Word of God, who is "of one substance" with the Father, assumed human flesh in Jesus Christ’. As a little reflection on this example shows, unlike in philosophical discussions of religious realism, it is difficult to tease out for separate analysis the ontological, epistemological and semantic aspects of the statement ‘God exists’ or to decide which should have priority in such an analysis. However, contemporary discussions of realism in theology focus less on whether God exists than on other questions: What is the correct analysis of language about God?; Is it metaphorical, analogical or univocal? How does it refer? Does Christian doctrine itself refer to God or does it set out rules for using the language of prayer and worship that is addressed to God? How, and to what extent, may God be known, and what is the role of narrative, worship and devotional practice in that process? What account is to be given of judgements as to the truth and falsehood of particular theological statements? The most popular current analysis of Christian discourse about God construes it on analogy with scientific realism about unobservable entities, but there are significant theological difficulties with this approach. Some Christians deny that God has any mind-independent existence but, rather than espouse atheism, they argue for versions of noncognitivism: the aim of Christian discourse is not to describe the world but to express the attitudes or feelings of those who use it. Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion – which holds that the meaning of a religious term is given by its use in a religious language game – is often, though controversially, interpreted along these lines (see Runzo 1993; Scott 2000; and Tessin and von der Ruhr 1995).

The Hypostatic Union as Normative over the Relation of God’s Self-Revelation and Human Cognition in the Thought of T.F. Torrance

T.F. Torrance held the hypostatic union to be the normative instance of divine–human relationship. The structure of the relation between the divine nature and the human nature as delineated in the hypostatic union is the archetype to which all other theological loci must correspond. This essay argues that Torrance applied this Christocentric approach to formulate his own theological realism in which God’s self-revelation through the Son and by the Spirit both shapes and is cognized by the rational structure of human understanding, preserving the distinct integrity of human cognition and divine revelation in theological knowledge. This constitutes a conscious attempt on the part of Torrance to reverse the synthesis of rational structure and material content in Immanuel Kant’s transcendental idealism.