scholarly journals Causal topology and non-material causes

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 575-585
Author(s):  
Alexey Vladimirovich Safronov
Keyword(s):  
Material Property ◽  
Mental Causation ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Mental Processes ◽  
Hypothetical Model ◽  
Neural Processes ◽  
Causal Closure ◽  
Causality Model ◽  
The Brain ◽  
State Of Activity

The principle of physical causal closure makes the problem of the ontology of consciousness insoluble since the principle rejects the possibility of mental causation. However, this principle is based on the linear causality model the foundation of which is the connection of material events with each other. The article deals with the possibility of mental causation based on non-material events, reflecting the influence of probability on probability, and not an event on an event. A hypothetical model is considered, in which one state of activity of neural processes in the brain can correspond to various mental states that differ from each other, however, not content-wise but within the framework of a non-material property. The non-material property is defined as the likelihood of mental assessments and, in essence, is the causal topology of mental processes.

Individual Differences in Conceptions of Soul, Mind, and Brain

2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 157-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marjaana Lindeman ◽  
Tapani Riekki ◽  
Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Large Individual ◽  
Mental Processes ◽  
Lay Conceptions ◽  
Paranormal Beliefs ◽  
Mind And Brain ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

We examined how people see the role of the brain, the mind, and the soul in biological, psychobiological, and mental states. Three clusters of participants were identified. The monists attributed biological, psychobiological, and mental processes only to the brain, the emergentists attributed the processes to the brain and to the mind, and the spiritualists attributed the processes to the brain, the mind, and the soul. Most participants attributed all states more to the brain than to the mind or soul. Beliefs, desires, and emotions were thought of as more likely to continue after death than other states, but belief in immortal souls was rare and only found among those who also held religious and paranormal beliefs. The results indicate that laypeople may see beliefs, desires, and emotions as both states of the mind, of the soul, and of the brain; that there are large individual differences in how the concept of the soul is understood, and that in lay conceptions, the idea that the processes of mind are processes of brain does not exclude supernatural brain-soul dualism.

Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology

1980 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. Fodor
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental Representations ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Research Strategy ◽  
Computational Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental Processes ◽  
Computational Theory ◽  
Methodological Solipsism ◽  
Semantic Properties

AbstractThe paper explores the distinction between two doctrines, both of which inform theory construction in much of modern cognitive psychology: the representational theory of mind and the computational theory of mind. According to the former, propositional attitudes are to be construed as relations that organisms bear to mental representations. According to the latter, mental processes have access only to formal (nonsemantic) properties of the mental representations over which they are defined.The following claims are defended: (1) That the traditional dispute between “rational” and “naturalistic” psychology is plausibly viewed as an argument about the status of the computational theory of mind. Rational psychologists accept a formality condition on the specification of mental processes; naturalists do not. (2) That to accept the formality condition is to endorse a version of methodological solipsism. (3) That the acceptance of some such condition is warranted, at least for that part of psychology which concerns itself with theories of the mental causation of behavior. This is because: (4) such theories require nontransparent taxonomies of mental states; and (5) nontransparent taxonomies individuate mental states without reference to their semantic properties. Equivalently, (6) nontransparent taxonomies respect the way that the organism represents the object of its propositional attitudes to itself, and it is this representation which functions in the causation of behavior.The final section of the paper considers the prospect for a naturalistic psychology: one which defines its generalizations over relations between mental representations and their environmental causes, thus seeking to account for the semantic properties of propositional attitudes. Two related arguments are proposed, both leading to the conclusion that no such research strategy is likely to prove fruitful.

