scholarly journals Disclosure Frequency, Information Environment, and Cost of Capital under Regulation Fair Disclosure in the Korean Market

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (14) ◽  
pp. 5856
Author(s):  
Hoshik Shim

Disclosure policy contributes to improve sustainable corporate information environment by mitigating information asymmetry surrounding companies. Economic theories generally support that more disclosures reduce the level of information asymmetry, increase stock liquidity, and thus decrease the costs of equity capital. However, the effect of corporate disclosure in emerging markets is not clearly predictable because of the potential information leakage prior to disclosure. Considering this issue, this study focuses on the Regulation Fair Disclosure which prohibits selective disclosure. Using the earnings-to-price ratio as a proxy of the costs of equity, the study finds that disclosure frequency is negatively related to the cost of equity capital. However, I do not find evidence that disclosure is negatively related to the implied costs of equity capital (ICOE). The results of the quintile analysis suggest that this inconsistency is attributable to the better information environment of the ICOE sample. The findings of this study have implications for disclosure regulations in emerging markets, given that the existing literature casts doubt on the effectiveness of corporate disclosure in such markets.

2020 ◽  
pp. 0148558X2093423
Author(s):  
Eli Amir ◽  
Shai Levi ◽  
Roy Zuckerman

We show negative stock returns reverse more and contain less information on the long-term changes in share prices than positive stock returns mostly on nondisclosure days, and these information differences between negative and positive returns decrease substantially on disclosure days. The results suggest investors are more likely to acquire positive information on nondisclosure days and to obtain both negative and positive information on disclosure days. Accounting conservatism and litigation exposure compels managers to reveal their negative information in disclosures, and if managers withhold negative information, they do it when investors are less likely to find the information on nondisclosure days. Moreover, we use the exogenous imposition of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. FD) to demonstrate that positive information leakage from firms during the quarter is driving the positive slant in investors’ information. Taken together, our results suggest that disclosure plays an important role in the differential informativeness and reversals of positive and negative returns.


2009 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 106-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhihong Chen ◽  
Dan S. Dhaliwal ◽  
Hong Xie

2004 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-225 ◽  
Author(s):  
Venkat R. Eleswarapu ◽  
Rex Thompson ◽  
Kumar Venkataraman

AbstractIn October 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) passed Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) in an effort to reduce selective disclosure of material information by firms to analysts and other investment professionals. We find that the information asymmetry reflected in trading costs at earnings announcements has declined after Regulation FD, with the decrease more pronounced for smaller and less liquid stocks. Return volatility around mandatory announcements is also lower but overall information flow is unchanged when mandatory and voluntary announcements are combined. Thus, the SEC appears to have diminished the advantage of informed investors, without increasing volatility.


2017 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Amiram ◽  
Alon Kalay ◽  
Avner Kalay ◽  
N. Bugra Ozel

ABSTRACT We examine the role of the coupon choice in bond contracts as a signaling mechanism in the presence of information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders about the credit quality of the borrower. Prior literature focuses on the use of maturity as a signaling mechanism. We conjecture that the coupon is a more effective signaling mechanism. We exploit the enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure (RegFD) as an exogenous shock to the level of information asymmetry, and employ both bond- and equity market-based variables of information asymmetry to test our conjecture. We find that following the enactment of RegFD, the coupon rates of bonds issued by unrated firms increase relatively more than those of rated firms, consistent with the coupon choice addressing information asymmetry. We fail to find similar increases in maturity. Our inferences remain the same when using the probability of informed trade to measure relative changes in information asymmetry around the enactment of RegFD. We also draw similar conclusions utilizing exogenous drops in analyst coverage that result from brokerage house closures as an alternative quasi-natural experiment. Finally, we provide evidence that the coupon is used more extensively when issuance costs are higher, precisely when maturity is predicted to be a less efficient contract term with which to address information asymmetry. JEL Classifications: G10; G23; M21; M41.


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