Against Representationalism
In this chapter some initial arguments for representationalism are considered and dismissed. Naturalist representationalism is distinguished from phenomenal intentionalism and shown to be implausible. Appeals to the ‘transparency’ of experience are considered and shown to be problematic. These doubts are put on a more explicit footing and are shown to lead to a general argument that conscious sensory properties cannot possibly be essentially representational. Phenomenal intentionalism is argued to collapse into the qualitative view.
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1979 ◽
Vol 49
(5)
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pp. 1219-1226
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2019 ◽
Vol 9
(6)
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pp. p9091
2020 ◽
Vol 24
(04)
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pp. 1663-1670
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2011 ◽
Vol 40
(12)
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pp. 1750-1756
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2003 ◽
Vol 32
(2)
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pp. 167-174
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2008 ◽
Vol 37
(1)
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pp. 53-59
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