Natural Law in the Teaching of Christian Ethics

This article looks at the ways that Thomas Aquinas’ classic and highly influential understanding of natural law ethics has been criticised by students coming from a number of different faith traditions. It suggests that the way that natural law ethics was deployed in Pope Paul vi’s encyclical Humanae Vitae has not typically been found to be persuasive even among Roman Catholic students. It then looks at the way that Lisa Sowle Cahill takes on board these criticisms and offers a more persuasive account of modified natural law ethics.

‘A Lantern On the Way’: Pope Francis’ Signposts for Ecclesial Ethics

Pope Francis’ way of doing ecclesial ethics is not easy to understand at first glance. It is often unconventional and does not meet the expectations of the faithful who do not wish to see changes in the church, nor does it satisfy those who want rapid change. But if we look more closely at how the Pope understands the church, his approach to ecclesial ethics seems to derive naturally from that. The following contribution aims to show how Pope Francis’ ecclesiology determines his approach to ecclesial ethics. To this end, it will (1) summarize important characteristics of his ecclesiology: the sensus fidelium and synodality; its orientation towards pastoral ministry, the focus on unity in plurality and its process-orientation. From there, it will show which cornerstones for ecclesial ethics can be derived from this ecclesial perspective, namely (2) with respect to formal characteristics and (3) with regard to its content.

Moral Disagreement in Anglican – Roman Catholic Relations

The belief that the Anglican and Roman Catholic churches were divided by moral disagreements came to prominence in the early 1980s and affected the direction of ecumenical dialogue. But no moral disagreements go back to the Reformation era, and the perception of moral difference has undergone many changes since that time, especially reflecting differences of social and political setting. A moral agreement or disagreement is difficult to chart with precision. It is not embodied in a formulation of moral doctrine, since moral reason functions on two planes, that of evaluative description and that of deliberation and decision. Disagreement is phenomenologically present as offence, which has its own dynamic of expansion. Addressing offence, a task involving lay, theological and episcopal contributions, is the primary way in which moral agreement has to be sought and defended.