scholarly journals Reasons in the Scientonomic Ontology

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 15-31
Author(s):  
Kye Palider
Keyword(s):  
Central Area ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Second Law ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Basing Relation ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Theory Acceptance

The question of how we come to accept new theories is a central area of inquiry in scientonomic discourse. However, there has yet to be a formal discussion of the subjective reasons an agent may have for accepting theories. This paper explores these epistemic reasons and constructs a historically sensitive definition of reason. This formulation takes an abstractionist stance towards the ontology of reasons and makes use of a composite basing relation. The descriptive and normative components of reasons are fully formulated in scientonomic terms through the application of the newly introduced notion of implication, and its separation from the notion of inference. In addition, the paper provides scientonomic definitions for sufficient reason, support, and normative inference. The fruitfulness of this formulation of reasons is illustrated by a few examples. Suggested Modifications [Sciento-2019-0009]: Accept the following definition of implication: Implication ≡ a logical transition from one theory to another. [Sciento-2019-0010]: Accept the following definitions of sufficient reason, reason, support, and normative inference: Sufficient Reason ≡ an agent takes theory A to be a sufficient reason for (accepting) theory B iff the following four conditions are met: (1) The agent accepts A. (2) The agent accepts that A→B. (3) The agent employs ε. (4) The agent accepts (ε, A, A→B) →ε (Should accept B). Support ≡ an agent takes theory A to be supporting theory B iff the agent accepts A and accepts that A→B. Reason ≡ an agent takes theory A to be a reason for theory B iff the agent accepts that A→B, employs ε, and accepts (ε, A, A→B) →ε (Should accept B). Normative Inference ≡ An agent takes theory A to normatively infer theory B iff the agent accepts A, accepts that A→B, and accepts (ε, A, A→B) →ε (Should accept B). [Sciento-2019-0011]: Provided that modification [Sciento-2019-0010] is accepted, accept the sufficient reason theorem and its deduction from the definition of sufficient reason and the second law: Sufficient Reason theorem: a theory becomes accepted by an agent, when an agent has a sufficient reason for accepting it. Accept the following question as a legitimate topic of scientonomic inquiry: Theory Acceptance without Sufficient Reason: how do theories become accepted without a sufficient reason, i.e. in the cases of circularity or theories without a reason?

scholarly journals Reformulating the Second Law

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 29-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Patton ◽  
Nicholas Overgaard ◽  
Hakob Barseghyan
Keyword(s):  
Second Law ◽  
Causal Connection ◽  
Acceptance Criteria ◽  
Current Formulation ◽  
Previous Formulation ◽  
Previous Definition ◽  
Assessment Outcomes ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
New Formulation ◽  
Theory Acceptance

The current formulation of the second law is flawed since it does not specify the causal relations between the outcomes of theory assessment and the actual acceptance/unacceptance of a theory; it merely tells us that a theory was assessed by the method employed at the time. We propose a new formulation of the second law: “If a theory satisfies the acceptance criteria of the method actually employed at the time, then it becomes accepted into the mosaic; if it does not, it remains unaccepted; if it is inconclusive whether the theory satisfies the method, the theory can be accepted or not accepted.” This new formulation makes the causal connection between theory assessment outcomes and cases of theory acceptance/unacceptance explicit. Also, this new formulation is not a tautology because it forbids certain logically possible scenarios, such as a theory satisfying the method of the time yet remaining unaccepted. Finally, we outline what inferences an observational scientonomist can make regarding theory assessment outcomes from the record of accepted theories.Suggested Modifications[Sciento-2017-0004]:Accept the following reformulation of the second law:The second law: if a theory satisfies the acceptance criteria of the method employed at the time, it becomes accepted into the mosaic; if it does not, it remains unaccepted; if assessment is inconclusive, the theory can be accepted or not accepted.Accept the following definitions of theory assessment outcomes:Outcome: satisfied ≡ the theory is deemed to conclusively meet the requirements of the method employed at the time.Outcome: not satisfied ≡ the theory is deemed to conclusively not meet the requirements of the method employed at the time.Outcome: inconclusive ≡ it is unclear whether or not the requirements of the method employed at the time are met.Accept the following ontology of theory assessment outcomes:The three possible outcomes of theory assessment are “satisfied”, “not satisfied”, and “inconclusive”.Accept the following redefinition of employed method:Employed method ≡ a method is said to be employed if its requirements constitute the actual expectations of the community.Reject:The previous formulation of the second law.The previous definitions of theory assessment outcomes.The previous ontology of theory assessment outcomes.The previous definition of employed method. [Sciento-2017-0005]:Contingent upon the acceptance of the preceding modification [Sciento-2017-0004], accept that the new second law is not a tautology. [Sciento-2017-0006]:Contingent upon the acceptance of modification [Sciento-2017-0004], accept the following set of inferences of theory assessment outcomes from the acceptance or unacceptance of a single contender (see text).Also accept the following set of inferences of theory assessment outcomes from the acceptance or unacceptance of two contender theories (see text).

