The measurement and prediction of conspiracy beliefs

<p>A conspiracy theory or belief has typically been defined as an allegation of malevolent secrecy and plotting by a group of powerful actors, working in unison to fulfil sinister hidden goals at the expense of the general populace. Such beliefs tend to contradict common (and typically more benign) explanations for events and have the potential to reinforce or be used to ‘justify’ undesirable behaviours (e.g., discrimination, non-adherence to crucial healthcare practices, and environmental damage). However, the social psychological literature, specifically, concerning conspiracy beliefs is in its relative infancy. The overarching aim of this thesis is to provide greater coherency to future literature via a comprehensive examination of the measurement and prediction of conspiracy beliefs. A review of the existing research illustrates that, to date, the literature has tended to take a ‘fractionated’ approach to the study of conspiracy beliefs. That is, studies have tended to focus on scenario-specific conspiracies, and isolated predictors of conspiracy belief. Demonstrating that belief in real-world conspiracies and a generalised tendency to believe in conspiracies are equivalent has theoretical implications of understanding exactly what leads to these beliefs. To address this issue Study 1 examined the development, validation, and comparison of a Specific Conspiracy Belief Scale and a Generalised Conspiracy Belief Scale. A comparison of the relationships between various psychological predictor variables and both of these conspiracy belief scales was conducted in Study 2. These studies revealed that the Generalised Conspiracy Belief Scale was equivalent in performance in terms of its relationship to various predictor variables, and reliability and validity, to previously used specific conspiracy belief measures. The advantage of using the single generalised measure is its ability to be used consistently and comparatively across a range of different conspiracy scenarios. The review of the literature also revealed that although a number of predictor variables have been identified as being associated with conspiracy beliefs, studies have tended to only look at a relatively small subset of variables within a given study. Indeed, a critical analysis shows that the variables themselves may fall in to various (not necessarily independent) groupings or clusters: socio-political, personality, psychopathological, cognitive, and psychological control factors. Thus, the second goal of this thesis was to gain a better understanding of the relative contribution of the variety of variables that have been suggested as predicting conspiracy beliefs. A comprehensive analysis of the role played by a large number of potential predictor variables on their own and as part of domain groupings was performed within the context of a single population study. This issue formed a second aim of Study 2. The results showed that these variables can be reduced down to several common elements, which reveals there is no (as yet identified) single powerfully predictive psychological cause of conspiracy thinking. Rather, it is likely that psychopathological, socio-political, personality, and cognitive elements combine to explain individual differences in conspiracy belief. Finally, the validity of the Generalised Conspiracy Belief Scale and the relationships between a subset of key predictor variables (identified in Study 2) and conspiracy beliefs in the context of a wider population sample was a focus of Study 3. By using a large New Zealand-wide sample, Study 3 also broadened the scope of the thesis to examine the potential contribution of key demographic variables and psychological predictor variables in the prediction of conspiracy beliefs. Combining the demographic and psychological variables together in a hierarchical multiple regression revealed that nearly a quarter of variance in conspiracy belief was explained by these factors. However, when removing the shared variance of these predictors a number of demographic and psychological variables became non-significant or weakly predictive at best – a finding which again suggests that there are common elements that predict conspiracy belief. The remaining unique predictors of conspiracy thinking suggests that one of these common elements represent a hostile, suspicious, cynical, and threat-based worldview. Finally, although demographic variables do impact conspiracy beliefs, their unique effect is very small, and their effect works indirectly by impacting psychological predictors of conspiracy thinking. In conclusion, the current thesis has demonstrated that a single Conspiracy Belief Scale can serve as a useful and valid tool for future studies investigating conspiracy beliefs and that although individual psychological and demographic variables only weakly predict conspiracy beliefs on their own, they do cluster around potential themes which can aid in the development in a more comprehensive theoretical perspective on conspiracy.</p>