Еnactivist Criticism of the Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness

2021 ◽  
pp. 76-80
Author(s):  
Anastasia O. Shabalina ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Science Methods ◽  
Neural Processes ◽  
Neural Substrate ◽  
Critical Revision ◽  
Concept Of Information ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Person Experience

The article considers the main arguments against the neurobiological theory of consciousness from the point of view of the enactivist approach within the philosophy of mind. The neurobiological theory of consciousness, which reduces consciousness to neural activity, is currently the dominant approach to the mind-body problem. The neurobiological theory emerged as a result of advances in research on the phenomena of consciousness and through the development of technologies for visualizing the internal processes of mind. However, at the very heart of this theory, there is a number of logical contradictions. The non-reductive enactivist approach to consciousness, introduced in this article, contributes to the existing argumentation against the reduction of consciousness to neural processes with remonstrations that take into account the modern neuroscientific data. The article analyzes the argumentation of the sensorimotor enactivism developed by A. Noe and offers the account of the teleosemantic approach to the concept of information provided by R. Cao. The key problems of the neurobiological theory of consciousness are highlighted, and the objections emerging within the framework of the enactivist approach are analyzed. Since the main concepts on which the neural theory is based are the concepts of neural substrate, cognition as representation, and information as a unit of cognition, the author of the article presents three key enactivist ideas that oppose them. First, the enactivist concept of cognition as action allows us to consider the first-person experience as a mode of action, and not as a state of the brain substrate. Second, the article deals with the “explanatory externalism” argument proposed by Noe, who refutes the image of cognition as a representation in the brain. Finally, in order to critically revise the concept of information as a unit of cognition, the author analyzes Cao’s idea, which represents a teleosemantic approach, but is in line with the general enactivist argumentation. Cao shows that the application of the concept “information” to neural processes is problematic: no naturalized information is found in the brain as a physical substrate. A critical revision of beliefs associated with the neural theory of consciousness leads us to recognize that there are not enough grounds for reducing consciousness to processes that take place in the brain. That is why Noe calls expectations that the visualization of processes taking place in the brain with the help of the modern equipment will be able to depict the experience of consciousness the “new phrenology”, thus indicating the naive character of neural reduction. The article concludes that natural science methods are insufficient for the study of consciousness.

scholarly journals Neuropsychological aspects of psychogenic nonepileptic seizures

2007 ◽  
Vol 13 (4 suppl 1) ◽  
pp. 24-27
Author(s):  
Mirna Wetters Portuguez ◽  
Danielle Irigoyen da Costa ◽  
Sabine Possa Marroni ◽  
Vanessa Pagliarini ◽  
Karin Vieira
Keyword(s):  
Sexual Abuse ◽  
Physical Abuse ◽  
Multidisciplinary Team ◽  
Emotional Abuse ◽  
Epileptic Seizures ◽  
Mental Processes ◽  
Psychogenic Nonepileptic Seizures ◽  
Therapeutic Procedures ◽  
Nonepileptic Seizures ◽  
The Brain

Psychogenic nonepileptic seizures (PNES) may be defined as paroxysmal changes in behavior that are similar to epileptic seizures but are not associated with quantifiable alterations in the electrical activity of the brain. At the Epilepsy Surgery Program (ESP) of the São Lucas Hospital at PUCRS (HSL-PUCRS), we studied 52 individuals (37 females and 15 males) with a diagnosis of PNES, associated (57%) or not (23%) with refractory epileptic seizures. We found emotional abuse (100%), physical abuse (80%), emotional neglect (80%), physical negligence (70%) and sexual abuse (30%), mood (40%) and anxiety disorders (50%), as the main psychological components in such population. Although the medical and psychosocial impact of PNES can be estimated as significant, the absence of specialized services for its treatment is striking. Multiple diagnostic and therapeutic procedures and the participation of a specialized multidisciplinary team – where neuropsychology functions as a link between the mental processes/psychopathologies and the brain – are required to ensure proper management of such cases.

scholarly journals Harmonic Brain Modes: A Unifying Framework for Linking Space and Time in Brain Dynamics

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Selen Atasoy ◽  
Gustavo Deco ◽  
Morten L. Kringelbach ◽  
Joel Pearson
Keyword(s):  
Neural Activity ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Activity Patterns ◽  
Structural Connectivity ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Brain Dynamics ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Brain

