Context-Free Semantics

On a traditional view, the semantics of natural language makes essential use of a context parameter, i.e. a set of coordinates that representss the situation of speech. In classical frameworks, this parameter plays two roles: it contributes to determining the content of utterances and it is used to define logical consequence. This paper argues that recent empirical proposals about context shift in natural language, which are supported by an increasing body of cross-linguistic data, are incompatible with this traditional view. The moral is that context has no place in semantic theory proper. We should revert back to so-called multiple-indexing frameworks that were developed by Montague and others, and relegate context to the postsemantic stage of a theory of meaning.

Truth

P. F. Strawson explained truth, as it applies to statements, by saying: ‘one who makes a statement or assertion makes a true statement if and only if things are as, in making the statement, he states them to be’. This explanation differs from others in taking a statement’s having a content (i.e. its saying that things are thus-and-so) to be a presupposition of an attribution of truth to it. This paper shows how this feature opens the way to a distinctive solution to the Liar Paradox and to a foundation for the axiomatic theories of truth now favoured by many logicians.

Conditional Acceptance

What is the correct semantics for indicative conditionals, and under what circumstances should agents accept a conditional claim? This paper presents a new case which has important implications for attempts to address these questions. The case involves an utterance of a certain indicative conditional in a particular context. It is shown that at least three prominent theories of conditionals (the material conditional view, the suppositional view, and Stalnaker’s view) predict that you ought to assign a high credence to the conditional in this case, but, it is argued, this prediction is incorrect. Finally, the paper discusses what conclusions we can draw from this case, both on the semantics of conditionals and on the epistemology of inference on the basis of suppositions more generally.

Subordinating Speech and Speaking Up

When we encounter speech that denigrates others unjustly, we sometimes feel a desire and an obligation to respond with more speech—a response that this paper calls ‘speaking up’. Even so, it is also common to have doubts about the value of speaking up. The paper exploits Stalnaker’s notion of a Context Set and Lewis’s work on Accommodation to further develop a model of subordinating speech that has been taking shape in the literature on pornography and hate speech. It then uses that model to suggest five ways in which speaking up can make a difference—while also noting that the model suggests that the effectiveness of speaking up can be limited by certain aspects of the context.

The Subtle Lives of Descriptive Names

This paper develops a radical alternative to standard accounts of descriptive names. A ‘descriptive name’ is a singular term introduced by a stipulation of form ┌Let α‎ refer to the Ψ‎ ┐. It is shown that—contrary to standard views—the reference-fixing mechanism for a descriptive name is not satisfactional. §1 argues for a background view of reference-fixing for ordinary language singular terms. §2 shows how this view generates a non-satisfactional account of reference-fixing for descriptive names. §3 explores the implications of the discussion in §§1–2 for the possibility of descriptively mediated singular thought. §4 argues for a new account of what speaker and hearer are committed to when the speaker makes and the hearer accepts a ┌Let α‎ refer to the Ψ‎ ┐ stipulation.

Semantic Explanations

This paper is a defense of substantive explanations in semantics. It begins by offering a diagnosis of why the view that semantic theories are merely descriptive has been widely accepted in philosophy and suggests that these grounds are not compelling. Then it argues that semantic explanations don’t have a uniform direction—upwards or downwards the syntactic tree. There is an explanatory division within the lexicon: the meanings of content words (nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs) are semantically fundamental, while the meanings of function words (auxiliaries, connectives, copulas, derivational morphemes, determiners, expletives, prepositions, etc.) are derivative.

Frege’s Begriffsschrift Theory of Identity Vindicated

In the Begriffsschrift, Frege held that identity is a relation between names, to wit, the relation of co-reference. The verdict of Frege scholarship on this conception of identity has not been favorable, to say the least; indeed, commentators including Alonzo Church, Michael Dummett, and Richard Heck have claimed that it is incompatible with ordinary first-order quantification. We show that these commentators are mistaken. The Begriffsschrift conception of identity is perfectly consistent with ordinary quantification over objects, and moreover generates the same consequence relation between sentences as does standard first-order logic with identity.

Words by Convention

Existing metasemantic projects presuppose that word- (or sentence-) types are part of the non-semantic base. This paper proposes a new strategy: an endogenous account of word types, that is, one where word types are fixed as part of the metasemantics. On this view, it is the conventions of truthfulness and trust that ground not only the meaning of the words (meaning by convention) but also what the word type is of each particular token utterance (words by convention). The same treatment extends to identifying the populations through which the conventions prevail. The paper considers whether this proposal leads to new underdetermination challenges for metasemantics, and makes a case that it does not.

Sources of Context-Dependence

This paper has two goals. The first is to defend a form of context-dependence for knowledge ascriptions. The second is to explore the different sources of context-dependence that natural language provides. Using knowledge ascriptions as an illustration, it argues that there are two very different sorts of sources of context-dependence in language. One is highly specific, typically lexical context-dependence. The other is general. Highly general features of extremely broad categories of expressions can create context-dependence that is only minimally associated with any one expression. The case of knowledge ascriptions provides an example of this kind of context-dependence. When it comes to philosophical concerns about contextualism, the difference points to something not always fully noted. Specific context-dependence can often reveal something important about the concept a given word expresses. General context-dependence does this in at best highly limited ways.