Crusius über die Vernünftigkeit des Wollens und die Rolle des Urteilens

In this paper, I consider the relevance of judgment for practical considerations by discussing Christian August Crusius’s conception of rational desire. According to my interpretation of Crusius’s distinction between rational and non-rational desire, we are responsible at least for our rational desires insofar as we can control them. And we can control our rational desires by judging whether what we want complies with our human nature. It should become clear that Crusius’s conception of rational desire is normative in that we necessarily desire things that are compatible with our nature, such as our own perfection. Therefore, a desire is rational if the desired object is apt to satisfy the desires compatible with our nature. From a contemporary perspective, such a normative conception of rational desire might not appear very attractive; it is apt, however, to stimulate a debate on the normative criteria and the role of judgment for rational desire, which is the ultimate aim of this paper.

Obstacles to Freedom? Obstacles to Responsibility?

This chapter raises three puzzles for the Neoplatonists. The first concerns ignorance and knowledge. How can we be responsible for our vicious activity if all such activity is involuntary and stems from ignorance? Conversely, how can knowledgeable contemplation be free, given that contemplation depends on the thing contemplated? The second puzzle concerns desire. If our passions drag us about and prevent us from being free, why doesn’t a rational desire for the good also count as dragging us about, and enslaving us to the good? If our passions enslave us, then how can we be responsible for what we do when we act on such passions? The third puzzle concerns fate. Why is freedom compatible with subjection to causation from above, but not compatible with subjection to fate? And how can we be responsible for what we do when we are enslaved to fate?

Rationalism: A Rational Ground for Morality

Rationalists (including Butler, Price, and Reid) defend an alternative to the sentimentalist position, in three main areas: (1) Against the view that practical reason is subordinate to non-rational desire, they argue that some of our actions result from desires that are responsive to reason, so that we are guided by the apparent merits of different course of action, not just by our non-rational preferences. (2) Against the view that moral judgments depend on our emotions, and moral facts are partly constituted by our emotional reactions, they argue that moral judgments cannot be understood unless we recognize that they are rational judgments about objective facts. (3) Against the view that our moral outlook is utilitarian, they argue that utility is only one relevant moral consideration, and that we have good reason to attend to justice, generosity, and other aspects of morality that are not subordinate to utility.

Shame and Honor: Aristotle’s Thumos as a Basic Desire

One of three basic types of desire, claims Aristotle, is thumos (‘spirit,’ ‘passion,’ ‘heart,’ ‘anger,’ ‘impulse’). The other two are epithumia (‘appetite’) and boulêsis (‘wish,’ ‘rational desire’). Yet, he never gives us an account of thumos; it has also received relatively little scholarly attention. I argue that thumos has two key features. First, it is able to cognize what I call ‘social value,’ the agent’s own perceived standing relative to others in a certain domain. In human animals, shame and honor are especially important manifestations of social value. Second, thumos provides non-rational motivation to pursue what affirms the agent’s social value and avoid what denies it. Interpretations that hold thumos just is anger, or that its object is the fine (kalon), I argue, are mistaken. My account also explains the role of thumos in moral education. In a virtuous agent thumos will be affectively attuned to the correct social rankings; it will take the practically wise, the lovers of the fine, or moral exemplars, as authorities.

Grades of rational desire in the Platonic soul

The partition of the soul is used extensively, both in Book iv and in Books viii-ix of the Republic, to describe and to explain the structure, growth, and decay, of just and unjust cities and souls. Plato has in mind a single conception of the three parts of the soul, and he expounds it gradually. He recognizes different grades of rationality in desire. These grades help us to understand the roles of the partition of the soul in Plato’s argument.

Aristotle on the Starting-Point of Motion in the Soul

In Eudemian Ethics 8.2, Aristotle posits god as the starting-point of non-rational desire (particularly for the naturally fortunate), thought, and deliberation. The questions that dominate the literature are: To what does ‘god’ refer? Is it some divine-like entity in the soul that produces thoughts and desires or is it Aristotle’s prime mover? And how does god operate as the starting-point of these activities? By providing a careful reconstruction of the context in which god is evoked, I argue against the popular deflationary reading of ‘god’, showing why Aristotle’s prime mover must be the end of these natural activities, and how it serves as a final cause for the rational and desirative parts of the soul. I contend that EE 8.2 provides evidence against the traditional notion that god operates as a final cause by drawing natural potentialities to their completion, and suggests instead that it serves as a final cause by entering into the explanation of natures and natural activities as their ultimate end.