Reasons and Basing in Commonsense Epistemology: Evidence from Two Experiments

I accomplish two things in this paper. I explain the motivation for including experimental research in philosophical projects on epistemic reasons and the basing relation. And I present the first experimental contributions to these projects. The results from two experiments advance our understanding of the ordinary concepts of reasons and basing and set the stage for further research on the topics. More specifically, the results support a causal theory of the basing relation, according to which reasons are causes, and a dualist theory of epistemic reasons, according to which reasons include both psychological and non-psychological items.

The Epistemic Role of Core Cognition

According to a traditional picture, perception and belief have starkly different epistemic roles. Beliefs have epistemic statuses as justified or unjustified, depending on how they are formed and maintained. In contrast, perceptions are “unjustified justifiers.” Core cognition is a set of mental systems that stand at the border of perception and belief, and has been extensively studied in developmental psychology. Core cognition's borderline states do not fit neatly into the traditional epistemic picture. What is the epistemic role of these states? Focusing on the core object system, the author argues that core object representations have epistemic statuses like beliefs do, despite their many prototypically perceptual features. First, the author argues that it is a sufficient condition on a mental state's having an epistemic status as justified or unjustified that the state is based on reasons. Then the author argues that core object representations are based on reasons, through an examination of both experimental results and key markers of the basing relation. The scope of mental states that are subject to epistemic evaluation as justified or unjustified is not restricted to beliefs.

Reasons in the Scientonomic Ontology

The question of how we come to accept new theories is a central area of inquiry in scientonomic discourse. However, there has yet to be a formal discussion of the subjective reasons an agent may have for accepting theories. This paper explores these epistemic reasons and constructs a historically sensitive definition of reason. This formulation takes an abstractionist stance towards the ontology of reasons and makes use of a composite basing relation. The descriptive and normative components of reasons are fully formulated in scientonomic terms through the application of the newly introduced notion of implication, and its separation from the notion of inference. In addition, the paper provides scientonomic definitions for sufficient reason, support, and normative inference. The fruitfulness of this formulation of reasons is illustrated by a few examples. Suggested Modifications [Sciento-2019-0009]: Accept the following definition of implication: Implication ≡ a logical transition from one theory to another. [Sciento-2019-0010]: Accept the following definitions of sufficient reason, reason, support, and normative inference: Sufficient Reason ≡ an agent takes theory A to be a sufficient reason for (accepting) theory B iff the following four conditions are met: (1) The agent accepts A. (2) The agent accepts that A→B. (3) The agent employs ε. (4) The agent accepts (ε, A, A→B) →ε (Should accept B). Support ≡ an agent takes theory A to be supporting theory B iff the agent accepts A and accepts that A→B. Reason ≡ an agent takes theory A to be a reason for theory B iff the agent accepts that A→B, employs ε, and accepts (ε, A, A→B) →ε (Should accept B). Normative Inference ≡ An agent takes theory A to normatively infer theory B iff the agent accepts A, accepts that A→B, and accepts (ε, A, A→B) →ε (Should accept B). [Sciento-2019-0011]: Provided that modification [Sciento-2019-0010] is accepted, accept the sufficient reason theorem and its deduction from the definition of sufficient reason and the second law: Sufficient Reason theorem: a theory becomes accepted by an agent, when an agent has a sufficient reason for accepting it. Accept the following question as a legitimate topic of scientonomic inquiry: Theory Acceptance without Sufficient Reason: how do theories become accepted without a sufficient reason, i.e. in the cases of circularity or theories without a reason?