scholarly journals Practical Intersubjectivity and Normative Guidance: Bratman on Shared Agency

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-48
Author(s):  
Abraham Sesshu Roth
Keyword(s):  
Power Sharing ◽  
Interpersonal Coordination ◽  
Shared Intention ◽  
Interesting Issue ◽  
Michael Bratman ◽  
Individual Planning ◽  
Shared Agency

AbstractIn an important new book on shared agency, Michael Bratman develops an account of the normative demand for the coordination of intentions amongst participants in shared agency. Bratman seeks to understand this form of normative guidance in terms of that associated with individual planning intentions. I give reasons to resist his form of reductionism. In addition, I note how Bratman’s discussion raises the interesting issue of the function or purpose of shared intention and of shared agency more generally. According to Bratman, the function of shared intention is to promote interpersonal coordination of intention and action. I suggest that power sharing amongst participants must also be included as a function of shared intention.

Bratman on shared intention

SATS ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-181
Author(s):  
Christian Kietzmann
Keyword(s):  
Human Agency ◽  
Shared Intention ◽  
Individual Agency ◽  
Michael Bratman ◽  
Single Person ◽  
Analytic Strategy ◽  
Individual Planning ◽  
Main Components ◽  
Shared Agency ◽  
Central Claim

AbstractIn work that spans almost four decades, Michael Bratman has developed a rich account of human agency. At the centre of this account lies an understanding of intentions as individual planning states. A significant strand in this enterprise has been his work on shared agency, culminating in his 2014 monograph, which aims to extend his account of individual agency to cover cases of what he calls “modest sociality”, i.e. simple cases of acting together. Central to this endeavour is Bratman’s analysis of shared intention, which for him is not asui generisphenomenon, but can be understood in terms of his concept of individual agency, as the main components of his account of shared intention are already available in his account of the intentions of a single person.In this paper, I want to critically examine Bratman’s approach to shared intention. I will proceed as follows: In Section 1, I will describe the analytic strategy that guides Bratman’s analysis. Section 2 will introduce his central claim that the fulfilment of a list of conditions suffices for a shared intention to be present. In Sections 3 to 5, I will discuss and criticise some of these conditions. In Section 6, I will draw some positive conclusions from my critical arguments.

scholarly journals Two Approaches to Shared Intention: An Essay in the Philosophy of Social Phenomena

2008 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Gilbert
Keyword(s):  
Shared Intention ◽  
Social Phenomena ◽  
Michael Bratman ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Common ◽  
Technical Terms

AbstractDrawing on earlier work of the author that is both clarified and amplified here, this article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In short, what is it for people to share an intention? It argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people share an intention when and only when they are jointly committed to intend as a body to do such-and-such in the future. This account is compared and contrasted with the common approach that treats shared intention as a matter of the correlative personal intentions, with particular reference to the work of Michael Bratman.

scholarly journals Shared Agency in Modest Sociality

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirk Ludwig
Keyword(s):  
Planning Theory ◽  
Michael Bratman ◽  
Shared Agency

AbstractA contribution to a symposium on Michael Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together.

scholarly journals Modest Sociality: Continuities and Discontinuities

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisabeth Pacherie
Keyword(s):  
Small Scale ◽  
Individual Agency ◽  
Planning Agency ◽  
Intentional Agency ◽  
Individual Planning ◽  
Shared Agency ◽  
Central Claim

AbstractA central claim in Michael Bratman’s account of shared agency is that there need be no radical conceptual, metaphysical or normative discontinuity between robust forms of small-scale shared intentional agency, i.e., modest sociality, and individual planning agency. What I propose to do is consider another potential discontinuity, whose existence would throw doubt on his contention that the structure of a robust form of modest sociality is entirely continuous with structures at work in individual planning agency. My main point will be that he may be wrong in assuming that the basic cognitive infrastructure sufficient to support individual agency doesn’t have to be supplemented in significant ways to support shared agency.

