The Relationship Between Conscious and Unconscious Intentionality

The contemporary view of the relationship between conscious and unconscious intentionality consists in two claims: (i) unconscious propositional attitudes represent the world the same way conscious ones do, and (ii) both sets of attitudes represent by having determinate propositional content. Crane (2017) has challenged both claims, proposing instead that unconscious propositional attitudes differ from conscious ones in being less determinate in nature. This paper aims to evaluate Crane's proposal. In particular, I make explicit and critique certain assumptions Crane makes in support of his asymmetry, and argue for a conditional claim: if Crane is right that unconscious intentional states are (relatively) indeterminate, this suggests that conscious intentional states are indeterminate in a similar fashion as well.

Conditional Acceptance

What is the correct semantics for indicative conditionals, and under what circumstances should agents accept a conditional claim? This paper presents a new case which has important implications for attempts to address these questions. The case involves an utterance of a certain indicative conditional in a particular context. It is shown that at least three prominent theories of conditionals (the material conditional view, the suppositional view, and Stalnaker’s view) predict that you ought to assign a high credence to the conditional in this case, but, it is argued, this prediction is incorrect. Finally, the paper discusses what conclusions we can draw from this case, both on the semantics of conditionals and on the epistemology of inference on the basis of suppositions more generally.

Anselmianism about God

It is sometimes held that God, as an Anselmian—that is, absolutely perfect—being, must be loving. This chapter defends a conditional claim: insofar as God is necessarily loving, that is due to, and extends only as far as, the love that God must have on account of God’s being necessarily morally perfect. For, first, any account of God’s nature that requires God to be loving in a way that goes beyond what is morally required will unacceptably limit God’s freedom of action; and second, being loving cannot be an independent divine perfection, for it lacks an intrinsic maximum, and having an intrinsic maximum is essential to divine perfections on the Anselmian conception. The chapter also considers, and rejects, reasons from revelation to hold that morality-surpassing love is a divine perfection.

Robust Bayesian Credibility Using Semiparametric Models

In performing Bayesian analysis of insurance losses, one usually chooses a parametric conditional loss distribution for each risk and a parametric prior distribution to describe how the conditional distributions vary across the risks. Young (1997) applies techniques from nonparametric density estimation to estimate the prior and uses the estimated model to calculate the predictive mean of future claims given past claims. A shortcoming of this method is that, in estimating the prior, one assumes the average claim amount equals the conditional claim. In this paper, we consider a class of priors obtained by perturbing the one determined nonparametrically, as in Young (1997). We thereby reflect the uncertainty in the prior that arises from the randomness in the claim data. We, then, calculate intervals for the corresponding predictive means. We illustrate our method with data from Dannenburg et al. (1996) and compare the intervals of the predictive means with nonparametric confidence intervals.