scholarly journals A Ontologia Social Analítica: Por uma Interlocução com a Teoria Sociológica

Dados ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Eduardo Sell
Keyword(s):  
John Searle ◽  
Margaret Gilbert ◽  
Michael Bratman

RESUMO O propósito deste artigo é aproximar as discussões da filosofia social analítica do movimento de virada ontológica que ocorre hoje nas Ciências Sociais. Com esse fim, apresentam-se alguns dos autores mais representativos da ontologia social analítica sobre o tema da intencionalidade coletiva. Demonstra-se que, de forma similar ao que acontece na teoria sociológica, seus principais representantes divergem sobre a relação de prioridade entre o nível micro ou macro da realidade social, defendendo posições identificadas com o holismo (John Searle e Margaret Gilbert), o coletivismo moderado (Raimo Tuomela) ou o individualismo relacional (Michael Bratman). Defende-se que a similaridade dessa problemática com as discussões sociológicas, sobre a relação micro/macro, representa uma importante plataforma de interlocução entre estas tradições disciplinares.

A hard choice for Tomasello

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Pettit
Keyword(s):  
Joint Action ◽  
The Other ◽  
Hard Choice ◽  
Margaret Gilbert ◽  
Michael Bratman ◽  
Human Sense ◽  
Sense Of Obligation

Abstract Michael Tomasello explains the human sense of obligation by the role it plays in negotiating practices of acting jointly and the commitments they underwrite. He draws in his work on two models of joint action, one from Michael Bratman, the other from Margaret Gilbert. But Bratman's makes the explanation too difficult to succeed, and Gilbert's makes it too easy.

John Searle

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Kober ◽  
Jan G. Michel
Keyword(s):  
John Searle

Threats, Warnings, and Assertions

2019 ◽  
pp. 200-218
Author(s):  
Hallie Liberto
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
John Searle

This article explores warnings and threats through the lens of popular illocutionary taxonomies. It argues that if we tap into moral philosophy to help carve out some important distinctions between types of warnings and threats, we find that these more specific concepts do constitute illlocutions. It shows that the principles used by John Searle, Kent Bach, and John Harnish to differentiate the categories of illocutions can be employed to analyze warnings and threats. When unconditional, warnings generally have what Searle calls an assertive illocutionary point, and threats a commissive (commitment-making) illocutionary point. However, the best way to explain conditional threats or warnings is through a combination of illocutions. The article concludes by describing a specific type of threat: noncommittal threats. It argues that noncommittal threats, unlike all other threats, involve assertions.

scholarly journals The Speech Act Fallacy Fallacy

1982 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 509-526 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Hurka
Keyword(s):  
Speech Act ◽  
Illocutionary Force ◽  
The Other ◽  
John Searle ◽  
Speech Act Analysis

John Searle has charged R.M. Hare's prescriptivist analysis of the meaning of ‘good,’ ‘ought’ and the other evaluative words with committing what he calls the ‘speech act fallacy.’ This is a fallacy which Searle thinks is committed not only by Hare's analysis, but by any analysis which attributes to a word the function of indicating that a particular speech act is being performed, or that an utterance has a particular illocutionary force. ‘There is a condition of adequacy which any analysis of the meaning of a word must meet,’ Searle writes, ‘and which the speech act analysis fails to meet. Any analysis of the meaning of a word must be consistent with the fact that the same word (or morpheme) can mean the same thing in all the different kinds of sentences in which it can occur.' Hare maintains that the word ‘good’ is used to indicate the speech act of prescribing. He maintains that one of the principal functions of this word is to indicate that utterances of sentences containing it have prescriptive illocutionary force, and that an analysis of its meaning must make explicit and ineliminable reference to this force-indicating function. But ‘good’ regularly occurs in sentences utterances of which appear to have no prescriptive illocutionary force.

