Robert Triffin

This book provides an intellectual biography of Robert Triffin. Triffin (1911–1993) played a key role in the international monetary debates in the postwar period. He became famous with trenchant analyses of the vulnerabilities of the international monetary system that was dependent on a national currency for its international liquidity (the Triffin dilemma), predicting the end of the Bretton Woods system. Triffin was a child of the interwar period, marked by the Great Depression and the rise of fascism. He became not only an eminent academic but also an influential policy adviser. In the mid-1940s he worked at the Federal Reserve, participating in several monetary reform missions in Latin America. Thereafter, Triffin played an important role in the creation of the European Payments Union. In his later academic life, Triffin put forward proposals for reforming the international monetary system. But because he doubted that they would come to fruition, he also developed plans for regional monetary integration, particularly in Europe, where he became the monetary adviser of Jean Monnet. With proposals for a European Reserve Fund and a European currency unit, he became one of the intellectual fathers of Europe’s monetary union. Throughout his life Triffin remained faithful to the ideals of his youth. The young Triffin was indignant about the Versailles Treaty, while the old Triffin fulminated against the Vietnam War. For him, economics was a way to contribute to a better world. He was strongly attached to his independence and the pursuit of a better and more peaceful world. He was a monk in economist’s clothing.

The International Monetary and Financial System

International currencies fulfill different roles in the world economy, with important synergies across those roles. We explore the implications of currency hegemony for the external balance sheet of the United States, the process of international adjustment, and the predictability of the US dollar exchange rate. We emphasize the importance of international monetary spillovers and of the exorbitant privilege, and we analyze the emergence of a new Triffin dilemma.

The New Triffin Dilemma

According to Pozsar, there is a new kind of “Triffin Dilemma.” Due to rising inequality, a shrinking numbers of large banks, and a ceiling on Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured deposits, there is a shortage of “safe assets.” The private supply of safe assets has occurred through the system of shadow banks, and is based on repos, or Treasury Bonds. But the supply of US Treasury bonds is limited by the ceiling on public debt, and is constrained by neoliberal theories of limits to the size of government. As a result, there is a presumed shortage of safe assets, just when the levels of inequality have increased the order of magnitude of assets under management which are in need of protection. There are also large accumulations of cash pools by large multinational corporations, often held overseas to evade taxes. The private provision of safe assets tends to reduce liquidity and increase costs of information, potentially leading to financial instability. Possible resolutions of this issue include (1) progressive taxes to reduce the size of the cash pools, (2) an increase in the ceiling for insured deposits, and (3) increasing support by the Fed for the role of “market maker of last resort.” This paper concludes with the implications of each alternative. JEL Classification: B5, E44, G01, P1