Ethics Through History
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Published By Oxford University Press

9780199603701, 9780191892042

2020 ◽  
pp. 188-213
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin

Kant argues that an understanding of the relation between morality and rational agency reveals the nature of moral rightness. Moral principles give us reasons for acting apart from our feeling or preferences. They give us reasons that apply to all rational agents alike. Principles that embody such reasons conform to a categorical imperative that states a universal law for all rational agents. Against critics who contend that this universal law is too general to tell us anything useful about right and wrong, Kant argues that it requires us to treat rational agents as ends in themselves, not to be sacrificed simply for the sake of other people’s goals. This attitude of mutual respect among rational agents is the basis for a moral and social order that realizes human freedom.


2020 ◽  
pp. 130-140
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin

Pufendorf criticizes Hobbes from a voluntarist point of view. He argues that if there were no divine commands, Hobbes would be right to derive morality from self-interest. Divine commands introduce the element of morality that goes beyond self-interest. Suarez is wrong, therefore, to believe in objective morality without divine commands. Shaftesbury attacks both egoists and voluntarists as ‘nominal moralists’ who overlook the objective reality of moral rightness and wrongness. Cudworth defends this position, arguing that any attempt to derive genuine morality from commands leads to a vicious regress. Clarke argues, from a position similar to Cudworth’s, that Hobbes cannot consistently maintain his view that nothing is morally right or wrong without enforcement by an organized state.


2020 ◽  
pp. 76-82
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin

Christian literature, from the New Testament onwards, pursues the main themes of ancient ethics, from the theological perspective derived from the Old Testament. Both Jewish and Christian writers defend their moral views by appeal to the natural law and natural reason that the Stoics acknowledge. The Christian Gospel does not reveal the moral law, but (1) makes us aware of how demanding it is, (2) shows us that we cannot fulfil its demands by our own unaided efforts, and (3) reveals that we can keep it through divine help that turns our free will in the right direction. These three claims underlie the Pauline and Augustinian doctrines of divine grace and human free will. Christian ethics looks forward to the ‘City of God’, which cannot be realized in human history. But it also engages with human societies in order to carry out the demands of the moral law.


2020 ◽  
pp. 34-50
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin

Aristotle agrees with Plato that virtue requires the cooperation of the rational and the non-rational parts of the soul, and that the virtuous person is always better off than the non-virtuous, even though virtue alone is not sufficient for happiness. To strengthen Plato’s argument for this claim, he offers a more detailed account of the nature of happiness, and of the relation between virtue and happiness. Since happiness is the supreme human good, it should be identified with rational activity in accordance with virtue in a complete life, in which external circumstances are favourable. A virtue of character is the appropriate agreement between the rational and the non-rational parts of the soul, aiming at fine action (i.e., action that promotes the common good). This requirement of appropriate agreement distinguishes virtue from continence (mere control of the rational over the non-rational part). To show that a life of virtue, so defined, promotes the agent’s happiness, Aristotle argues that one’s own happiness requires the right kind of friendship with others, in which one aims at the good of others for their own sake.


2020 ◽  
pp. 24-33
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin

Plato rejects Socrates’ belief that knowledge of the good is sufficient for being virtuous; he argues that human souls have a non-rational part (emotions, impulses), and that the virtues require not only knowledge, but also the correct training of the non-rational part. He rejects Socrates’ belief that virtue is sufficient for happiness. Instead he argues that the virtuous person is always happier than anyone else. He defends this view in the most difficult case, the other-regarding virtue of justice. Plato recognizes that one may plausibly argue that my justice is good for other people, but harmful to me. None the less he rejects this argument. The appropriate relation between the rational and the non-rational parts of the soul promotes both the agent’s good and the good of others; that is why the just person is happier than anyone else. Those who suppose that the just person may be worse off by being just do not understand the character of the human good.


2020 ◽  
pp. 101-108
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin

Scotus and Ockham reject the Aristotelian outlook, as Aquinas presents it, and develop a voluntarist account of the will and of morality. In their view, determination by practical reason does not ensure free will; a free will must be wholly undetermined by reason. Nor can it be determined by the desire for one’s ultimate good; the impulse towards the right is separate from the impulse towards happiness. If we apply these principles to the freedom of the divine will, we find that God could not be free if the nature of right and wrong were independent of the divine will. We must infer that moral rightness and wrongness are ultimately constituted by divine commands.


2020 ◽  
pp. 51-57
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin

Sceptics maintain that they cannot find any rational resolution of the apparent conflicts among different people’s views on ethics (among other things), and that their inability causes them to suspend judgment. In the face of variation among ethical beliefs between different people and different societies they recognize no rational grounds for forming any ethical beliefs. In drawing this conclusion from ethical variation the Sceptics disagree with Aristotle’s argument to show that variation does not undermine ethical beliefs. They claim to live without ethical beliefs, and indeed claim to achieve happiness this way, identifying happiness with the tranquillity that results from freedom from the anxiety that disturbs anyone who tries to form rational beliefs. Opponents of the Sceptics argue that life without beliefs leaves the Sceptics incapable of the sort of action that constitutes a tolerable human life.


2020 ◽  
pp. 264-278
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin

Moore’s arguments begin a debate that revives sentimentalist and rationalist arguments. According to Moore, ‘good’ is indefinable, because there is no definition of it that mentions only ‘natural’ properties. Non-naturalist objectivists argue that we know about objective moral properties, but not in the way we know about other properties. Non-cognitivists argue that goodness is not an objective property at all; when we say that something is good, we are not stating a fact about it, but expressing an emotion, or issuing some prescription. Even if objectivism is correct about the meaning of moral judgments, we may still deny that any moral judgments are true, on the ground that we have no reason to believe that there are any moral facts of the sort that objectivists claim to describe. Further discussion of these arguments against objectivism requires closer attention to the difference between moral concepts and moral properties.


2020 ◽  
pp. 232-255
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin

While Hutcheson and Hume present a utilitarian outlook, Mill and Sidgwick offer a systematic defence of it. They argue: (1) Utilitarianism makes sense of ordinary moral beliefs, so that anyone who takes these beliefs seriously has good reason to be a utilitarian. The utilitarian principle is the primary principle that explains the approximate truth of the secondary principles—ordinary moral rules. Apparent exceptions to utilitarianism—e.g., principles about justice and rights—can be reconciled with it. The hedonist theory of value—suitably interpreted—can explain the widespread view that pleasure is not the only good. (2) Utilitarianism follows from basic principles of practical reason, so that anyone who questions ordinary moral beliefs still has good reason to be a utilitarian. Once we understand that rational concern for our own interest requires us to aim at our own greatest good, without caring more or less about different times, we see that rational concern for everyone’s interest requires us to maximize the total good, without caring about whether this or that person gets more of it.


2020 ◽  
pp. 220-225
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin

Hegel believes that we can grasp the character of morality by reflexion on different aspects of the rational will. In willing we will a particular goal, but we also will it as our own goal, as the goal of a rational agent who has other ends. As rational agents we apply critical standards to the goals that we will. Kant is right to argue that morality includes these critical standards, but (as Schopenhauer argues) he is wrong to suppose that the critical standards alone give us the true content of morality. We find the correct morality in so far as we find the goals that meet the right critical standards; these are the goals that fully realize the nature of the rational agent. If we find these goals, we overcome (contrary to Schopenhauer) any opposition between self-interest and morality.


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