Εἰκὼςλόγος, or A rational motivation in Plato's philosophy

Plato opposed εἰκὼςμῦθος and εἰκὼςλόγος, thereby asserting the logos as the highest type of account, which revealed the strict rationality and intelligibility of the cosmos. Plato used the logos to affirm a new way of life in accordance with the intelligibility of the kalos cosmos and its copies (εἰκών) created by Theos. For Plato, therefore, dialogue as an exercise was more important than the results obtained, and for Aristotle, the discussion of problems had more educational value than their solution. Plato and Aristotle perceived the logos in the meanings of dialogue as the art of living by the highest account. They considered the logos as an opportunity to make a transition, or rather, self-transformation to the highest order, into which the idea of agathos was opened. The author argues the thesis put forward referring to the original texts of Plato. English version of the article on pp. 376-385 at URL: https://panor.ru/articles/eikslogos-or-a-rational-motivation-in-platos-philosophy/66016.html

Extremes are Typical. A Game Theoretical Derivation

In this paper we argue that a typical member of a class, or category, is an extreme, rather than a central, member of this category. Making use of a formal notion of representativeness, we can say that a typical member of a category is a stereotype of this category. In the second part of the paper we show that this account of typicality can be given a rational motivation by providing a game-theoretical derivation.

Shame and Honor: Aristotle’s Thumos as a Basic Desire

One of three basic types of desire, claims Aristotle, is thumos (‘spirit,’ ‘passion,’ ‘heart,’ ‘anger,’ ‘impulse’). The other two are epithumia (‘appetite’) and boulêsis (‘wish,’ ‘rational desire’). Yet, he never gives us an account of thumos; it has also received relatively little scholarly attention. I argue that thumos has two key features. First, it is able to cognize what I call ‘social value,’ the agent’s own perceived standing relative to others in a certain domain. In human animals, shame and honor are especially important manifestations of social value. Second, thumos provides non-rational motivation to pursue what affirms the agent’s social value and avoid what denies it. Interpretations that hold thumos just is anger, or that its object is the fine (kalon), I argue, are mistaken. My account also explains the role of thumos in moral education. In a virtuous agent thumos will be affectively attuned to the correct social rankings; it will take the practically wise, the lovers of the fine, or moral exemplars, as authorities.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR MANAGEMENT

Business is neither a new branch of science, nor a recently emerged social or political phenomenon. We are not tend to discuss the history of management as obviously this field like many other activities stimulated by human includes own origin, gained experience and a certain retrospective. A modern world has strongly developed the concept of management thus becoming an integral and manifold idea. A number of published articles, text/books, recommendations, etc. represent different levels of writing. Moreover, corrections and supplements are made to the already available management theories and conceptions the new versions of which are also successfully created. The present structure of studies at university can be hardly imagined without varying courses on the subjects related to management. For the last two decades, the majority of countries around the world have faced the young generation engaged in management sciences; after graduating secondary school, a relatively large part of the youth keep on studying management sciences, i.e. a strong tendency reveals that graduates prefer social sciences and humanities. The reasons for motivation may vary. However, more frequently expressed opinions are those stating that such choice can be simply influenced by laziness experienced by a part of students, willingness to try, overcome difficulties, etc. Despite a notable lack of professionals in the field in technological sciences in a large part of countries, quite a few learners are greatly interested in social sciences. Supposedly, such choice can be the result of the existing stereotypes and rational motivation (less complicated entry to a university, easier studies, etc.). Lengthy discussions are inappropriate due to the fact that in-depth research on dominant motifs is required. This is important because today’s young people are would-be leaders and managers and the degree of their motivation, purposeful choice and responsibility will affect not only the well-being of a certain organization but also that of particular society.

Diotima's Eudaemonism: Intrinsic Value and Rational Motivation in Plato's Symposium

This paper gives a new interpretation of the central section of Plato's Symposium (199d-212a). According to this interpretation, the term "καλóν", as used by Plato here, stands for what many contemporary philosophers call "intrinsic value"; and "love" (ερωζ) is in effect rational motivation, which for Plato consists in the desire to "possess" intrinsically valuable things – that is, according to Plato, to be happy – for as long as possible. An explanation is given of why Plato believes that "possessing" intrinsically valuable things, at least for mortals like us, consists in actively creating instantiations of the intrinsic values, both in oneself and in the external world, and in knowing and loving these intrinsic values and their instantiations. Finally, it is argued that this interpretation reveals that Plato's "eudaemonism" is a different and more defensible doctrine than many commentators believe.

The Irreducible Importance of Religious Hope in Kant's Conception of the Highest Good

Kant is clear that the concept of the ‘highest good’ involves both a demand, that we follow the moral law, as well as a promise, that happiness will be the outcome of being moral. The latter element of the highest good has troubled commentators, who tend to find it metaphysically extravagant, involving, as it does, belief in God and an afterlife. Furthermore, it seems to threaten the moral purity that Kant demands: that we obey the moral law for its own sake, not out of interest in the consequences. Those commentators brave enough to tackle the issue look to the concept of the highest good either to add content to the moral law (Silber), or to provide rational motivation, in a way that does not violate moral purity (Beiser and Wood). I argue that such interpretations, although they may be plausible reconstructions, are unable to account for certain conceptual and textual problems. By placing Kant's thought against the background of medieval theology, I argue that the hope for the summum bonum is irreducibly important for Kant, even where its function is not that of providing the content or motivational force of the moral law. Kant is not only concerned with the shape of our duties and motivations, but the shape of the universe within which these emerge.

The evolved architecture of hazard management: Risk detection reasoning and the motivational computation of threat magnitudes

The architecture of the hazard management system underlying precautionary behavior makes functional sense, given the adaptive computational problems it evolved to solve. Many seeming infelicities in its outputs, such as behavior with “apparent lack of rational motivation” or disproportionality, are susceptibilities that derive from the sheer computational difficulty posed by the problem of cost-effectively deploying countermeasures to rare, harmful threats.

Rationality and Revolution

The question of an action's rationality has two aspects: 1) the ‘appropriateness’ of the action given the beliefs held and 2) the ‘reasonableness’ of the beliefs themselves or of holding those beliefs. The former involves questions of motivation, the latter epistemology. This paper will concentrate on the former aspect of the question.One way of understanding rational motivation is so widely accepted as to seem incontrovertible to many of its proponents. This is the sense of rationality as maximization of utility. Although individual action is motivated by many things, the claim is that when behavior is rational it can be understood as an attempt to maximize utility. Rationality in this view has solely to do with means, not ends. The only restriction on an agent's ends is that they form a coherent set and whatever the content of the utility at which the agent aims, it is presumed to be open-ended. The theory is descriptive in that it says that (normal) people act this way most of the time and also normative in that behavior which does not fit the model is Judged irrational.