Archetype, Psyche, World

In our dialogues over the nature of archetypes, essence, psyche, and world, I further respond to Erik Goodwyn’s recent foray into establishing an ontological position that not only answers to the mind-body problem, but further locates the source of Psyche on a cosmic plane. His impressive attempt to launch a neo-Jungian metaphysics is based on the principle of cosmic panpsychism that bridges both the internal parameters of archetypal process and their emergence in consciousness and the external world conditioned by a psychic universe. Here I explore the ontology of experience, mind, matter, metaphysical realism, and critique Goodwyn’s turn to Neoplatonism. The result is a potentially compatible theory of mind and reality that grounds archetypal theory in onto-phenomenology, metaphysics, and bioscience, hence facilitating new directions in analytical psychology.

METACRITICISM AS A LITERARY PROBLEM

The latest decades are associated with an active rethinking of the existing literary and philosophical achievements, which are reflected significantly in changes and refinements in contemporary literary terminology. Along with the already known concepts such as "literature", "postmodernism", "criticism", the concepts "metafiction", "metamodernism" and "metacriticism" exist and become popular. At the same time, one may notice that the widely used now prefix meta- lays claim to a greater depth and coverage of higher horizons. If criticism marks the analysis, comprehension, and interpretation of literary works, then metacriticism focuses on literary-critical, historical-literary, and methodological researches, thus showing "criticism of criticism". The article deals with a complex analysis of the concept of "metacriticism". On the one hand, both aesthetic and philosophical approaches to the understanding of the notion of criticism are taken into account – starting from the antique times to Karl Popper’s critical-rationalistic approach. On the other hand, it is found that metacriticism as a phenomenon dates back to the end of the XVIII century when the works of two famous German philosophers Johann Georg Hamann’s "Metacritique on Purism of Reason" and Johan Gottfried Herder’s "Metacriticism of Critique of Pure Reason" were published as a debate on Immanuel Kant’s ideas. Based on the available data, it is found that metacriticism is a rather convenient multilevel term that may qualitatively contain various interpretations, including the criticism of criticism, metascience concerning criticism, criticism of the highest level, short form of the term "metaphysical critique" as a critique of "metaphysical realism". At the same time, while taking into account the current trends of the digital age, metacriticism becomes a product of digital technology - popular platforms for writing reviews, making discussions, and even creating a virtual library, such as site Metacritic, the English-language portal Goodreads and its Russian equivalent Livelib. The article itself does not exhaust the problem of metacriticism as a multidimensional phenomenon, but it provides opportunities for further and deeper studies of the outlined issues, in particular within the context of theoretical and literary discourse.

No God, no God's Eye: A Quasi-Putnamian Argument for Monotheism

Metaphysical realism is the thesis that “the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects” such that “there is exactly one true and complete description of 'the way the world is'”. In the first part of this essay, I will present Hilary Putnam’s worry with metaphysical realism. Secondly, I will argue that metaphysical realists must commit to metaphysical anthropocentrism in order to solve Putnam’s problem. Thirdly, I will argue that metaphysical anthropocentrism requires monotheism. Lastly, I argue that metaphysical realism is true. Therefore, we must be ontologically committed to God.

On Being in a Quandary

This chapter addresses three problems: the problem of formulating a coherent relativism, the Sorites paradox, and a seldom noticed difficulty in the best intuitionistic case for the revision of classical logic. A response to the latter is proposed which, generalized, contributes towards the solution of the other two. The key to this response is a generalized conception of indeterminacy as a specific kind of intellectual bafflement—Quandary. Intuitionistic revisions of classical logic are merited wherever a subject matter is conceived both as liable to generate Quandary and as subject to a broad form of evidential constraint. So motivated, the distinctions enshrined in intuitionistic logic provide both for a satisfying resolution of the Sorites paradox and a coherent outlet for relativistic views about, for example, matters of taste and morals. An important corollary of the discussion is that an epistemic conception of vagueness can be prised apart from the strong metaphysical realism with which its principal supporters have associated it, and acknowledged to harbour an independent insight.

