Clearing the Ground

This chapter sets the stage. It clarifies ‘sensory experience’ and related concepts. It offers arguments against both naïve realism and sense-datum theories. It distinguishes different kinds of representationalism about sensory experience along with a number of further issues that can be put to one side.

Introspection, Adverbialism, and Rich Contents

The qualitative view is distinguished from sense-datum theories. Introspection is distinguished from attention. An account of sensory introspection is developed. A new theory of phenomenal concepts is outlined. The qualitative theory is compared with adverbialism and shown not to be subject to the same criticisms. The qualitative theory is shown to transform the debate about rich contents and allow a wide range of such contents.

Against Representationalism

In this chapter some initial arguments for representationalism are considered and dismissed. Naturalist representationalism is distinguished from phenomenal intentionalism and shown to be implausible. Appeals to the ‘transparency’ of experience are considered and shown to be problematic. These doubts are put on a more explicit footing and are shown to lead to a general argument that conscious sensory properties cannot possibly be essentially representational. Phenomenal intentionalism is argued to collapse into the qualitative view.

The Structure of Experience

In this chapter, the qualitative view is outlined and shown to avoid the problems facing representationalism. The qualitative view is defended as a ‘pure paint’ view and distinguished from the ‘partial paint’ views of Block and Peacocke. The structure of experience is acknowledged. ‘Intentional objects’ are explained, and the dangers of equating them with elements of experience are exposed. The idea that mental ‘paint’ might ‘point’ is discredited.

Introduction

This book addresses a specific question. What is the metaphysical nature of the conscious properties we enjoy when we have sensory experiences? Right now I am looking at a yellow ball in the middle of my garden lawn. In so doing, I am having a conscious visual experience, constituted by my instantiating certain conscious properties, properties that I would cease to possess if I closed my eyes. Similarly, I can hear various background noises, and I can feel the hardness of the chair I am sitting on. These are further sensory experiences involving further conscious properties....