Intentionality, Normativity, and a Problem for Searle

Dialogue ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 703-713
Author(s):  
Michael Gorman
Keyword(s):  
John Searle ◽  
Il Y A

RésuméAu cœur de la philosophie de John Searle se trouve une compréhension biologique de l'esprit. Mais il y a une tension dans sa position. D'un côté, la biologie moderne, telle qu'il la comprend, requiert une certaine conception de la normativité. D'un autre côté, la façon dont Searle lui-même comprend l'intentìonnalité requiert une conception très différente de la normativité. Pour résoudre la difficulté, Searle devrait à la fois modifier sa compréhension de la biologie et nuancer son idée que l'esprit est un phénomène biologique comme n'importe quel autre.

Defending Derrida: A Response to Milbank and Pickstock

2001 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 344-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guy Collins
Keyword(s):  
Jacques Derrida ◽  
Academic Community ◽  
John Searle ◽  
Honorary Degree ◽  
Cambridge University ◽  
Secondary Sources ◽  
Intensity Of Emotion

The reception of Jacques Derrida in the academic community has frequently been a source of controversy. Whilst America has often been hospitable to his thought, the situation in British and even French universities has occasionally been openly hostile. Derrida arouses an intensity of emotion illustrated by the two hundred and four academics at Cambridge University who attempted to block the award of an honorary degree in 1992. Like the reaction within other disciplines, the theological response was, and remains, fissured. Leading the critics, Brian Hebblethwaite lent vocal support to Derrida's detractors. Nevertheless, Hebblethwaite's published criticisms of Derrida at the time lack either theological or philosophical arguments. Instead, his assessment reveals a knowledge of Derrida gleaned almost exclusively from secondary sources, with the exception of a lone reference to Derrida's debate with John Searle in Limited Inc.

Human Mind and Its Carriers: Is It Possible to Transform Ourselves into Robots?

2021 ◽  
pp. 105-117
Author(s):  
Vadim V. Vasilyev ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Human Person ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
John Searle ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Main Emphasis ◽  
Theories Of Mind ◽  
Continuous Stream ◽  
Previous State ◽  
The Brain

In this paper I discuss some aspects of the problem of carriers of human mind and person. The main emphasis is placed on the origin of our idea of the identi­cal self in the stream of perceptions, the need for a physical carrier of our self and person, and on possibility of replacing the biological carriers of self and per­son with artificial analogues. I argue that the idea of identical self is constructed by reflection on memories, that its truth is guaranteed by continuous stream of perceptions kept in memories, and that the stream of perceptions presupposes the presence of a normally functioning brain, which can be considered as a car­rier of our mind and person. Therefore, personal identity turns out to be depen­dent on the identity of the brain in time. An attempt to copy the structures of mind and person onto other possible carriers can thus only lead to creation of duplicates of the original person, but not to the continuation of its existence on another carrier. I argue that the gradual replacement of their components with artificial analogues is a more promising way of transforming the biological carri­ers of human person. To access the possible consequences of such a replacement I analyze arguments of John Searle and David Chalmers, designed to show, re­spectively, the disappearance of consciousness and person with such a replace­ment and, on the contrary, their preservation in a previous state. I explain why Searle’s arguments are unconvincing, and demonstrate that Chalmers’ arguments are based on a hidden premise, the confirmation of which is possible in the con­text of dubious theories of mind-body identity, epiphenomenalism or panpsy­chism only. I conclude that in the current situation it is impossible to predict which consequences for our person would follow such a replacement.

John Searle

2013 ◽  
pp. 229-231
Author(s):  
Gerard O’Regan
Keyword(s):  
John Searle

scholarly journals Can a wise society be free?

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 28-48
Author(s):  
Joshua Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Negative Argument ◽  
Margaret Gilbert ◽  
Other Hand

Recently, Margaret Gilbert has argued that it appears that the wisdom of a society impinges, greatly, on its freedom. In this article, I show that Gilbert’s “negative argument” fails to be convincing. On the other hand, there are important lessons, particularly for democratic theory, that can be by looking carefully, and critically, at her argument. This article will proceed as follows. First, I present Gilbert’s argument. Next, I criticize her understanding of freedom, and then, using arguments from Christopher McMahon, criticize her understanding of a wise society. Finally, I discuss how what has been said can inform how one should think about democratic theory.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document