The Gödel incompleteness theorems (1931) by the axiom of choice

Those incompleteness theorems mean the relation of (Peano) arithmeticand (ZFC) set theory, or philosophically, the relation of arithmetical finiteness andactual infinity. The same is managed in the framework of set theory by the axiom ofchoice (respectively, by the equivalent well-ordering "theorem'). One may discuss thatincompleteness form the viewpoint of set theory by the axiom of choice rather thanthe usual viewpoint meant in the proof of theorems. The logical corollaries from that"nonstandard" viewpoint the relation of set theory and arithmetic are demonstrated

A Mathematical Model of Quantum Computer by Both Arithmetic and Set Theory

A practical viewpoint links reality, representation, and language to calculation by the concept of Turing (1936) machine being the mathematical model of our computers. After the Gödel incompleteness theorems (1931) or the insolvability of the so-called halting problem (Turing 1936; Church 1936) as to a classical machine of Turing, one of the simplest hypotheses is completeness to be suggested for two ones. That is consistent with the provability of completeness by means of two independent Peano arithmetics discussed in Section I.Many modifications of Turing machines cum quantum ones are researched in Section II for the Halting problem and completeness, and the model of two independent Turing machines seems to generalize them.Then, that pair can be postulated as the formal definition of reality therefore being complete unlike any of them standalone, remaining incomplete without its complementary counterpart. Representation is formal defined as a one-to-one mapping between the two Turing machines, and the set of all those mappings can be considered as “language” therefore including metaphors as mappings different than representation. Section III investigates that formal relation of “reality”, “representation”, and “language” modeled by (at least two) Turing machines.The independence of (two) Turing machines is interpreted by means of game theory and especially of the Nash equilibrium in Section IV.Choice and information as the quantity of choices are involved. That approach seems to be equivalent to that based on set theory and the concept of actual infinity in mathematics and allowing of practical implementations.

Incompleteness in a General Setting

Full proofs of the Gödel incompleteness theorems are highly intricate affairs. Much of the intricacy lies in the details of setting up and checking the properties of a coding system representing the syntax of an object language (typically, that of arithmetic) within that same language. These details are seldom illuminating and tend to obscure the core of the argument. For this reason a number of efforts have been made to present the essentials of the proofs of Gödel's theorems without getting mired in syntactic or computational details. One of the most important of these efforts was made by Löb [8] in connection with his analysis of sentences asserting their own provability. Löb formulated three conditions (now known as the Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions), on the provability predicate in a formal system which are jointly sufficient to yield the Gödel's second incompleteness theorem for it. A key role in Löb's analysis is played by (a special case of) what later became known as the diagonalization or fixed point property of formal systems, a property which had already, in essence, been exploited by Gödel in his original proofs of the incompleteness theorems. The fixed point property plays a central role in Lawvere's [7] category-theoretic account of incompleteness phenomena (see also [10]).