The measurement and prediction of conspiracy beliefs

<p>A conspiracy theory or belief has typically been defined as an allegation of malevolent secrecy and plotting by a group of powerful actors, working in unison to fulfil sinister hidden goals at the expense of the general populace. Such beliefs tend to contradict common (and typically more benign) explanations for events and have the potential to reinforce or be used to ‘justify’ undesirable behaviours (e.g., discrimination, non-adherence to crucial healthcare practices, and environmental damage). However, the social psychological literature, specifically, concerning conspiracy beliefs is in its relative infancy. The overarching aim of this thesis is to provide greater coherency to future literature via a comprehensive examination of the measurement and prediction of conspiracy beliefs. A review of the existing research illustrates that, to date, the literature has tended to take a ‘fractionated’ approach to the study of conspiracy beliefs. That is, studies have tended to focus on scenario-specific conspiracies, and isolated predictors of conspiracy belief. Demonstrating that belief in real-world conspiracies and a generalised tendency to believe in conspiracies are equivalent has theoretical implications of understanding exactly what leads to these beliefs. To address this issue Study 1 examined the development, validation, and comparison of a Specific Conspiracy Belief Scale and a Generalised Conspiracy Belief Scale. A comparison of the relationships between various psychological predictor variables and both of these conspiracy belief scales was conducted in Study 2. These studies revealed that the Generalised Conspiracy Belief Scale was equivalent in performance in terms of its relationship to various predictor variables, and reliability and validity, to previously used specific conspiracy belief measures. The advantage of using the single generalised measure is its ability to be used consistently and comparatively across a range of different conspiracy scenarios. The review of the literature also revealed that although a number of predictor variables have been identified as being associated with conspiracy beliefs, studies have tended to only look at a relatively small subset of variables within a given study. Indeed, a critical analysis shows that the variables themselves may fall in to various (not necessarily independent) groupings or clusters: socio-political, personality, psychopathological, cognitive, and psychological control factors. Thus, the second goal of this thesis was to gain a better understanding of the relative contribution of the variety of variables that have been suggested as predicting conspiracy beliefs. A comprehensive analysis of the role played by a large number of potential predictor variables on their own and as part of domain groupings was performed within the context of a single population study. This issue formed a second aim of Study 2. The results showed that these variables can be reduced down to several common elements, which reveals there is no (as yet identified) single powerfully predictive psychological cause of conspiracy thinking. Rather, it is likely that psychopathological, socio-political, personality, and cognitive elements combine to explain individual differences in conspiracy belief. Finally, the validity of the Generalised Conspiracy Belief Scale and the relationships between a subset of key predictor variables (identified in Study 2) and conspiracy beliefs in the context of a wider population sample was a focus of Study 3. By using a large New Zealand-wide sample, Study 3 also broadened the scope of the thesis to examine the potential contribution of key demographic variables and psychological predictor variables in the prediction of conspiracy beliefs. Combining the demographic and psychological variables together in a hierarchical multiple regression revealed that nearly a quarter of variance in conspiracy belief was explained by these factors. However, when removing the shared variance of these predictors a number of demographic and psychological variables became non-significant or weakly predictive at best – a finding which again suggests that there are common elements that predict conspiracy belief. The remaining unique predictors of conspiracy thinking suggests that one of these common elements represent a hostile, suspicious, cynical, and threat-based worldview. Finally, although demographic variables do impact conspiracy beliefs, their unique effect is very small, and their effect works indirectly by impacting psychological predictors of conspiracy thinking. In conclusion, the current thesis has demonstrated that a single Conspiracy Belief Scale can serve as a useful and valid tool for future studies investigating conspiracy beliefs and that although individual psychological and demographic variables only weakly predict conspiracy beliefs on their own, they do cluster around potential themes which can aid in the development in a more comprehensive theoretical perspective on conspiracy.</p>

Acquiring knowledge: Epistemic trust in the age of fake news

The alarming spread of fake news and the breakdown of collective trust in sources of information is a major ongoing concern. Public mistrust and conspiracy beliefs canchange behaviour in a way that profoundly alters society’s reaction to new information. However, we still lack a broad psychological and socio-evolutionary understanding ofthe transmission of knowledge: the concept of epistemic trust (defined as trust in communicated knowledge) could provide the basis for such an integrated understanding. This study examined the role of epistemic trust in determining individualcapacity to recognise fake and real news, and susceptibility to conspiracy thinking – both in general and in relation to COVID-19. Measuring three different epistemic dispositions – trusting, mistrusting and credulous – in two different studies (study 1 = 705; study 2 = 502), we found that Credulity is associated with inability to discriminate between fake and real news. To explore the developmental factors at work in creating vulnerability to fake news, we investigated the mediating role of Mistrust and Credulity, and found that these factors mediated the relationship between exposure to childhood adversity and the failure to distinguish between fake and real news. Both Mistrust and Credulity were also associated with general and COVID-19 related conspiracy beliefs; similarly, Mistrust and Credulity were associated with vaccine hesitancy, both in general and in relation to COVID-19. Findings illuminate the potential psychological processes at work in generating broad social-political phenomena such as fake news and conspiracy thinking.