Reactions in solution

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis Sherwood ◽  
Paul Dalby
Keyword(s):  
Phase Equilibria ◽  
Gas Phase ◽  
First Principles ◽  
Unique Feature ◽  
Life Sciences ◽  
Equilibrium Mixture ◽  
Second Law ◽  
Ideal Solution ◽  
Coupled Reactions ◽  
Definition Of

Another key chapter, examining reactions in solution. Starting with the definition of an ideal solution, and then introducing Raoult’s law and Henry’s law, this chapter then draws on the results of Chapter 14 (gas phase equilibria) to derive the corresponding results for equilibria in an ideal solution. A unique feature of this chapter is the analysis of coupled reactions, once again using first principles to show how the coupling of an endergonic reaction to a suitable exergonic reaction results in an equilibrium mixture in which the products of the endergonic reaction are present in much higher quantity. This demonstrates how coupled reactions can cause entropy-reducing events to take place without breaking the Second Law, so setting the scene for the future chapters on applications of thermodynamics to the life sciences, especially chapter 24 on bioenergetics.

scholarly journals The Status of Questions in the Ontology of Scientific Change

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
William Rawleigh
Keyword(s):  
Basic Element ◽  
Scientific Change ◽  
Semantic Structure ◽  
Epistemic Agent ◽  
Distinct Class ◽  
Epistemic Stance ◽  
The Status ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Theory Acceptance ◽  
Scientific Questions

The currently accepted scientonomic ontology includes two classes of epistemic elements – theories and methods. However, the ontology underlying the Encyclopedia of Scientonomy includes questions/topics as a basic element of its semantic structure. Ideally there should be no discrepancy between the accepted ontology of theoretical scientonomy and that of the Encyclopedia.  I argue that questions constitute a distinct class of epistemic elements as they are not reducible to other elements that undergo scientific change – theories or methods. I discuss and reject two attempts at reducing questions to either descriptive or normative theories. According to the descriptive-epistemic account, scientific questions can be logically reduced to descriptive propositions, while according to the normative-epistemic account, they can be reduced to normative propositions. I show that these interpretations are incapable of capturing the propositional content expressed by questions; any possible reduction is carried at the expense of losing the essential characteristic of questions. Further, I find that the attempts to reduce questions to theories introduce an infinite regress, where a theory is an attempt to answer a question, which is itself a theory which answers another question, ad infintum. Instead, I propose to incorporate the question-answer semantic structure from erotetic logic in which questions constitute a distinct class of elements irreducible to propositions. An acceptance of questions into scientonomic ontology as a separate class of epistemic elements suggests a new avenue of research into the mechanism of question acceptance and rejection, i.e. how epistemic communities come to accept certain questions as legitimate and others as illegitimate. Suggested Modifications [Sciento-2018-0001]: Accept the following definition of question: Question ≡ a topic of inquiry. [Sciento-2018-0002]: Accept the ontology of epistemic elements with theories, methods, and questions as distinct epistemic elements. Reject the previously accepted ontology of epistemic elements. [Sciento-2018-0003]: Provided that modification [Sciento-2018-0002] is accepted, accept that the epistemic stance that can be taken by an epistemic agent towards a question is question acceptance (the opposite is unacceptance), defined as follows:  Question Acceptance ≡ a question is said to be accepted if it is taken as a legitimate topic of inquiry. [Sciento-2018-0004]: Provided that modifications [Sciento-2018-0002] and [Sciento-2018-0003] are accepted, accept the following question as legitimate topics of scientonomic inquiry:  Mechanism of Question Acceptance: How do questions become accepted as legitimate? What is the mechanism of question acceptance?  Indicators of Question Acceptance: What are the historical indicators of theory acceptance? How can observational scientonomists establish that such-and-such a question was accepted as a legitimate topic of inquiry by a certain epistemic agent at a certain time?