We-Narratives and the Stability and Depth of Shared Agency

2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deborah Tollefsen ◽  
Shaun Gallagher
Keyword(s):  
Joint Action ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
The Self ◽  
Shared Intention ◽  
Basic Approach ◽  
Intentional States ◽  
Joint Actions ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Shared Agency

The basic approach to understanding shared agency (or joint action) has been to identify individual intentional states that are somehow “shared” by participants and that contribute to guiding and informing the actions of individual participants. But, as Michael Bratman suggests, there is a problem of stability and depth that any theory of shared agency needs to solve. Given that participants in a joint action might form shared intentions for different reasons, what binds them to one another such that they have some reason for continuing to participate in the joint action in the face of conflicting reasons? This is particularly pressing in cases of joint actions that unfold over long periods of time. There are a variety of ways that the problem of stability and depth of shared intention might be addressed. We review some of those ways in section 1. We do not intend to challenge these approaches. Instead, in this article, we want to suggest that narrative is an additional, perhaps in some cases a predominant, way in which stability and depth are achieved. According to some theories, narrative plays a crucial role in the development of the self. Our suggestion is that the narratives we tell about our joint projects contribute to the development of a stable and deep “we.”

scholarly journals Shared Agency Without Shared Intention

2020 ◽  
Vol 70 (281) ◽  
pp. 665-688
Author(s):  
Samuel Asarnow
Keyword(s):  
Social Interactions ◽  
Great Apes ◽  
Shared Intention ◽  
Small Children ◽  
Agency Model ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
The Social ◽  
Psychological Capacities ◽  
Shared Agency ◽  
Reductive Account

Abstract The leading reductive approaches to shared agency model that phenomenon in terms of complexes of individual intentions, understood as plan-laden commitments. Yet not all agents have such intentions, and non-planning agents such as small children and some non-human animals are clearly capable of sophisticated social interactions. But just how robust are their social capacities? Are non-planning agents capable of shared agency? Existing theories of shared agency have little to say about these important questions. I address this lacuna by developing a reductive account of the social capacities of non-planning agents, which I argue supports the conclusion that they can enjoy shared agency. The resulting discussion offers a fine-grained account of the psychological capacities that can underlie shared agency, and produces a recipe for generating novel hypotheses concerning why some agents (including, arguably, the great apes) do not engage in shared agency.

A hard choice for Tomasello

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Pettit
Keyword(s):  
Joint Action ◽  
The Other ◽  
Hard Choice ◽  
Margaret Gilbert ◽  
Michael Bratman ◽  
Human Sense ◽  
Sense Of Obligation

Abstract Michael Tomasello explains the human sense of obligation by the role it plays in negotiating practices of acting jointly and the commitments they underwrite. He draws in his work on two models of joint action, one from Michael Bratman, the other from Margaret Gilbert. But Bratman's makes the explanation too difficult to succeed, and Gilbert's makes it too easy.

Power Sharing and Democracy in Post-Civil War States

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline A. Hartzell ◽  
Matthew Hoddie
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Power Sharing

Governing Diversity: Reflections on the Doctrine and Tradition of Religious Accommodation in Islam

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dr. Muhammad Mushtaq ◽  
Muhammad Riaz Mahmood
Keyword(s):  
Power Sharing ◽  
Primary Concern ◽  
Peaceful Coexistence ◽  
Religious Traditions ◽  
Faith Based ◽  
Religious Accommodation ◽  
Pluralistic Approach ◽  
Inclusive Governance ◽  
Multicultural Policies ◽  
Islamic Values

The problématique of governing diversity has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention but literature has largely overlooked the challenges appertaining to growing religious diversity in many places. The contemporary power sharing models and multicultural policies which are of a secular nature fall short of the expectations to foster peaceful coexistence in multi-religious societies. The primary concern of this paper is to manifest how religion can help us to lessen faith based violence. It is argued that religious traditions may offer valuable insights to design more inclusive governance. In this backdrop, the current paper evaluates the Islamic values of religious accommodation to gauge how helpful they are for designing inclusive policies in religiously diverse societies. The analysis illustrates that Islamic doctrine contemplates the politics of accommodation and forbearance. The pluralistic approach of Islam offered religious autonomy to non-Muslims in the state of Madinah. The ‘millet system’ established by the Ottoman Empire is widely admired for granting non-territorial autonomy in the matters related to religion, culture, and personal laws to non-Muslims. This display of an Islamic pluralistic approach at different junctures of Muslim history attests the capacity of the Islamic values of accommodation to nurture peaceful coexistence in modern societies. However, it requires a more unbiased and rigorous analysis to convince the global audience in this regard.

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