Edgar Wind on Experiment and Metaphysics

The paper presents a detailed interpretation of Edgar Wind’s Experiment and Metaphysics (1934), a unique work on the philosophy of physics which broke with the Neo-Kantian tradition under the influence of American pragmatism. Taking up Cassirer’s interpretation of physics, Wind develops a holistic theory of the experiment and a constructivist account of empirical facts. Based on the concept of embodiment which plays a key role in Wind’s later writings on art history, he argues, however, that the outcomes of measurements are contingent. He then proposes an anti-Kantian conception of a metaphysics of nature. For him, nature is an unknown totality which manifests itself in discrepancies between theories and experiment, and hence the theory formation of physics can increasingly approximate the structure of nature. It is shown that this view is ambiguous between a transcendental, metaphysical realism in Kant’s sense and an internal realism in Putnam’s sense. Wind’s central claim is that twentieth century physics offers new options for resolving Kant’s cosmological antinomies. In particular, he connected quantum indeterminism with the possibility of human freedom, a connection that Cassirer sharply opposed.

Management of the Independent Learning Curriculum during the Covid-19 Pandemic

The reason for this examination was to inspect the status, all things considered, ranging from teachers, learning facilities, students and school partnerships, namely the school committee (parents of students). on the one hand, the readiness of some teachers in mastering technology is still not optimal as a demand for distance learning and the school is not yet optimal in disseminating the curriculum for independent learning or the enactment of the curriculum during the pandemic. This investigation utilizes an illustrative subjective technique which means analyzing and afterward describing the problem obviously, sourced from library research with metaphysical realism as the approach. To help understudies influenced by the pandemic and possibly left behind, instructors are required to complete a symptomatic evaluation. The aftereffects of the appraisal are utilized as the reason for choosing learning procedures and giving healing or extra exercises to understudies who are generally given up.

Kant and the Forms of Realism (Translated by M. Evstigneev)

Realism takes many forms. The aim of this paper is to show that the “Critique of Pure Reason” is the founding document of realism and that to the present-day Kant’s discussion of realism has shaped the theoretical landscape of the debates over realism. Kant not only invents the now common philosophical term ‘realism’. He also lays out the theoretical topography of the forms of realism that still frames our understanding of philosophical questions concerning reality. The paper explores this by analysis of Kant’s methodological procedure to distinguish between empirical (i.e. nonmetaphysical) and transcendental (metaphysical) realism. This methodological procedure is still of great help in contemporary philosophy, although it has its limits.

Foundations of relativism by J. Margolis in the polemic of R. Rorty and H. Putnam

The polemic about the realism of H. Putnam and R. Rorty is a remarkable event of the 20th century for a number of reasons. Forming within the analytical philosophy, and using the most relevant concepts and ideas of this direction as arguments, this polemic for almost three decades of its existence balanced on the border with relativism, the least popular and admited direction of philosophy of the 20th century. Putnam's arguments against metaphysical realism reject any "point of view of God", entail "internalism", accept the concept of incommensurability of conceptual schemes and the relativization the reality described by the epistemic agent to his experience. Rorty's arguments reject not only relativism, but also realism, but his concepts of ethnocentrism and solidarity also take the view that the standards of truth correlate with the conceptual schemes, are "sociologized" and meet the interests of the majority. J. Margolis find in this polemic not only a retreat into relativism, but also recognized its pragmatistic potential, which gave him the opportunity to defend relativism, proposing its reliable (robust) version and building a neo-pragmatist philosophy on the development of the arguments of both sides.

Epistemic logic: All knowledge is based on our experience, and epistemic logic is the cognitive representation of our experiential confrontation in reality

Epistemic Logic is our basic universal science, the method of our cognitive confrontation in reality to prove the truth of our basic cognitions and theories. Hence, by proving their true representation of reality we can self-control ourselves in it, and thus refuting the Berkeleyian solipsism and Kantian a priorism. The conception of epistemic logic is that only by proving our true representation of reality we achieve our knowledge of it, and thus we can prove our cognitions to be either true or rather false, and otherwise they are doubtful. Therefore, truth cannot be separated from being proved and we cannot hold anymore the principle of excluded middle, as it is with formal semantics of metaphysical realism. In distinction, the intuitionistic logic is based on subjective intellectual feeling of correctness in constructing proofs, and thus it is epistemologically encapsulated in the metaphysical subject. However, epistemic logic is our basic science which enable us to prove the truth of our cognitions, including the epistemic logic itself.