Self-Improvement

This chapter argues for a qualified optimism about self-improvement, that is, for the view that self-improvement in respect of our epistemic vices is sometimes possible and that there is something we can do about our epistemic vices, including our implicit biases. It is possible for us to tackle our character vices as long as we know we have them, are motivated to tackle them, and are willing and able to make the necessary effort of self-control. Some of our epistemic vices are resistant to self-improvement strategies because they deprive us of the motivation to do anything about them. Such vices are resistant vices. Epistemic vices that can’t be eliminated can sometimes be bypassed or outsmarted, but self-ignorance and lack of motivation can limit the effectiveness of outsmarting strategies just as effectively as they can limit the effectiveness of vice-reduction strategies.

Epistemic Postures

Epistemic insouciance is an epistemic vice that takes the form of an affective epistemic posture. Epistemic insouciance is the epistemic vice behind bullshit in Harry Frankfurt’s sense. Epistemic insouciance, which consists in a casual lack of concern about whether one’s beliefs have any basis in reality or adequate evidential support, is different from epistemic malevolence. The latter is a voluntarily adopted epistemic stance rather than an affective posture. Epistemic malevolence, defined by Jason Baehr as opposition to knowledge as such or to another person’s share of knowledge, is illustrated by reference to what Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway refer to as the ‘tobacco strategy’.

A Question of Character

This chapter focuses on epistemic vices that are character traits and, in particular, on the epistemic vice of closed-mindedness. The nature and significance of this epistemic vice is explained by reference of the failure of Israeli intelligence to anticipate the 1973 Yom Kippur surprise attack on Israel. Closed-mindedness is a high-fidelity epistemic vice, that is, one that requires a high degree of behavioural consistency. It is underpinned in many cases by a high need for closure and a low tolerance for ambiguity. Character accounts of epistemic vice are not undermined by situationism but they do need to acknowledge the insights of structuralism since flawed epistemic conduct can have structural as well as personal explanations.

Stealthy Vices

Stealthy vices, such as closed-mindedness, are epistemic vices that are inherently hard to detect because it is in their nature to block their own detection. This chapter defends the view that at least some epistemic vices are stealthy and some are stealthier than others. The stealthiness of stealthy vices is explained on the basis that such vices negate or nullify the epistemic virtues on which active critical reflection on one’s own vices depends. The stealthiness of stealthy vices is the vice epistemological analogue of the Dunning-Kruger effect, but traumatic experiences can sometimes open one’s eyes to one’s own epistemic vices. In such cases one acquires self-knowledge by transformational insight rather than by active critical reflection.

Vice and Responsibility

This chapter explains and defends the distinction between blame and criticism and makes the case that epistemic vices can merit criticism even if they aren’t blameworthy. We are blameworthy for our epistemic vices only if they are epistemically harmful and we are, in the relevant sense, responsible for them. A distinction is drawn between responsibility for acquiring a vice (‘acquisition responsibility’) and responsibility for having a vice that one can change or revise (‘revision responsibility’). Revision responsibility requires the ability to control or modify the vice in question and there are three different varieties of control: voluntary, evaluative, and managerial. To the extent that we have effective control over our character vices that control is managerial rather than voluntary or evaluative.

Vicious Thinking

Judicial thinking in the Birmingham Six trials is used to illustrate the category of thinking vices, epistemically vicious ways of thinking that are distinct from character vices. Thinking that is epistemically vicious in some respect or other isn’t the exclusive preserve of thinkers with the corresponding character vice. There are vices of slow thinking and of fast thinking. Some vicious thinking, such as conspiracy thinking, is only conditionally vicious. A distinction is drawn between thinking vices proper and subject-specific thinking vices and it is argued that the extent to which a given piece of thinking is epistemically vicious is determined by the extent to which it displays thinking vices proper.

Vice and Knowledge

This chapter discusses the view, associated with David Hume and Saul Kripke, that the supposed epistemic vice of dogmatism can play a positive role in protecting our knowledge. It discusses Kripke’s dogmatism paradox and Kuhn’s view that dogmatism can play a positive role in normal science. This chapter argues that the supposed epistemic benefits of dogmatism have been greatly exaggerated and its epistemic drawbacks underestimated. The appropriate response to the claims of Holocaust deniers and other conspiracy theorists is not to avoid or ignore them but to rebut them. Knowers have responsibilities, including the responsibility not to dismiss challenges to their beliefs without good reason.

The Anatomy of Vice

This chapter explains and defends obstructivism about epistemic vice, the view that epistemic vices are blameworthy or otherwise reprehensible character traits, attitudes, or ways of thinking that systematically obstruct the gaining, keeping, or sharing of knowledge. It explains how epistemic vices get in the way of knowledge and criticizes motivational accounts of epistemic vice. Obstructivism focuses on the epistemic consequences of epistemic vices and is a form of consequentialism. The focus in this chapter is on arrogance and its role in obstructing the acquisition and sharing of knowledge during preparations for the 2003 American invasion of Iraq. Epistemic vices are distinguished from mere cognitive defects and an account is given of different senses in which we might have responsibility for our own epistemic vices.