Element Decay

This paper attempts to establish the existence of element decay by making a historical case for the existence of theory decay, a phenomenon where theories leave an agent’s mosaic without any re-evaluation or decision on the agent’s part. The phenomenon of theory decay is to be theoretically distinguished from rejection without replacement; while the latter is a result of an agent’s deliberation, the former is a result of an agent’s inaction. To locate historical instances of theory decay, there should be evidence that the agent under study existed continuously throughout the period under study, that the theory was accepted at some point and unaccepted at some later point, and that the theory left the mosaic without any decision on the part of the agent. With these indicators at hand, I discuss five potentially promising historical cases: Poisson distribution, the Aharonov-Bohm effect, Damascus steel, Greek fire, and Cremonese violins. I argue that there is solid historical evidence to interpret the last case as an instance of element decay, which is sufficient to establish the existence of the phenomenon. I show that element decay is best seen as a non-scientonomic phenomenon; its existence highlights that individual and communal agents have limited capacities of knowledge retention and transmission and, when these limits are reached, element decay often takes place. This suggests that sufficient epistemic capacity to retain and transmit knowledge is a necessary precondition for the existence of scientonomic patterns, which emerge and hold only when the agent has measures in place to counteract potential element decay.

Question Dynamics

The paper presents a new scientonomic account of question dynamics. To explain the process of question acceptance and rejection, we begin by introducing the notion of epistemic presupposition and show how it’s different from the notion of logical presupposition. With the notion of epistemic presupposition at hand, we formulate the law of question acceptance, a new scientonomic axiom, which states that a question becomes accepted only if all of its epistemic presuppositions are accepted, and it is accepted that the question is answerable. We then show how the process of question rejection can be explained by means of the question rejection theorem, which states that a question becomes rejected when other elements that are incompatible with the question become accepted. To deduce this theorem in the usual scientonomic fashion (from the first law and the compatibility corollary), we first ascertain that the notion of compatibility/incompatibility is applicable to questions and show that one can legitimately speak of both question-theory and question-question incompatibility. We conclude by providing a quick illustration of the historical applicability of this new framework and suggest a number of questions for future research.

Scientific Error and Error Handling

Error is a common part of scientific practice, which must be accounted for by scientonomy. A scientific error occurs when an agent accepts a theory that should not have been accepted given that agent’s employed method. One might suspect that the handling of scientific error seems to violate the theory rejection theorem according to which a theory becomes rejected only when other theories that are incompatible with the theory become accepted, because it appears as though a theory isn’t replaced by anything. Here, we analyze several instances of scientific error and show that error handling, when properly analyzed, is fully consistent with the theory rejection theorem. We show that instances of scientific error typically involve the rejection of an erroneous conclusion as well as one or more of the premises of the argument that leads to that erroneous conclusion. In most cases, first-order propositions of the original erroneously accepted theory are replaced by other first-order propositions incompatible with them. In some cases, however, first-order propositions are replaced by second-order propositions asserting the lack of sufficient reason for accepting these first-order propositions. In both cases, such a replacement is fully consistent with the theory rejection theorem.

Disciplines in the Scientonomic Ontology

The role of categories of knowledge, or disciplines, in science has not previously been explored in scientonomy. While disciplinary communities devoted to the production of knowledge are a modern phenomenon, the practice of dividing knowledge into categories is a universal feature of science. Although at any moment of time, many questions and theories can be part of a given discipline, not all of these are essential to the discipline. We show that two components are essential to a discipline: the discipline’s core questions as well as the discipline’s delineating theory, a second-order theory that identifies these questions as essential to the discipline. If the questions of one discipline are a proper subset of the questions of another discipline, the former discipline is a subdiscipline of the latter. Since a discipline is a complex entity consisting of questions and a theory, epistemic agents can take epistemic stances towards disciplines. A discipline is said to be accepted if its core questions and its delineating theory are all accepted. To illustrate the applicability of these new concepts, the transition from physical to biological anthropology is discussed.

