Does the Additional Worth-Having Existence Make Things Better?

Let’s call the principle that says that the mere addition of the worth-having existence (other things equal) makes things morally better Pareto plus. If we accept Pareto plus, then it seems we should also say that some additions that make at least some person at least a little worse off also may – depending on the numbers – make things morally better. I find that latter claim potentially dangerous. As a main focus of an argument why we ought to do something about climate change, I think it moves people not to do anything much about climate change. People won’t accept that they or their progeny – or the many, many future people beyond their own progeny – should bear a cost, perhaps a significant cost, just to bring ever more future people into existence. But we can’t just reject Pareto plus out of hand. For a number of arguments seem to compel us to accept Pareto plus. My goal in this paper is to identify some of the most interesting of those arguments and to show how, in each case, the argument on closer analysis fails.

Person-Affecting and Non-Identity

According to a popular version of the person-affecting idea of morality, what is better (worse) must be better (worse) for someone. However, there seems to be a clear tension between this idea and some of our considered judgements about cases in which the existence of future people is contingent on our choice. For example, we want to say that creating a very unhappy person makes the world worse, other things being equal. In order to comply with a person-affecting morality in this case, we need to show that coming into existence can be worse for a person, but it does not seem plausible to say that it can be worse for a person to exist than not to exist. This paper discusses some recent attempts to ease this tension, and it is argued that none of these attempts is convincing. That leaves us with only one option: to reject the person-affecting constraint in its current form.

Comparison of the Development of TikTok and Bilibili

According to the comparison between TikTok and Bilibili in five aspects, TikTok is far more than Bilibili in terms of user flow and business model. However, TikTok still has some disadvantages, such as the failure to provide high-quality short videos or the lack of development prospects for creators. TikTok and Bilibili are two related but different video platforms. Through the comparison between them, we can intuitively understand the problems faced by the two companies and predict the developmental trend of the two in the future. People can clearly understand the development and future trend of entertainment video platforms through the comparison between the two. The author thinks, TikTok will continue to generate high revenue with high traffic, and if Bilibili continues to produce high-quality videos and tries to break into the market, it will be able to gain a foothold like Youtube.

The Role of Research Ethics Committees: Making a Fair Offer

"In this paper, I engage with the on-going debate about the nature of the task that research ethics committees (RECs) have in coming to assess the ethics of research proposals. Some have argued that the role of RECs is to protect participants from harm in the context of researchers who want to benefit future people. Others have argued that the role of RECs is primarily to ensure that potential participants are provided with full information – enough to make an informed choice. On this later view, RECs protect choice rather than restrict it. I argue that both of these orientations are mistaken and that the role of RECs more akin to a societal overseer who ensures that the research is worthwhile and, most importantly, that it presents a fair offer to potential participants. On this view, the REC’s role is to balance potential harms to participants with the potential benefits of the research in the context of presenting the choice about whether to participate to potential participants. "

Social Innovation for a Just Sustainable Development: Integrating the Wellbeing of Future People

Social innovation has gained increased attention as a mechanism for sustainable development. As the Brundtland Commission highlights, the improvement of present conditions should not compromise future generations’ needs. So far, (social) sustainable development has mostly focused on the amelioration of contemporary people’s wellbeing, relegating its duties towards future generations to second place. Given this, I consider it necessary to (re-)direct social innovation towards the promotion of the wellbeing of future people. I propose the concept of irreplaceable goods, a notion deriving from a strong sustainability perspective, which could then be integrated into social innovation practices related to sustainable development. Focusing on guaranteeing, at least, sufficient fruition of certain goods and resources, I devise this concept as a governance tool for steering development actions towards intergenerational justice, driven by social innovation action. In this article, we firstly delineate the relations between sustainable development and social innovation, while focusing on ‘value-driven’ social innovation. Afterward, I shortly introduce strong sustainability as support for future generations’ wellbeing. Furthermore, I develop the concept of irreplaceable goods as a governance tool in social innovation practices and finalize with a discussion on the application of irreplaceable goods in the assessment of sustainable development strategies.

Oncology in the education field

This article is a literatura review of childhood oncology and oncology. How oncology can influence the educational field and if teachers should know about oncology or not, they should always know about it and they should also know how to treat students at school, as well as work on inclusion day by day. Another important aspect is prevention in oncology, if there is prevention in the future, people would have a better quality of life.

Postericide and Intergenerational Ethics

In the Anthropocene, future people are dangerously vulnerable to the conduct of present people. The advances made by humanity since the Industrial Revolution give the current generation the ability to damage and degrade the environment in ways that could make humanity go extinct. What measures should be taken to protect future people from the dangers of extinction they face? This chapter outlines a new international crime of postericide as a morally required response to humanity’s changed circumstances. Postericide is committed when an agent intentionally or recklessly performs conduct fit to bring about the extinction of humanity. International criminal law contains no precedents for the prosecution of postericide. A proper understanding of the moral imperatives embodied in international criminal law shows that it is, in this respect, incomplete. Drawing on political and legal theory, moral philosophy, and jurisprudence, this chapter defends postericide as a moral necessity in the Anthropocene, and shows how it is entailed by the ideals at the heart of international criminal law.

Parfit and the Non-Identity Problem

In this chapter, the author explains what the non-identity problem is and why it matters, as well as Derek Parfit’s central role in the literature on the problem. The author explains the solution to the problem Parfit tentatively proposed in Reasons and Persons (1984) and the two reasons he gave for being dissatisfied with that solution. The author then explains the solution that Parfit later defended in his final (posthumous) publication (2017) and why he thought that solution overcame the two problems with his earlier solution. The author then identifies a third problem with Parfit’s earlier solution and shows that this third problem is also a problem with his later solution. The author concludes by suggesting that one lesson that might be drawn from the failure of Parfit’s last solution points in the direction of a very different kind of response to the problem, one defended in the author’s 2014 book, The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People. And in doing so, the author responds to some of the criticisms of that response that Parfit himself makes early in his final publication.