The Food, Water, Air and Fire Doctrines in Ancient Indian and Greek Philosophies from a Comparative Perspective

The main aim of this article lies in the comparison of ancient cosmico-natural elements from the Vedic period with their counterparts in the Presocratics, with a focus on food, air, water and fire. By way of an introduction to the ancient elemental world, we first present the concept of food (anna) as an idiosyncratic Vedic teaching of the ancient elements. This is followed by our first comparison—of Raikva’s natural philosophy of Vāyu/prāṇa with Anaximenes’s pneûma/aér teaching in the broader context of both the Vedic and Presocratic teachings on the role of air/breath. Secondly, water as brought to us in pañcāgnividyā teaching from Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad and Chāndogya Upaniṣad is compared to the teaching of the Greek natural philosopher Thales. Finally, the teaching on fire as heat being present in all beings (agni vaiśvānara) and in relation to cosmic teachings on fire in the ancient Vedic world are compared to Heraclitus’ philosophy of fire as an element. Additionally, this article also presents a survey and analysis of some of the key representatives of comparative and intercultural philosophy dealing with the elemental and natural philosophy of ancient India and Greece.

Bhartṛprapañca and the Eight States of Brahman

<p>A gradual evolution of Brahman in eight successive states is described and criticized in Śaṅkara’s commentary on <em>Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad</em> and in Sureśvara’s and Ānandagiri’s sub-commentaries where the teaching is attributed to Bhartṛprapañca, an ancient Bhedābhedavādin whose commentary on BĀU is now lost. This paper examines fragmentary records of the teaching of Brahman’s evolution and tries to interpret different categories mentioned in different accounts of the teaching by comparing these terms with same or similar categories in other philosophical and religious systems of ancient India in order to understand Bhartṛprapañca’s original eight-fold scheme and its meaning. Tentative conclusion might be that Ānandagiri conveyed Bhartṛprapañca’s scheme literally while Śaṅkara and Sureśvara paraphrased it very freely. </p>

Buddha’s scheme for forming noble-minded generalists in society

A passage of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad asserts that the cause of actions is the will, which has desire as its origin, and that the removal of desire is a sine qua non for entrance into eternal bliss. Following the main line of this idea, Buddha has made two important discoveries. The first is the discovery of the subconscious entity called papañca, a subjacent but influential concomitant of all kinds of human mental phenomena and, at the same time, the cause of all of our miseries. The second discovery is the fact that, to eliminate the papañca, it is necessary to practice the solitary and meditative life of a mendicant without any possession. Our consciousness cannot be changed, at least as far its foundations are concerned, by rational inference but only through such actions as solitary life with introspection into the nature of our consciousness. His claim that only such a solitary meditative mendicant could give people good advice on life would be most suggestive. Good advice (i.e. the most precious gift) could only be given by a person of profound wisdom as well as of total altruism, who realizes himself as such a personality through introspection into the nature of consciousness and a solitary life of no possession. These two processes should be the main components of forming the wise and altruistic person. Buddha’s instruction was addressed neither to the general public nor to monks living in a community (saṅgha, which did not seem to exist at his time) but to his small number of disciples. His scheme for forming in a society a small number of generalists of noble character should be the subject of more serious examination for the human and social sciences of today. In addition, the proposal of Buddha to carry on praxis for the change of cognitive foundation may suggest that the objectivist stance of scientists puts them in fetters, preventing them from engaging themselves in praxis to ensure the objectivity of observation, and restricting them to their sphere of cognition.