Can there Be Epistemic Reasons for Action?

2006 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Robert Booth
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Basing Relation

In this paper I consider whether there can be such things as epistemic reasons for action. I consider three arguments to the contrary and argue that none are successful, being either somewhat question-begging or too strong by ruling out what most epistemologists think is a necessary feature of epistemic justification, namely the epistemic basing relation. I end by suggesting a "non-cognitivist" model of epistemic reasons that makes room for there being epistemic reasons for action and suggest that this model may support moral realism.

God

2019 ◽  
pp. 53-73
Author(s):  
Martin Lin
Keyword(s):  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
The Third ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Way

This chapter offers reconstructions of Spinoza’s four arguments for the existence of God. Among the lessons learned from these reconstructions is that, although Spinoza’s first argument is often described as ontological, it relies on many substantive premises that go beyond the definition of God and it is not vulnerable to standard objections to ontological arguments. Additionally, the second argument introduces Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason, and seeing how Spinoza applies it to the existence of God sheds light on how he understands both the PSR and causation and explanation more generally. The chapter concludes by arguing that the third and fourth arguments pave the way for Spinoza’s claim that, besides God, no substance can be or be conceived and consideration of them shows why Spinoza’s argument for monism does not beg the question against the orthodox Cartesian.

The Categorical Imperative and Not Being Unworthy of the Event: Ethics in Deleuze's Difference and Repetition

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-135
Author(s):  
Leonard Lawlor
Keyword(s):  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Good Sense ◽  
Moral Purpose ◽  
The Third ◽  
Intensive Quantities ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Way

This essay starts from a consideration of Deleuze's theory of time. It begins with the empty form of time. But the essay's aim is to understand Deleuze's reversal of Platonism in his 1968 Difference and Repetition. There is no question that the stakes of the reversal of Platonism are ontological. But I argue that what is really at stake is a movement of demoralisation. The essay proceeds in three steps. First, we determine what sufficient reason or grounding is, for Deleuze. Sufficient reason is struck with an irreducible ambiguity. It is this ambiguity in sufficient reason that allows it to be taken advantage of, to be used by representation and good sense for a moral purpose. The second part of the essay will therefore concern ‘the moralisation of sufficient reason’. Its focus will be good sense. But then, third, we must understand Deleuze's ‘demoralisation of sufficient reason’, which necessarily passes through others. Like sufficient reason, others are ambiguous, at once lending themselves to what cancels differences, and opening the way towards difference and intensity. The third step focuses on what Deleuze calls ‘the ethics of intensive quantities’. In the Conclusion, I examine Deleuze's famous, almost cliché, definition of ethics as not being unworthy of the event and, through the empty form of time, I connect it to Kant's formalistic ethics.

Identical thermodynamical processes and the generalization of the Clausius inequality

2008 ◽  
Vol 86 (2) ◽  
pp. 369-377 ◽  
Author(s):  
J Anacleto ◽  
J M Ferreira ◽  
A Anacleto
Keyword(s):  
Second Law ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Thermodynamical Processes ◽  
Clausius Inequality

We stress the advantages of heat and work reservoirs in the formalism of Thermodynamics and using an illustrative example show the need to reformulate the concepts of heat and work to avoid inconsistencies, namely, with regard to the Second Law. To deal with this problem, we use the concept of identical thermodynamical processes and obtain the condition for two such processes to be identical even when the system neighbourhood as a whole cannot be treated as a reservoir. The aforementioned concept is then applied to obtain a standardized definition of heat and work as well as a generalization of the well-known Clausius inequality. Finally, we return to the example given earlier to corroborate the effectiveness of our results.PACS Nos.: 05.70.–a, 44.90.+c, 65.40.Gr

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