A fundamental characteristic of spontaneous brain activity is coherent oscillations covering a wide range of frequencies. Interestingly, these temporal oscillations are highly correlated among spatially distributed cortical areas forming structured correlation patterns known as the resting state networks, although the brain is never truly at “rest.” Here, we introduce the concept of harmonic brain modes—fundamental building blocks of complex spatiotemporal patterns of neural activity. We define these elementary harmonic brain modes as harmonic modes of structural connectivity; that is, connectome harmonics, yielding fully synchronous neural activity patterns with different frequency oscillations emerging on and constrained by the particular structure of the brain. Hence, this particular definition implicitly links the hitherto poorly understood dimensions of space and time in brain dynamics and its underlying anatomy. Further we show how harmonic brain modes can explain the relationship between neurophysiological, temporal, and network-level changes in the brain across different mental states ( wakefulness, sleep, anesthesia, psychedelic). Notably, when decoded as activation of connectome harmonics, spatial and temporal characteristics of neural activity naturally emerge from the interplay between excitation and inhibition and this critical relation fits the spatial, temporal, and neurophysiological changes associated with different mental states. Thus, the introduced framework of harmonic brain modes not only establishes a relation between the spatial structure of correlation patterns and temporal oscillations (linking space and time in brain dynamics), but also enables a new dimension of tools for understanding fundamental principles underlying brain dynamics in different states of consciousness.

scholarly journals II. Experimental researches on the temperature of the head

1878 ◽  
Vol 27 (185-189) ◽  
pp. 166-177 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Present Communication ◽  
Experimental Researches ◽  
The Brain

The present communication forms an abstract of the first portion of a series of investigations having the following primary objects in view:— 1st. To find out, as far as possible, the normal relative temperatures of different portions of the surface of the head, when the brain is comparatively inactive. 2nd. To study the effect of different mental states upon the different portions of the surface of the head previously examined in the condition of comparative cerebral inactivity.

scholarly journals Ecstasy from a physiological point of view

1982 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 74-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaj Björkqvist
Keyword(s):  
Religious Tradition ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Body ◽  
Biological Study ◽  
Physiological Basis ◽  
Slowing Down ◽  
Psychosomatic Diseases ◽  
The Brain

The biological study of man is one of today's most rapidly advancing sciences. There is no reason for not utilizing these methodologies of research and the knowledge already gained when studying ecstasy and other similar religious phenomena. Drugs have been used in all parts of the world as an ecstasy technique. Since mental states and physiological correlates always accompany each other, it is obvious that the human mind can be affected by external means, for instance by drugs. But the opposite is also true; mental changes affect the body, as they do in the case of psychosomatic diseases. Ecstasy is often described as an extremely joyful experience; this pleasure must necessarily also have a physiological basis. It is of course too early to say anything for certain, but the discovery of pleasure centres in the brain might offer an explanation. It is not far-fetched to suggest that when a person experiences euphoric ecstasy, it might, in some way or other, be connected with a cerebral pleasure center. Can it be, for example, that religious ecstasy is attained only by some mechanism triggering off changes in the balance of the transmitter substances? Or is it reached only via a change in the hormonal balance, or only by a slowing down of the brain waves, or is a pleasure centre activated? When a person is using an ecstasy technique, he usually does so within a religious tradition. When he reaches an experience, a traditional interpretation of it already exists.

scholarly journals Scale-Free Coupled Dynamics in Brain Networks Captured by Bivariate Focus-Based Multifractal Analysis

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Orestis Stylianou ◽  
Frigyes Samuel Racz ◽  
Andras Eke ◽  
Peter Mukli
Keyword(s):  
Resting State ◽  
Functional Coupling ◽  
Dependent Manner ◽  
Coupled Dynamics ◽  
Scale Free ◽  
Neural Processes ◽  
Eeg Recordings ◽  
Cortical Regions ◽  
The Brain