Factors affecting conspiracy theory endorsement in paranoia

Paranoia and conspiracy thinking are known to be distinct but correlated constructs, but it is unknown whether certain types of conspiracy thinking are more common in paranoia than others. In a large (n=1000), pre-registered online study we tested if endorsement of items on a new Components of Conspiracy Ideation Questionnaire varied according to a) whether harm was described as being intentional, and b) whether they were self-referential. Our predictions were supported: paranoia was positively associated with endorsement of items on this questionnaire overall and more paranoid individuals were more likely to endorse items describing intentional and self-referential harm. Belief in one item on the Components of Conspiracy Ideation Questionnaire was associated with belief in others and items describing incidental harm and harm to others were found to be more believable overall. Individuals who endorsed conspiracy theory items on the questionnaire were more likely to state that people similar to them would as well, although, counter to our expectations, this effect was not reduced in paranoia.

Gender Differences and the Five Facets of Conspiracy Theory

Although research examining conspiracy theory beliefs has been examined, there is conflicting literature on the relationship between gender and conspiracy thinking. Before this study, little research has been conducted on the differences between males and females in each of the five facets of conspiracy theory. This study was designed to investigate differences in gender as they pertain to government malfeasance (GM), malevolent global conspiracies (MG), extraterrestrial cover-up (ET), personal well-being (PW), and control of information (CI). It was hypothesized that there are statistically significant differences between females and males when it comes to conspiracy theory beliefs for each of the five facets. Archival data from 2016 containing responses to the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale was analyzed. Results supported the main hypothesis of this investigation that significant differences do, in fact, exist between females and males in all five facets of conspiracy theory: government malfeasance, malevolent global conspiracies, extraterrestrial cover-up, personal well-being, and control of information. In addition, this study revealed that females score higher than males in all facets. In general, a computed total conspiracy belief score demonstrated that females (M = 45.10, SD = 15.07) were significantly higher than males (M = 42.13, SD = 15.90). Nevertheless, some recent research has reported that women were significantly less likely than men to engage in &lsquo;conspiratorial thinking&rsquo; and endorse a conspiracy about the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020. These findings may be suggesting a change in direction for gender differences and a need for further research.&nbsp; &nbsp;

Angstcultuur en complotdenken tijdens het Bestand

Conspiracy Thinking and the Culture of Fear During the Twelve Year’s Truce: The Character Assassination of Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (1617-1619) A remarkable public attack was launched against John of Oldenbarnevelt during the Dutch Truce Conflicts of 1609-1619, which culminated in his execution in May 1619. This article analyses the genesis and effectiveness of this early modern ‘character assassination’ of a leader of state. It argues that this attack derived its power from a carefully nourished, international, protestant culture of fear, in which the preservation of the Dutch Republic was deemed essential to the survival of protestantism as a whole. Two interconnected elements of this culture of fear played into the hands of Oldenbarnevelt’s opponents: the steady stream of international news to the Dutch Republic due to its new infrastructure of news, and the dominant conspiratorial mindset amongst the elite and the wider public alike.

Right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation predict rejection of science and scientists

Previous research has highlighted how ideological factors such as political self-identification, religiosity and conspiracy thinking influence our beliefs about scientific issues such as climate change and vaccination. Across three studies (combined N = 9,022) we expand on this line of inquiry to show for the first time that the ideological attitudes relating to authoritarianism and group-based dominance predict disagreement with the scientific consensus in several scientific domains. We show these effects are almost entirely mediated by varying combinations of ideological (political ideology, religiosity, free-market endorsement, conspiracy thinking) and science-specific (scientific knowledge, trust in scientists) constructs, depending on the scientific issue in question. Importantly, a general distrust of science and scientists emerges as the most consistent mediator across different scientific domains. We find that, consistent with previous research, the ideological roots of rejection of science vary across scientific issues. However, we also show that these roots may share a common origin in ideological attitudes regarding authority and equality.

Facing Epistemic Authorities

Disrespect for the truth, the rise of conspiracy thinking, and a pervasive distrust in experts are widespread features of the post-truth condition in current politics and public opinion. Among the many good explanations of these phenomena there is one that is only rarely discussed: that something is wrong with our deeply entrenched intellectual standards of (i) using our own critical thinking without any restriction and (ii) respecting the judgment of every rational agent as epistemically relevant. This chapter argues that these two Enlightenment principles—the Principle of Unrestricted Critical Thinking and the Principle of Democratic Reason—not only conflict with what is rationally required from a purely epistemic point of view, but also further the spread of conspiracy theories and undermine trust in experts. As a result, we should typically defer to experts without using any of our own reasons regarding the subject matter