Why Do They Write That Way?

A deep gulf of misunderstanding separates analytic philosophers from scholars in other humanistic disciplines. The same gulf also separates analytic theologians from the rest of the religious studies academy. Explaining and addressing this gulf is one of the major tasks of this book as a whole. There is no doubt that the gulf is a joint construction, and that analytic and nonanalytic thinkers have collectively created it and allowed it to persist. Analytic philosophers sometimes lack hermeneutical charity. But at the same time, other humanists often misunderstand what analytic philosophy really is. I want to persuade nonanalytic colleagues of the value of analytic theology, and so I must allay some of these misunderstandings. Yet I also want analytic theologians and philosophers to recognize that the analytic style of writing and thinking comes with its own limitations. Like all forms of inquiry, analytic theology has “characteristic deformations,” typical excesses, and common ways of going wrong. Many of its characteristic deformations are inherited from analytic philosophy. Analytic theologians can accept this criticism without conceding the value of analytic philosophy or analytic theology.

Analytic Theology as Rigorous Appreciation

Part IV turns to an extended engagement with the academic study of religion, which is often constitutively hostile to any form of theology. Chapter 14 considers the vexed role of normative inquiry in the academic study of religion. It defends normative inquiry, and argues that analytic theology is a form of post-critical, normative inquiry that prizes attachment and “rigorous appreciation.” As such, analytic theology can contribute to the study of religions while it also maintains its own distinctive focus on evaluating Christian truth claims and practices. The chapter then concludes with a modest proposal on behalf of comparative analytic theology.

Inquiry and Argument in the Secular Academy

Part IV turns to an extended engagement with the academic study of religion, which is often constitutively hostile to any form of theology. Chapter 11 identifies some of the norms of inquiry and argument that prevail in the secular academy in order to show that analytic theology conforms to those very same norms. I develop a framework for academic argument that depends on the notion of “discursive commitments,” taken from the pragmatist philosophy of Robert Brandom and Jeffrey Stout. Here is the central insight: when we engage in academic argument, we are obliged to support our claims with reasons and evidence, and to respond with reasons and evidence when our claims are appropriately challenged.

Analytic Theology in the Religious Studies Academy

The book begins with three very brief chapters that collectively introduce the work as a whole. Chapter 3 turns to the academic study of religion. Many contemporary scholars of religion do not regard theology as a genuine form of academic inquiry. Yet contemporary analytic philosophy shows that theology need not confine itself to historicist or empiricist methods in order to count as a genuine form of academic inquiry. The methods of analytic epistemology and metaphysics—which flourish in every philosophy department—are also appropriate tools with which to investigate questions about the divine. Analytic theology draws on these same tools. I outline the argument of Part IV, which considers three ongoing debates within the academic study of religion: naturalism, critique, and normativity.

Naturalism as Metaphysics, Reduction without Fears

Part IV turns to an extended engagement with the academic study of religion, which is often constitutively hostile to any form of theology. Chapter 12 considers the place of “naturalism” and “reductionism” in the academic study of religion. While individual scholars of religion can—and often should—practice methodological naturalism, attempts to justify methodological naturalism as a global, field-defining norm inevitably presuppose controversial metaphysical claims, and thereby collapse into ontological naturalism—a position that I call “ontological naturalism on the cheap.” The chapter concludes that any barriers to including analytic theology in the wider field of religious studies are local and prudential, not global and methodological.

The Value and Distinctiveness of Analytic Theology

The book begins with three very brief chapters that collectively introduce the work as a whole. I aim to hold together three very different audiences: analytic theologians and philosophers of religion, other academic theologians, and scholars of religion. I want to build bridges across the various intellectual gaps that currently divide them. Chapter 1 introduces analytic theology and attempts to distinguish it from related forms of inquiry. Analytic theology uses analytic philosophy to elucidate the meaning, coherence, and truth of Christian doctrines. This form of inquiry is valuable because the questions it asks are intrinsically important. For analytic theologians, though not for everyone, analytic theology is also fun. I outline the argument of Part II, which considers the nature of analytic theology and analytic philosophy in more depth.

The Hegemony of Critique

Part IV turns to an extended engagement with the academic study of religion, which is often constitutively hostile to any form of theology. Chapter 13 concerns the role of “critique” in the academic study of religion, where “critique” is understood as a specific discourse—something more than mere criticism. Critique remains valuable, but in the contemporary religious studies academy, it has become hegemonic, to the point where it threatens to crowd out other equally legitimate methods of inquiry. Analytic theologians are well positioned to grasp the limitations of critique precisely because critique’s moves and methods are so different from those of analytic theology. I argue that the academic study of religion needs to supplement critical inquiry’s “epistemology of power” with a more analytic “epistemology of truth,” one that allows us to assess religious adherence as a form of rational behavior. At the same time, analytic theologians have much to learn from the tradition of critical inquiry.

Three Theological Objections

The book begins with three very brief chapters that collectively introduce the work as a whole. Chapter 2 discusses three common theological objections to analytic theology: the objections from history, mystery, and practice. The objection from history argues that analytic theology does not take history or historical contingency seriously enough. Sometimes, this objection takes an even more direct form: analytic theologians are simply ignorant of the history of doctrine, and of historical sources more generally. According to the objection from mystery, analytic theology falters because it is not well suited for grappling with the mystery and paradox that lie at the heart of the Christian faith. The objection from practice holds that analytic theology is spiritually sterile and therefore not really a form of genuine theology at all. Although they all have some purchase, these three objections do not finally succeed as objections to analytic theology as such, though they may apply to individual analytic theologians. I outline the argument of Part III, which calls for a more “theological analytic theology,” and defends analytic theology from a nest of connected objections that all concern idolatry.

On “Theistic Personalism”

Part III calls for a more theological analytic theology and defends analytic theology from some common theological objections. Chapter 9 considers worries about “theistic personalism,” and the charge that the God that emerges from analytic theology is still too limited and anthropomorphic to be the God of the Christian faith. According to critics, treating God as a person, even the greatest conceivable person, is equivalent to treating God as a very exalted creature. Analytic theologians have a variety of ways to avoid this charge. When properly understood, analytic perfect being theology is a way of affirming the creator/creature distinction, not a way of effacing it.

A Theology of Analytic Reason

Part III calls for a more theological analytic theology and defends analytic theology from some common theological objections. Chapter 6 argues that the Christian doctrine of creation furnishes a warrant for analytic theology. The doctrine of creation gives us good reason to value theology as such, traditionally understood as faith seeking understanding. So the only real question is whether analytic theology counts as a legitimate way for those with faith to seek understanding. This question resolves into the practical question of whether analytic theology really can help us distinguish theological truth from theological falsehood. The answer to this question is: sometimes, but not always.