While most connectivity studies investigate functional connectivity (FC) in a scale-dependent manner, coupled neural processes may also exhibit broadband dynamics, manifesting as power-law scaling of their measures of interdependence. Here we introduce the bivariate focus-based multifractal (BFMF) analysis as a robust tool for capturing such scale-free relations and use resting-state electroencephalography (EEG) recordings of 12 subjects to demonstrate its performance in reconstructing physiological networks. BFMF was employed to characterize broadband FC between 62 cortical regions in a pairwise manner, with all investigated connections being tested for true bivariate multifractality. EEG channels were also grouped to represent the activity of six resting-state networks (RSNs) in the brain, thus allowing for the analysis of within- and between- RSNs connectivity, separately. Most connections featured true bivariate multifractality, which could be attributed to the genuine scale-free coupling of neural dynamics. Bivariate multifractality showed a characteristic topology over the cortex that was highly concordant among subjects. Long-term autocorrelation was higher in within-RSNs, while the degree of multifractality was generally found stronger in between-RSNs connections. These results offer statistical evidence of the bivariate multifractal nature of functional coupling in the brain and validate BFMF as a robust method to capture such scale-independent coupled dynamics.

scholarly journals A causal study of bumetanide on a marker of excitatory-inhibitory balance in the human brain

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas L. Botch ◽  
Alina Spiegel ◽  
Catherine Ricciardi ◽  
Caroline E. Robertson
Keyword(s):  
Human Brain ◽  
Binocular Rivalry ◽  
Response Times ◽  
Autism Spectrum ◽  
Autism Spectrum Conditions ◽  
Placebo Control ◽  
Acute Administration ◽  
Neural Processes ◽  
Within Subjects ◽  
The Brain

AbstractBumetanide has received much interest as a potential pharmacological modulator of the putative imbalance in excitatory/inhibitory (E/I) signaling that is thought to characterize autism spectrum conditions. Yet, currently, no studies of bumetanide efficacy have used an outcome measure that is modeled to depend on E/I balance in the brain. In this manuscript, we present the first causal study of the effect of bumetanide on an objective marker of E/I balance in the brain, binocular rivalry, which we have previously shown to be sensitive to pharmacological manipulation of GABA. Using a within-subjects placebo-control crossover design study, we show that, contrary to expectation, acute administration of bumetanide does not alter binocular rivalry dynamics in neurotypical adult individuals. Neither changes in response times nor response criteria can account for these results. These results raise important questions about the efficacy of acute bumetanide administration for altering E/I balance in the human brain, and highlight the importance of studies using objective markers of the underlying neural processes that drugs hope to target.

scholarly journals Values Encoded in Orbitofrontal Cortex Are Causally Related to Economic Choices

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sébastien Ballesta ◽  
Weikang Shi ◽  
Katherine E. Conen ◽  
Camillo Padoa-Schioppa
Keyword(s):  
Electrical Stimulation ◽  
Neuronal Activity ◽  
Orbitofrontal Cortex ◽  
Rhesus Monkeys ◽  
Fundamental Issue ◽  
High Current ◽  
Neural Processes ◽  
Economic Choices ◽  
The Brain

AbstractIt has long been hypothesized that economic choices rely on the assignment and comparison of subjective values. Indeed, when agents make decisions, neurons in orbitofrontal cortex encode the values of offered and chosen goods. Moreover, neuronal activity in this area suggests the formation of a decision. However, it is unclear whether these neural processes are causally related to choices. More generally, the evidence linking economic choices to value signals in the brain remains correlational. We address this fundamental issue using electrical stimulation in rhesus monkeys. We show that suitable currents bias choices by increasing the value of individual offers. Furthermore, high-current stimulation disrupts both the computation and the comparison of subjective values. These results demonstrate that values encoded in orbitofrontal cortex are causal to economic choices.

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