The ‘Two Worlds’ Theory in the Phaedo

Plato is often thought to hold the Two Worlds Theory, according to one version of which there is knowledge only of forms and belief only of sensibles; one can’t know sensibles or have beliefs about forms. One such dialogue is the Phaedo. However, Chapter 4 argues that the Phaedo countenances both belief about forms and knowledge of sensibles; and so it rejects the Two Worlds Theory. The chapter also asks whether the Phaedo argues that, if knowledge is possible at all, we can have it only when discarnate.

Plato on the Grades of Perception: Theaetetus 184–186 and the Phaedo

This chapter asks how the Phaedo conceives of perception, both in its own right and as compared to Theaetetus 184–6. The chapter argues that, though the Phaedo agrees with Theaetetus 184–6 at an abstract level insofar as both dialogues argue that perception is not knowledge, they give different reasons. The task in Theaetetus 184–6 is to provide a precise account of the nature of perception and what it can achieve. The primary task in the Phaedo (so far as the passages that discuss perception are concerned) is to defend the view that we can’t acquire knowledge of forms if we rely on perception or perception-guided inquiry; rather, we need to reason in a way that is, in the right way and to the relevant extent, independent of both of them. Further, though Theaetetus 184–6 takes perception to be non-propositional, the Phaedo is neutral on this issue.

Descartes and Ancient Skepticism: Reheated Cabbage?

Chapter 13 considers a variety of ways in which Pyrrhonian skepticism has been thought to differ from Cartesian skepticism: that is, from the sort of skepticism Descartes describes in (among other places) Meditation 1. For example, it has been argued that Pyrrhonian skepticism disavows belief, whereas Cartesian skepticism disavows only knowledge. It has also been argued that Pyrrhonian skepticism is less extensive than Cartesian skepticism is, and that Pyrrhonian but not Cartesian skepticism is a way of life. This chapter argues, however, that Pyrrhonian skepticism is closer to Cartesian skepticism than it is often taken to be, siding with Descartes in his statement that what is new is not the skepticism he describes, but his refutation of it.

Aristotle on Knowledge

This chapter considers Aristotle’s epistemology, focusing on issues explored in Part I. It asks how he conceives of epistêmê in the Posterior Analytics. In particular, is it knowledge and, if so, is it knowledge as such or just a kind of knowledge? In considering this question, the chapter compares Aristotle’s account of epistêmê in the Posterior Analytics with Plato’s account of it in the Meno. It argues that, in defining epistêmê, Aristotle is defining knowledge—but just one kind of knowledge, not knowledge as such. Epistêmê counts as knowledge because it is a truth-entailing cognitive condition that is appropriately cognitively superior to mere true belief. But it isn’t knowledge as such, because Aristotle recognizes other cognitive conditions that also fall under the concept of knowledge but that do not count as epistêmê as it is defined in 1.2

Recollection and Innatism in the Phaedo

It’s often thought that the theory of recollection posits innate knowledge. Chapter 6 asks whether the Phaedo’s account of recollection does so. It also asks whether the argument for the claim that what we think of as learning is really just recollecting is as bad as it has sometimes been thought to be: it has been argued that it is invalid, that it is circular, and that it begs the question. The chapter argues that the argument is not as bad as it has been taken to be. It also argues that the Phaedo, so far from countenancing innate knowledge, rejects its existence. Indeed, Plato’s argument for recollection depends on rejecting it. The chapter also distinguishes among varieties of innatism.

Epistêmê and Doxa, Knowledge and Belief, in the Phaedo

Chapter 5 asks how the Phaedo conceives of epistêmê and doxa. In particular, it asks whether the Phaedo uses doxa for belief, and whether it uses epistêmê for knowledge. In discussing this, I distinguish a concept from a conception; the former is an abstract account, the latter a more determinate way of filling it in. The chapter argues that what the Phaedo says about epistêmê and doxa is closer to some modern views of knowledge and belief than has sometimes been thought. It also argues that the dialogue doesn’t individuate epistêmê and doxa by their objects; in particular, and contrary to the Two Worlds Theory, both epistêmê and doxa range over both sensibles and forms.

Skeptical Dogmata: Outlines of Pyrrhonism I 13

This chapter asks whether, in PH 1.13, Sextus says that Pyrrhonian skeptics have some, or no, dogmata. The chapter distinguishes an internal from an external question. The internal question asks whether Sextus says that skeptics have any dogmata; and, if he says they do, what dogmata does he takes them to have? The external question asks whether dogmata are beliefs in the sense of taking to be true. The chapter argues that dogmata are beliefs in that sense. It also argues that, according to I 13, Sextus allows that skeptics have beliefs, though only about how they are appeared to.

Sextus and External World Skepticism

Chapter 14 discusses the scope of Pyrrhonian skepticism and how it compares with the scope of Cartesian skepticism, with a focus on external world skepticism. At least three general views have been held. First, some commentators think that Pyrrhonian skepticism is less extensive than Cartesian skepticism is. Secondly, Descartes denies that there is a difference in the scopes of ancient and Cartesian skepticism. Thirdly, Hegel thinks that ancient skepticism is more extensive than the skepticism from Descartes’s day to his own is. This chapter argues that the Pyrrhonian skeptics and the Cyrenaics countenance external world skepticism in a recognizable sense. Hence, contrary to a familiar view, Descartes is not the first philosopher to expound external world skepticism.

Introduction

This chapter outlines the main themes of the essays that follow. It also occasionally corrects or clarifies them, and sometimes it discusses more recent literature than they do. One central theme is cognitive conditions and their contents. For example, is epistêmê knowledge as it is conceived of nowadays? Are doxa and dogma belief as it is conceived of nowadays? This chapter also asks whether Plato and/or Aristotle countenances some version of a Two Worlds Theory; and whether ancient skeptics countenance subjective states and/or external world skepticism. It also explains some key distinctions used throughout, such as that between concept and conception.

Subjectivity, Ancient and Modern: The Cyrenaics, Sextus, and Descartes

It’s sometimes argued that the ancients lack the concept of subjectivity and that Descartes is the first to have had such a concept. The question of whether any of the ancients has the concept of subjectivity or takes anything to be subjective depends, in part, on what one takes subjectivity to be. And just as there is controversy about how to characterize knowledge and belief, so there is controversy about how to characterize subjectivity. Chapter 12 argues that Pyrrhonian skeptics and the Cyrenaics have a recognizable conception of subjectivity, and take various things to be subjective, and that Descartes does not articulate the stronger conception of subjectivity that is sometimes ascribed to him.