Sensitivity to interventions and the relationship with numeracy

The main goal of this research was to investigate whether people exhibit algorithm aversion—a tendency to avoid using an imperfect algorithm even if it outperforms human judgments—in the case of estimating students’ percentile scores on a standardized math test. We also explored the relationships between numeracy and algorithm aversion and tested two interventions aimed at reducing algorithm aversion. In two studies, we asked participants to estimate the percentiles of 46 real 15-year-old Polish students on a standardized math test. Participants were offered the opportunity to compare their estimates with the forecasts of an algorithm—a statistical model that predicted real percentile scores based on fi ve explanatory variables (i.e., gender, repeating a class, the number of pages read before the exam, the frequency of playing online games, socioeconomic status). Across two studies, we demonstrated that even though the predictions of the statistical model were closer to students’ percentile scores, participants were less likely to rely on the statistical model predictions in making forecasts. We also found that higher statistical numeracy was related to a higher reluctance to use the algorithm. In Study 2, we introduced two interventions to reduce algorithm aversion. Depending on the experimental condition, participants either received feedback on statistical model predictions or were provided with a detailed description of the statistical model. We found that people, especially those with higher statistical numeracy, avoided using the imperfect algorithm even though it outperformed human judgments. Interestingly, a simple intervention that explained how the statistical model works led to better performance in an estimation task

Culture, learning and rational decision-making: evidence from a TV show

This paper analyzes the French and the Vietnamese versions of the TV game show “The Price is Right”, using data from 130 episodes. We focus on the bidding game, covering 434 rounds and 1,736 bids. We document that players deviate signifi cantly from what is predicted by the model of rational expectations, especially in the French population. Moreover, Vietnamese fourth bidders are found to win more frequently than their French counterparts in spite of using strategic bids less often. We attribute these results to cultural reasons. Contestants from the collectivistic, uncertainty-tolerant culture (i.e., Vietnam) are more reluctant to engage in strategic bidding than individuals from the individualistic, uncertainty-avoidant culture (i.e., France). However, Vietnamese contestants pay more attention to the estimates of the previous players and thus make a better use of the informational advantage inherent to the sequential nature of the game. Overall, our evidence suggests that culture is an important omitted variable in studies that examine cross-country differences in decision-making.