minimality property
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2021 ◽  
Vol 37 ◽  
pp. 276-294
Author(s):  
D. Steven Mackey

A new way to formulate the notions of minimal basis and minimal indices is developed in this paper, based on the concept of a filtration of a vector space. The goal is to provide useful new tools for working with these important concepts, as well as to gain deeper insight into their fundamental nature. This approach also readily reveals a strong minimality property of minimal indices, from which follows a characterization of the vector polynomial bases in rational vector spaces. The effectiveness of this new formulation is further illustrated by proving several fundamental properties: the invariance of the minimal indices of a matrix polynomial under field extension, the direct sum property of minimal indices, the polynomial linear combination property, and the predictable degree property.



2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (03) ◽  
pp. 1250018 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUAN C. CESCO

In this paper we introduce two related core-type solutions for games with transferable utility (TU-games) the [Formula: see text]-core and the [Formula: see text]-core. The elements of the solutions are pairs [Formula: see text] where x, as usual, is a vector representing a distribution of utility and [Formula: see text] is a balanced family of coalitions, in the case of the [Formula: see text]-core, and a minimal balanced one, in the case of the [Formula: see text]-core, describing a plausible organization of the players to achieve the vector x. Both solutions extend the notion of classical core but, unlike it, they are always nonempty for any TU-game. For the [Formula: see text]-core, which also exhibits a certain kind of "minimality" property, we provide a nice axiomatic characterization in terms of the four axioms nonemptiness (NE), individual rationality (IR), superadditivity (SUPA) and a weak reduced game property (WRGP) (with appropriate modifications to adapt them to the new framework) used to characterize the classical core. However, an additional axiom, the axiom of equal opportunity is required. It roughly states that if [Formula: see text] belongs to the [Formula: see text]-core then, any other admissible element of the form [Formula: see text] should belong to the solution too.



Groups ◽  
2004 ◽  
pp. 297-305
Author(s):  
R. I. Grigorchuk ◽  
J. S. Wilson
Keyword(s):  




1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-161
Author(s):  
Augo Nobile
Keyword(s):  


1970 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. P. Shunkov


1969 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 439-439 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Zaks
Keyword(s):  


1967 ◽  
Vol s1-42 (1) ◽  
pp. 456-462 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. H. Rhemtulla


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