Epistemic Tools and Epistemic Agents in Scientonomy

The only subtype of epistemic agent currently recognized within scientonomy is community. The place of both individuals and epistemic tools in the scientonomic ontology is yet to be clarified. This paper extends the scientonomic ontology to include epistemic agents and epistemic tools as well as their relationship to one another. Epistemic agent is defined as an agent capable of taking epistemic stances towards epistemic elements. These stances must be taken intentionally, that is, based on a semantic understanding of the epistemic element in question and its available alternatives, with reason, and for the purpose of acquiring knowledge. I argue that there can be both communal and individual epistemic agents. Epistemic agents are linked by relationships of authority delegation based on their differing areas of expertise. Having established the role of epistemic agents in the process of scientific change, I then turn to the role of epistemic tools, such as a thermometer, a text, or a particle accelerator in epistemic activities. I argue that epistemic tools play a different role in scientific change than do epistemic agents. This role is specified by an agent’s employed method. A physical object or system is an epistemic tool for some epistemic agent if there is a procedure by which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge for answering some question under the employed method of the agent. An agent is said to rely on such a tool. Suggested Modifications [Sciento-2019-0014]: Accept the following definition of epistemic agent: Epsitemic Agent ≡ an agent capable of taking epistemic stances towards epistemic elements. [Sciento-2019-0015]: Accept that there are two types of epistemic agents – individual and communal. Also accept the following question as a legitimate topic of scientonomic inquiry: Applicability of the Laws of Scientific Change to Individuals: do the scientonomic laws apply to individual epistemic agents? [Sciento-2019-0016]: Accept the term epistemic tool, with the following definition: Epistemic Tool ≡ a physical object or system is an epistemic tool for an epistemic agent, when there is a procedure by which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge for answering some question under the employed method of that agent. [Sciento-2019-0017]: Accept the following definition of authority delegation, which generalizes the currently accepted definition to apply to all epistemic agents: Authority Delegation ≡ epistemic agent A is said to be delegating authority over question x to epistemic agent B iff (1) agent A accepts that agent B is an expert on question x and (2) agent A will accept a theory answering question x if agent B says so. Also accept the following redefinitions of subtypes of authority delegation, including mutual authority delegation, one-sided authority delegation, singular authority delegation, multiple authority delegation, hierarchical authority delegation, and non-hierarchical authority delegation: Mutual Authority Delegation ≡ epistemic agents A and B are said to be in a relationship of mutual authority delegation iff A delegates authority over question x to B, and B delegates authority over question y to A. One-Sided Authority Delegation ≡ epistemic agents A and B are said to be in a relationship of one-sided authority delegation iff A delegates authority over question x to B, but B doesn’t delegate any authority to A. Singular Authority Delegation ≡ epistemic agent A is said to engage in a relationship of singular authority delegation over question x iff A delegates authority over question x to exactly one epistemic agent. Multiple Authority Delegation ≡ epistemic agent A is said to engage in a relationship of multiple authority delegation over question x iff A delegates authority over question x to more than one epistemic agents. Hierarchical Authority Delegation ≡ a sub-type of multiple authority delegation where different epistemic agents are delegated different degrees of authority over question x. Non-Hierarchical Authority Delegation ≡ a sub-type of multiple authority delegation where different epistemic agents are delegated the same degree of authority over question x. [Sciento-2019-0018]: Accept the relationship of tool reliance can obtain between epistemic agents and epistemic tools. Accept the following definition of tool reliance: Tool Reliance ≡ an epistemic agent is said to rely on an epistemic tool when there is a procedure through which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge for answering some question under the employed method of that agent.

The Status of Classical Physics in the Contemporary Scientific Mosaic

This paper argues that the traditional scientonomic portrayal of theories of classical physics (e.g. Newtonian mechanics, thermodynamics) as merely used but no longer accepted is too simplistic. To that end, I consider the current status of the meteorological theory, which is accepted as the best available description of atmospheric phenomenon despite the fact that it is founded on the principles of classical physics, including those of Newtonian mechanics. This apparent paradox is resolved if the distinction between a theory’s ontology and its phenomenological laws is properly appreciated. The phenomenological laws of meteorology are accepted by the scientific community as the best available description of atmospheric phenomena. Yet, this acceptance does not imply that the classical ontology implicit in the current meteorological theory is also accepted. Thus, the modern meteorological theory (as well as many tenets of classical physics) can be said to be accepted as the best available description of the observable atmospheric phenomena even though its classical ontology is no longer accepted. Suggested Modifications [Sciento-2019-0012]: Accept that while the ontologies of classical theories, such as those of Newtonian mechanics, classical thermodynamics, or classical electrodynamics are no longer accepted by the physics community, their phenomenological claims are still accepted as the best available descriptions of their respective observable phenomena, i.e. as the best available answers to their respective questions. Consequently, reject the idea that these classical theories are no longer accepted but merely used.

