Cartesian Circles and the Analytic Method

The apparently circular arguments in Descartes’s Meditations should be read as analytic arguments, as Descartes himself suggested. This both explains and excuses the appearance of circularity. Analysis “digs out” what is already present in the meditator’s mind but not yet “expressly known” (Letter to Voetius). Once this is achieved, the meditator may take the result of analysis as an epistemic starting point independent of the original argument. That is, analytic arguments may be reversed to yield demonstrative proofs that follow an already worked-out order of ideas. The “Cartesian Circle,” for example, is circular only when Descartes’s original analytic argument is mistaken for the demonstration that it enables. This approach to Cartesian Circles is unlike the standard approach, which attempts to show that Descartes’s original arguments do work as demonstrations after all.

Faculties, Knowledge, and Reasons for Doubt in the Cartesian Circle

This paper argues for a novel solution to the Cartesian Circle by emphasising the important epistemic role of the Second Meditation and Descartes’ faculty epistemology. I argue that, for Descartes: doubt requires a ‘good reason’ to doubt (§2.1); whether a reason qualifies as a ‘good reason’ depends on which faculty produces that reason (§2.2); and for distinct metaphysical perceptions from the faculty of the intellect, no other faculty can provide ‘good reasons’ to doubt (§2.3). The upshot of §2 is that the doubts raised up to the Third Meditation do not apply to the distinct metaphysical perceptions of the intellect, and in particular do not apply to the premises of the proof of the existence of God. I present the role of God as primarily to secure clear and distinct perceptions beyond the intellect, and knowledge of conclusions when those conclusions are no longer being clearly and distinctly perceived (§3.1). Finally, I give an account of Descartes’ use of ‘cognoscere’, ‘scire’, and ‘scientia’ as three distinct epistemic levels, providing a valuable structure within which one can see the meditator progress (§3.2).

Descartes’s Pyrrhonian Virtue Epistemology

This chapter discusses how Descartes uses his principle of clarity and distinctness to raise his first-order judgments to the scientia level. Error is what one must avoid, not just falsity; so he seeks not just truth but also aptness. You are to assure yourself that you attain such aptness, which is required for confidence that you avoid error and attain certainty. But this assurance is forthcoming only with assurance that the operative source of your judgment is indeed a reliable-enough competence. This raises an issue of circularity, also known as the Cartesian Circle. The chapter shows how this circle also affects contemporary virtue epistemology when it postulates a level of reflective knowledge above that of animal knowledge.

Conclusion

This chapter makes a plea both for intellectual humility, which cautions against overconfidence in one’s opinions, and for deference to experts when one is not well positioned to reach an opinion on one’s own. The chapter also discusses how Descartes’s efforts to find a method that would inoculate inquirers against error encountered problems with the Cartesian Circle. The chapter concludes that intellectual humility and openness to new ideas are appropriate even for those who have immense expertise in their fields. All the more so, they are the appropriate attitudes for nonexperts to have; and since no one has expertise in all fields, they are the attitudes that specialists in one field should have when considering issues in other fields. The chapter concludes by pointing out, in particular, they are the attitudes those in the humanities ought to have toward work in the sciences, and vice versa.

Against the new Cartesian Circle

In two recent papers, Michael Della Rocca accuses Descartes of reasoning circularly in the Fourth Meditation. This alleged new circle is distinct from, and more vicious than, the traditional Cartesian Circle arising in the Third Meditation. We explain Della Rocca’s reasons for this accusation, showing that his argument is invalid.