Review of: Mark C. Murphy. Divine Holiness & Divine Action

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On Determinism, Causality, and Free Will: Contribution from Physics

Determinism, causality, chance, free will and divine providence form a class of interlaced problems lying in three domains: philosophy, theology, and physics. Recent article by Dariusz Łukasiewicz in Roczniki Filozoficzne (no. 3, 2020) is a great example. Classical physics, that of Newton and Laplace, may lead to deism: God created the world, but then it goes like a mechanical clock. Quantum mechanics brought some “hope” for a rather naïve theology: God acts in gaps between quanta of indetermination. Obviously, any strict determinism jeopardizes the existence of free will. Yes, but only if human mind follows the laws of physics and only if nothing exists outside the physical limits of space and time. We argue that human action lies in-between two worlds: “earth” and “heavens” using the language of Genesis. In that immaterial world, outside time and space constraints, there is no place for the chain of deterministic events. We discuss, in turn, that the principle of causality, a superior law even in physics, reigns also in the non-material world. Though, determinism in the material universe and causality in both worlds seem to be sufficient conditions, to eliminate “chaotic”, or probabilistic causes from human (and divine) action.

Contingency, Free Will, and Particular Providence

The results from contemporary science, especially the theory of evolution and quantum physics, seem to favor process theology. Moreover, the evil committed by free will leads some theologians to reduce divine action in order to prevent God from being responsible for evil. Thus, among those who defend a particular providence, Molinism finds many followers. This article first argues that contemporary science does not constrain us to deny particular providence. Second, it criticizes the implicitly deterministic character of Molinism. Thirdly, a Thomistic solution is proposed as an alternative which, by means of a different metaphysical approach to cosmic contingency and freedom of will, defends particular providence without reducing divine activity except in personal sins.

Divine Action and the Emergence of Four Kinds of Randomness

If the microphysical domain is deterministic, this would seem to leave God with only two ways of influencing events: setting initial conditions or law-breaking intervention. Arthur Peacocke and Philip Clayton argue there is a third possibility, if there is strong emergence. We will examine four candidates for emergence: of intentionality from computational animal behavior, of sentience from biology, of biology from chemistry, and of chemistry from finite quantum mechanics. In all four cases, a kind of finite-to-infinite transition in modeling is required, and in each case a kind of randomness is involved, potentially opening up a third avenue for divine action.

Divine Action is Constitutive of Theology: William Abraham, John Webster, and Theological Theology

This article puts forward the view that divine action is constitutive of Christian theology. More precisely, it claims that what makes a theologian’s work theological is her commitment to a narrative composed by God’s actions to create, redeem, sustain and perfect creatures. It begins with a systematic summary of William Abraham’s four-volume Divine Agency and Divine Action. Two objections are then put to it, one regarding the breadth of the concept ‘action’ and another regarding its ability to facilitate a complete theological method. It then argues that these objections can be overcome when partnered with John Webster’s ‘theological theology’ approach, as it supplies the crucial concept of an ‘economy’ of divine action. A final section presents a ‘Websterian/Abrahamic’ approach, with the result that divine action is no longer relegated to discussions of special divine providence but is the defining feature of all theological work.

Divine Action and Human Action

Throughout his work, Barth is determined to consider human action in relation to divine action, and not in itself. This determination poses three questions. First, can Barth make human action intelligible as the agent’s own action? Second, does he leave human action unstable, lacking anything that secures its continuity throughout its engagements with divine action? Third, is the agent who encounters divine action a fully and genuinely human agent with the full range of agential capacities? Barth adequately answers all three questions, but it is unclear that he can answer any of them in a fully satisfactory way without the notion of habits as persistent tendencies of action. Without such a notion, Barth cannot account for morally good action as a persistent tendency enabled by grace—that is, as virtue. This limitation limits the plausibility of this theological ethics.