This chapter asks whether, in PH 1.13, Sextus says that Pyrrhonian skeptics have some, or no, dogmata. The chapter distinguishes an internal from an external question. The internal question asks whether Sextus says that skeptics have any dogmata; and, if he says they do, what dogmata does he takes them to have? The external question asks whether dogmata are beliefs in the sense of taking to be true. The chapter argues that dogmata are beliefs in that sense. It also argues that, according to I 13, Sextus allows that skeptics have beliefs, though only about how they are appeared to.
This article is intended to analyse the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal by considering its origins and decisions in order to find out to what extend it has been successful in the settlement of international commercial and inter-state disputes between Iran and the United States. The Tribunal work is evaluated to determine whether it has been a workable pattern of Western-style legal institution for further instances of politically changed circumstances. In its arguments and expositions, I will discuss whether the Tribunal is an international arbitral tribunal created to resolve private law disputes or an interstate arbitration body typically established by treaty. I will argue that the Tribunal should be considered as an instrument of public international law, because it is based on an international treaty between sovereign states. Through this study I will examine the question of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and its application of international law as compared with the decisions of other international tribunals. It also considers an internal question to the theory of the governing law to the resolution of disputes.
As Moore does in his proof of the external world, Locke asks the question about the existence of things external to our minds as, in Carnap's sense, an "internal" question. The real reason to be dissatisfied with Locke's causal arguments against skepticism is not that they fail to remove the skeptical alternatives imperiling our knowledge, but in the fact that they sidestep the philosophical skepticism, the characteristically "external" way of posing the philosophical questions about the knowledge of external objects.
Representation theory has contributed much to the study of linear associative algebras. The central problem of representation theory per se is the determination for each algebra of all its indecomposable representations. This turns out to be a much deeper problem than the classification of algebras, in the sense that there are algebras for which any “internal question” can be answered but for which the number and nature of representations is almost completely unknown, or if known is much more complicated than the internal theory. This can be illustrated by the example of a commutative algebra of order three for which the representation theory can be shown to be essentially the same as the problem of classifying pairs of rectangular matrices under equivalence. (This algebra has indecomposable representations of every integral degree.)
A review of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal