Olson E. T. Was I Ever a Fetus? / trans. from Engl. V. A. Sermaksheva

The Standard View of personal identity says that someone who exists now can exist at another time only if there is continuity of her mental contents or capacities. But no person is psychologically continuous with a fetus, for a fetus, at least early in its career, has no mental features at all. So the Standard View entails that no person was ever a fetus-contrary to the popular assumption that an unthinking fetus is a potential person. It is also mysterious what does ordinarily happen to a human fetus, if it does not come to be a person. Although an extremely complex variant of the Standard View may allow one to persist without psychological continuity before one becomes a person but not afterwards, a far simpler solution is to accept a radically non-psychological account of our identity

Abortion - a philosophical perspective

The central issue in the abortion debate is the moral status of the conceptus. There are two positions that argue this issue. At one extreme are the views of the pro-life group which argues that human life begins at the moment of conception whilst at the other are views of the pro-choice group that argues in favour of a woman’s right to self-determination. Two basic principles come into conflict in this debate, namely the Value of Life and that of Self-determination. In this paper the arguments forwarded by each group in justification of its position are presented. Also discussed is the moderate developmental viewpoint which accepts that the genetic basis of an individual is established at conception. Some development, however, has to occur before the conceptus can be called a person. The fact that an entity is a potential person is a prima facie reason for not destroying it. On the other hand, we need not conclude that a person has a right to life by virtue of that potentiality. Simultaneously we should recognise that the right a potential entity has, may be nullified by the woman’s right to self-determination.

Michael Tooley on Possible People and Promising

In Abortion and Infanticide, Michael Tooley argues that it is not wrong to destroy potential persons, such as fetuses and newly born infants. His argument presupposes the following: 1)that the destruction of potential persons is not directly wrong because potential persons do not have a right to life; 2)that destroying a potential person—a fetus or an infant—is morally the same as preventing the existence of an (as-yet-unconceived) possible person by, for example, using a contraceptive or refraining from, intercourse during a woman's fertile period; and 3)that it is not wrong to prevent the existence of additional persons who are likely to lead happy or satisfying lives. Here I am concerned with the third presupposition. On this presupposition, the prima facie permissibility of abortion and infanticide hinges on the “moral neutrality” of those of our reproductive decisions on which the existence of additional people depends.

Do Potential People Have Moral Rights?

By a potential person I shall mean an entity which is not now a person but which is capable of developing into a person, given certain biologically and/or technologically possible conditions. This is admittedly a narrower sense than some would attach to the term ‘potential'. After all, people of the twenty-fifth century, if such there will be, are in some sense potential people now, even though the specific biological entities from which they will develop, i.e. the particular gametes or concepti, do not yet exist. For there do exist, in the reproductive capacities of people now living and in the earth's resources, conditions adequate to produce these future people eventually, provided of course that various possible catastrophes are avoided. Indeed, in some sense of ‘potential’ there have been countless billions of potential people from the beginning of time. But I am concerned not with such remote potentialities but with currently existing entities that are capable of developing into people.