The Wager

Pascal argues, on the basis of the logic of probability, that it is more advantageous to believe in God than not, since the gains of belief, if he exists, are far greater than any loss we would incur by believing if he does not exist. In the light of this, he argues that anyone who cannot believe should condition himself or herself to do so by the bodily discipline of practising Christian rituals. These arguments are clarified in detail, and the objections addressed to both are evaluated, especially the argument that the Wager would validate belief in any God. The conclusion is that our assessment of the Wager’s efficacy must depend on our views as to its relation to the anthropological, scriptural, and historical arguments discussed in earlier chapters.

The Order of Charity

The apparent disorderliness of Scripture is merely superficial; it possesses a non-logical order which appeals to the heart. The affective aspects of this notion (hitherto subordinated to the cognitive) are discussed, in ways that illuminate Pascal’s conception of faith. The fundamental message of Scripture is the necessity of charity (the love of God). The notion of the three orders (the flesh, the mind, and the will) is explained. The greatness of Christ is as much above intellectual greatness as intellectual values transcend purely material magnitude. The love of God enables liberation from toxic self-love: the Christian ethic consists in learning to see ourselves not as isolated entities but as ‘thinking members’, parts of a spiritual body, the community of the faithful.

The Claims and Limits of Reason

Pascal argues that a genuinely divine religion would not be contrary to reason, but that it would contain elements beyond the reach of human reason (a fully comprehensible religion might well be a human invention). Christianity contains such elements, mysteries (such as the doctrine of the Trinity), and miracles. Hume’s objection to miracles cannot carry conviction with anyone prepared to accept the concept of an interventionist God, and the Pascalian seeker is in this position. It is reasonable to take some beliefs on authority, but to do so in cases where personal judgement is legitimate is superstition.

‘The Plan of his Whole Work’

Pascal has drawn up the blueprint for a hypothetical true religion. This would apparently require him to examine actually existing religions to see which one best matches up to it. But the Pensées discusses only one other religion in any detail: Islam (it conflates Judaism and Christianity). This apparent lacuna is discussed in the light of two accounts of a talk he gave to his friends at Port-Royal in which he set out his apologetic strategy; this is compared with the strategy he seems to be pursuing in the Pensées. In the light of this, two alternative views are set out: (i) he intended to provide a survey of world religions; (ii) he decided that this was superfluous, given the prima facie claims of Christianity.

Self

Pascal believes that human beings are in thrall to an uncontrollable self-love, a self-centredness that sets them at odds with their fellow creatures and that is intrinsically unjust. (For this reason he rejects the ethic of honnêteté—politeness, consideration for others—as inadequate.) Self-love involves both the urge to tyrannize over others and the desire for recognition from them. A long fragment on the nature of the self establishes that we know others only through their qualities, and thus that a direct self-to-self relationship is impossible. Love between human beings is intrinsically flawed since no human being can be another’s fulfilment. Various objections to this line of argument are considered (Pascal’s conception of love is a very partial one), and the conclusion is that, powerful though his analysis his, he has not established that the nature of self-love is a further reason for believing in the Fall.

Conclusion

There is a brief discussion of Pascal’s affinities with existentialism. One of these concerns his denial that we can infer moral norms from human nature as it is. Our attitude to human nature will largely condition how we react to his philosophy. His arguments for Christian belief are to a certain extent detachable from his particular version of Augustinian theology. He remains relevant partly because we cannot escape confronting human nature as a problem and because he insists on the liberating potential of Christianity. He functions still as a witness to his faith.

The Need to Seek for God

Given the foregoing reasons for taking the Christian option seriously, Pascal argues that the non-believer should, as a matter of sheer self-interest, seek for God; that is, in the first instance, investigate the truth-claims of Christianity. Atheists’ dismissal of these claims, he argues, rests on a misunderstanding of the claims themselves. Christianity preaches that God is hidden (as a result of the Fall, before which he made himself clearly known to human beings). This notion is discussed in the light of the argument by J. L. Schellenberg that the hiddenness of God, that is, the absence of evidence of God, constitutes grounds for affirming his non-existence. Pascal emphasizes the difference between Christianity and deism, a purely philosophical belief in a supreme being. Although God is hidden, it is in our interest to seek for him, as Pascal explains on the basis of his theory of probability. Different theories as to the placing of this appeal to self-interest (at the very beginning of the Apology, or halfway through) are evaluated.

Diversion

Having established that Christianity, through the doctrine of the Fall, throws light on the contradictions of human nature, Pascal turns his attention to its capacity to satisfy our desire for happiness. He begins by arguing that our particular day-to-day activities are driven, first, by the desire to keep at bay painful reflections on our vulnerable and mortal condition, and, secondly, by the desire to gratify our vanity. This applies both to recreational activities and to work. This analysis is subjected to critical examination: Pascal has overlooked our natural impulse to exercise our capacities and to find pleasure in the exercise. But the question as to the ultimate value of these activities remains.

The Fall

Pascal argues that the doctrine of the Fall explains the contradictions he has studied. Human nature has been transformed by original sin. Our ‘greatness’ is the residue of our former nature, the vestigial memory of which takes the form of our frustration at the ‘wretchedness’ into which we have fallen. Pascal’s particular conception of the Fall is essentially inspired by St Augustine, from whom he derives the key notion of concupiscence (earthly desire), and certain problems in the Augustinian theory are discussed. The chapter concludes by mentioning more recent presentations of the doctrine in the work of Kierkegaard and Rahner, and of contemporary theologians discussing the relationship between the doctrine and findings in biology.

Contradictions

The conflict between the greatness and the wretchedness of human nature is considered on a more philosophical level. The Stoics do justice to our moral ideals but the Pyrrhonists (whom Pascal sees as implicitly putting humankind on a level with non-human animals) seem better to describe human beings in the mass. The quest for an essence of human nature is compromised by an awareness of the power of custom to determine our beliefs and values. Even our belief in fundamental principles may be based on custom. Yet radical scepticism is in practice unacceptable. The clash between dogmatism (the belief that we have knowledge) and scepticism is irreconcilable. Only the Christian doctrine of the Fall can enable us to get out of this impasse.