Pyrrho and Pyrrhonism

The chapter argues that Pyrrho and ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism (specifically, Sextus Empiricus) are plausibly interpreted as accepting a self-cultivation philosophy, though in somewhat different senses and with some qualification. For both, the existential starting point is an emotionally troubled life rooted in beliefs about the world, and the ideal state of being is a life of tranquility without these beliefs and guided by appearances. It is difficult to say what spiritual exercises Pyrrho thought were needed to achieve the ideal state: perhaps learning his philosophy and habituating ourselves to follow it. However, for Sextus, employment of skeptical arguments was the primary exercise. Since neither Pyrrho nor Sextus supposed we could make assertions about the specific nature of things, neither had a philosophy of human nature in a straightforward sense. Nonetheless, presentations of their outlooks betray some perspective on this (e.g., about the relationship between absence of belief and tranquility).

Descartes and Ancient Skepticism: Reheated Cabbage?

Chapter 13 considers a variety of ways in which Pyrrhonian skepticism has been thought to differ from Cartesian skepticism: that is, from the sort of skepticism Descartes describes in (among other places) Meditation 1. For example, it has been argued that Pyrrhonian skepticism disavows belief, whereas Cartesian skepticism disavows only knowledge. It has also been argued that Pyrrhonian skepticism is less extensive than Cartesian skepticism is, and that Pyrrhonian but not Cartesian skepticism is a way of life. This chapter argues, however, that Pyrrhonian skepticism is closer to Cartesian skepticism than it is often taken to be, siding with Descartes in his statement that what is new is not the skepticism he describes, but his refutation of it.

Sextus and External World Skepticism

Chapter 14 discusses the scope of Pyrrhonian skepticism and how it compares with the scope of Cartesian skepticism, with a focus on external world skepticism. At least three general views have been held. First, some commentators think that Pyrrhonian skepticism is less extensive than Cartesian skepticism is. Secondly, Descartes denies that there is a difference in the scopes of ancient and Cartesian skepticism. Thirdly, Hegel thinks that ancient skepticism is more extensive than the skepticism from Descartes’s day to his own is. This chapter argues that the Pyrrhonian skeptics and the Cyrenaics countenance external world skepticism in a recognizable sense. Hence, contrary to a familiar view, Descartes is not the first philosopher to expound external world skepticism.

The Moral Transcendental Argument against Skepticism

Transcendental arguments against skepticism claim that the skeptical argument depends on the falsehood or the unbelievability of the skeptical hypothesis. This chapter argues that the skeptic needs to presuppose the moral or practical rationality of the subject, requiring the existence of an external world with certain features (strongest arguments), the falsehood of the skeptical hypothesis (strong arguments), or the subject’s belief in such a world (weak arguments). The argument starts with rational agency and investigates the sense of moral obligation, moral motives, and virtues that would exist in “vat morality,” arguing that although the skeptic needs to presuppose the rational and moral agency of the subject, the skeptical hypothesis denies or undermines the subject’s agency. The chapter ends by considering whether the skeptic can retreat to Pyrrhonian skepticism to save the skeptical project, concluding that he cannot.

Is Modern Science a Problem for Living as a Pyrrhonist Today? A Discussion of Richard Bett’s “Can We Be Ancient Sceptics?”

In the final chapter of his recent book How to Be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Skepticism, Richard Bett discusses the possibility of living as a Pyrrhonian skeptic today. Chief among his concerns is the scope of the skeptic’s suspension of judgment and whether or not the skeptic could maintain suspension of judgment in light of the results of modern science. For example, how might the skeptic sustain suspension of judgment in light of overwhelming evidence for climate change? Or even atomic theory? Ultimately, Bett concludes that such claims within the natural sciences preclude us from living as Pyrrhonists today. In the following paper I argue, how it is possible for the Pyrrhonian skeptic to suspend judgment on certain well-confirmed scientific theories, how the skeptic does so in accord with rational norms, and in turn, that Pyrrhonian skepticism is possible as a way of life today.

Pyrrhonian Skepticism Meets Speech-Act Theory

This paper applies speech-act theory to craft a new response to Pyrrhonian skepticism and diagnose its appeal. Carefully distinguishing between different levels of language-use and noting their interrelations can help us identify a subtle mistake in a key Pyrrhonian argument.

Beyond Quietism: Transformative Experience in Pyrrhonism and Wittgenstein

Pyrrhonian skepticism is usually understood as a form of quietism, since it is supposed to bring us back to where we were in our everyday lives before we got disturbed by philosophical questions. Similarly, the ‘therapeutic’ and ‘resolute’ readings of Wittgenstein claim that Wittgenstein’s ‘philosophical practice’ results in the dissolution of the corresponding philosophical problems and brings us back to our everyday life. Accordingly, Wittgenstein is often linked to Pyrrhonism and classified as a quietist. Against this reading, I will employ Laurie Paul’s notion of epistemically transformative experience and argue that Pyrrhonian skepticism and Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be interpreted as a philosophical practice that changes our self-understanding in significant ways. I will argue that this practice can evoke transformative experiences and is thereby able to yield a non-propositional insight into the finitude of the human condition. This shows that Pyrrhonian skepticism and Wittgenstein’s philosophy go beyond quietism.

Hegels negative Dialektik

Hegel’s approach to ancient scepticism is often discussed only in the context of epistemological questions. But it is also of crucial importance for his practical philosophy. Hegel draws on central figures of Pyrrhonian scepticism in order to subject Kant’s antinomies – i. e., Kant’s cosmology – to a fundamental revision. He radicalises Kant’s sceptical method to “self-completing scepticism”. At the same time he gives Kant’s concept of the world a practical twist: In Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, world means an inhabited sphere in which powers and counter-powers are in conflict with each other. In doing so, he opens up the tradition of negativist thinking in political philosophy, which ranges from Marx and Adorno to the current theories of radical democracy. When Hegel calls Pyrrhonian skepticism a “negative dialectic”, he thereby marks what he views as a deficit: the inferiority of Pyrrhonian skepticism to speculative philosophy. However, it is precisely the practical dimension of Hegel’s dialectic that suggests that the sceptical motives of his thinking should be given great weight. This can be seen most clearly in Hegel’s concept of Bildung, which defines emancipation processes as the reactivation of open power relations in static conditions of domination.

Does Skepticism Lead to Tranquility? Exploring a Pyrrhonian Theme

Pyrrhonian Skepticism, as described by Sextus Empiricus, has proven to be an influential philosophical tradition. However, little attention has been paid to the empirical claims that animate the Pyrrhonian project. This chapter aims to reverse that trend. First, it argues that Sextus’s assertion that belief causes anxiety plays an essential role in Sextus’s philosophy. It then reviews modern research on dogmatism and anxiety, and building on this research, presents three different studies conducted with the purpose of elucidating the relationship between them. The results suggest, contrary to Sextus’s claim, that dogmatism predicts low levels of anxiety, though no evidence about their causal relation was found.