Method Hierarchies in Clinical Epidemiology

Accumulating evidence from diverse fields of inquiry suggests the existence of method hierarchies, where criteria employed by the same epistemic agent constitute a certain preference hierarchy. In this paper, we illustrate the phenomenon of method hierarchy by discussing several prominent studies in clinical epidemiology of coronary artery disease. The current “gold standard” in clinical epidemiology is the randomized controlled trial (RCT) method. Yet, in the absence of studies that satisfy the strict requirement of the RCT method, clinical epidemiologists often relax the requirements of double-blinding, complete follow-up, no treatment switching, and/or randomization. Instead, they sometimes employ less stringent requirements, such as the requirement to account for the potential imbalances between groups through statistical models. This suggests the existence of a certain method hierarchy. However, it is unclear how method hierarchies are to be conceptualized and documented. Specifically, it remains to be seen whether a method hierarchy is best understood as being composed of individual employed methods or as a single composite method with a complex system of if-s and else-s. Suggested Modifications [Sciento-2019-0013]: Accept the existence of method hierarchies. Accept the following definition of method hierarchy: Method Hierarchy ≡ a set of methods is said to constitute a hierarchy iff theories that satisfy the requirements of methods that are higher in the hierarchy are preferred to theories that satisfy the requirements of methods that are lower in the hierarchy. Accept the following question as a legitimate topic of scientonomic inquiry: Conceptualizing Method Hierarchies: should we conceive of a method hierarchy as being composed of individual employed methods/requirements, or should we think of it as constituting one composite method with a system of if-s and else-s, and-s and or-s?

Reasons in the Scientonomic Ontology

The question of how we come to accept new theories is a central area of inquiry in scientonomic discourse. However, there has yet to be a formal discussion of the subjective reasons an agent may have for accepting theories. This paper explores these epistemic reasons and constructs a historically sensitive definition of reason. This formulation takes an abstractionist stance towards the ontology of reasons and makes use of a composite basing relation. The descriptive and normative components of reasons are fully formulated in scientonomic terms through the application of the newly introduced notion of implication, and its separation from the notion of inference. In addition, the paper provides scientonomic definitions for sufficient reason, support, and normative inference. The fruitfulness of this formulation of reasons is illustrated by a few examples. Suggested Modifications [Sciento-2019-0009]: Accept the following definition of implication: Implication ≡ a logical transition from one theory to another. [Sciento-2019-0010]: Accept the following definitions of sufficient reason, reason, support, and normative inference: Sufficient Reason ≡ an agent takes theory A to be a sufficient reason for (accepting) theory B iff the following four conditions are met: (1) The agent accepts A. (2) The agent accepts that A→B. (3) The agent employs ε. (4) The agent accepts (ε, A, A→B) →ε (Should accept B). Support ≡ an agent takes theory A to be supporting theory B iff the agent accepts A and accepts that A→B. Reason ≡ an agent takes theory A to be a reason for theory B iff the agent accepts that A→B, employs ε, and accepts (ε, A, A→B) →ε (Should accept B). Normative Inference ≡ An agent takes theory A to normatively infer theory B iff the agent accepts A, accepts that A→B, and accepts (ε, A, A→B) →ε (Should accept B). [Sciento-2019-0011]: Provided that modification [Sciento-2019-0010] is accepted, accept the sufficient reason theorem and its deduction from the definition of sufficient reason and the second law: Sufficient Reason theorem: a theory becomes accepted by an agent, when an agent has a sufficient reason for accepting it. Accept the following question as a legitimate topic of scientonomic inquiry: Theory Acceptance without Sufficient Reason: how do theories become accepted without a sufficient reason, i.e. in the cases of circularity or theories without a reason?

Problems and Prospects with the Scientonomic Workflow

While the scientonomic workflow guiding the development of a general theory of scientific change has been practiced for nearly four years, it has yet to be formally evaluated. The goal of this paper is to fill this gap with a critical appraisal of the practice and theoretical underpinnings of the workflow currently used in scientonomy. First, we consider the traditional workflow which uses publications as the primary vehicle for substantive epistemic change and find that it fails to be sufficiently transparent or inclusive and is ambiguous at decisive points. Conversely, as we argue, the scientonomic workflow has the potential to succeed where the traditional workflow fails and thus provides a promising alternative workflow. We then go on to note a number of practical and theoretical problems that have arisen upon reflection on the scientonomic workflow and suggest some modifications to the workflow and to our practices. This paper takes the first steps in improving the workflow to reach its maximum potential. Suggested Modifications [Sciento-2019-0001]: Accept that the goal of peer-reviews in the scientonomic workflow is evaluation for pursuitworthiness rather than acceptability. [Sciento-2019-0002]: Accept that the discussions concerning a suggested modification are to be published once a communal verdict is available. The discussions are to be published in the journal as special commentary articles co-authored by all participants of the discussion or in special edited collections. [Sciento-2019-0003]: Accept that the commentators of suggested modifications are allowed to suggest reformulations of the original formulations. Also accept that, by default, the new formulation should bear the original author’s name, unless the author decides to give credit to those who significantly contributed to the new reformulation. This should be decided collegially by the author, the commentators, and the editors on a case-by-case basis. [Sciento-2019-0004]: Accept that an annual book prize is to be offered for extensive participation on the encyclopedia. The winner(s) are to be decided by the encyclopedia editors. [Sciento-2019-0005]: Accept that star-ratings are to be introduced for commentators who comment on suggested modifications on the encyclopedia. [Sciento-2019-0006]: Accept that the encyclopedia editors are to be granted official housekeeping rights to handle the ripple effects. Also accept that if the additional required changes are implicit in the suggested modification, the editors should create and alter encyclopedia pages to ensure that the accepted body of scientonomic knowledge is properly documented; if it is conceivable to accept the modification without accepting the ripple effect change in question, the editors should register these changes as new suggested modifications so that the community can discuss and evaluate them in an orderly fashion. [Sciento-2019-0007]: Accept that the verdict on suggested modifications is to be decided by a communal vote that will follow the discussion period. Have a communal discussion and decide as to what percentage of votes it should take for a modification to be accepted – a simple majority (50% +1), or supermajority of three fifths (60%), two thirds (67%), or three quarters (75%). Also discuss to decide as to how long the discussion period and the voting period should be. This modification is incompatible with modification [Sciento-2019-0008]. [Sciento-2019-0008]: Accept that a countdown mechanism is to be introduced, where a modification is accepted by default if there are no objections within a 90-day period following its publication. This modification is incompatible with modification [Sciento-2019-0007].

The Status of Technological Knowledge in the Scientific Mosaic

In this paper, I argue that there is accepted propositional technological knowledge which appears to exhibit the same patterns of change as questions, theories, and methods in the natural, social, and formal sciences. I show that technological theories attempting to describe the construction and operation of artifacts as well as to prescribe their correct mode of operation are not merely used, but also often accepted by epistemic agents. Since technology often involves methods different from those found in science and produces normative propositions, many of which remain tacit, one may be tempted to think that changes in technological knowledge should be somehow exempt from the laws of scientific change. Indeed, it seems tacitly accepted in the scientonomic community that, while scientific communities clearly accept theories, technological communities merely use them. As a result, scientonomy currently deals with natural, social, and formal sciences, and the status of technological knowledge within the scientonomic ontology remains unclear. To help elucidate the topic, I propose that the historical cases of sorting algorithms, telescopes, crop rotation, and colorectal cancer surgeries confirm that technological theories and methods are often an integral part of an epistemic agent’s mosaic and seem to exhibit the same scientonomic patterns of change typical of accepted theories therein. Thus, I suggest that propositional technological knowledge can be part of a mosaic. Suggested Modifications [Sciento-2018-0011]: Accept the three-fold distinction between explicit, explicable-implicit, and inexplicable with the following definitions: Explicit ≡ propositional knowledge that has been openly formulated by the agent. Explicable-Implicit ≡ propositional knowledge that hasn’t been openly formulated by the agent. Inexplicable ≡ non-propositional knowledge, i.e. knowledge that cannot, even in principle, be formulated as a set of propositions. Also accept the following definition of implicit: Implicit ≡ not explicit. [Sciento-2018-0012]: Accept that propositional technological knowledge – i.e. technological questions, theories, and methods – can be part of a mosaic. Also accept the following questions as legitimate topics of scientonomic inquiry: History of Technological Mosaics: What technological theories were accepted and what technological methods were employed by different epistemic agents at different time periods? The Status of Inexplicable Knowledge: Is there such a thing as inexplicable knowledge? Typology of Technological Knowledge: What types of technological knowledge are there?