Reproductive Choice

Abstract An enduring ethical dispute accompanies prenatal screening and testing (PST) technologies. This ethical debate focuses on notions of reproductive choice. On one side of the dispute are those who have supported PST as a way to empower women’s reproductive choice, while on the other side are those who argue that PST, particularly when made a routine part of prenatal care, limits deliberate choice. Empirical research does not resolve this ethical debate with evidence both of women for whom PST enhances their choices but also persistent evidence of recurrent problems between PST and women’s autonomous decision-making. While there have been attempts to remove challenges to reproductive choice, it has been argued that these challenges cannot be removed entirely. In this paper I provide a historical review of PST technologies’ development and in doing so provide a detailed insight into the root causes of this tension between the opposing sides of this debate. This historical account provides evidence that those who championed the early use of these technologies did so in order to achieve a number of wholly different goals other than women’s choice and empowerment. These different aims focus on scientific discovery and eugenic goals and, I argue, are irreconcilable with women’s choice and empowerment. It thus may not be surprising that the resulting practice of PST continues to resist compatibility with women’s choice and empowerment. Ultimately, by understanding the historical foundations of PST we can more effectively assess how to reconcile women’s reproductive autonomy with routine prenatal screening.

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Defining Life and Regulating Reproductive Choice

The Hastings Center Report ◽

10.1002/hast.892 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 48 (5) ◽

pp. 3-4

Author(s):

Jonathan F. Will

Keyword(s):

Reproductive Choice

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'They are Not the Ones Facing a Life Changing Choice': Public Attitudes to Anti-Reproductive Choice ('Pro-Life') Protests

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.3132457 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Louise Livesey ◽

Kerry Rees ◽

Pauline Dooley ◽

Brian Frederick ◽

Joanna Kesy

Keyword(s):

Public Attitudes ◽

Reproductive Choice ◽

Pro Life

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Liberalism or Immigration Restrictions, but Not Both

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy ◽

10.26556/jesp.v10i2.99 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 10 (2) ◽

pp. 1-23 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Christopher Freiman ◽

Javier Hidalgo

Keyword(s):

Occupational Choice ◽

Freedom Of Speech ◽

Prima Facie ◽

Social Costs ◽

Self Determination ◽

Reproductive Choice ◽

Freedom Of Movement ◽

The Social

This paper argues for a dilemma: you can accept liberalism or immigration restrictions, but not both. More specifically, the standard arguments for restricting freedom of movement apply equally to textbook liberal freedoms, such as freedom of speech, religion, occupation and reproductive choice. We begin with a sketch of liberalism’s core principles and an argument for why freedom of movement is plausibly on a par with other liberal freedoms. Next we argue that, if a state’s right to self-determination grounds a prima facie right to restrict immigration, then it also grounds a prima facie right to restrict freedom of speech, religion, sexual choice and more. We then suggest that the social costs associated with freedom of immigration are also costs associated with occupational choice, speech and reproduction. Thus, a state’s interest in reducing these costs gives it prima facie justification to restrict not only immigration but also other core liberal freedoms. Moreover, we rebut the objection that, even if the standard arguments for a prima facie right to restrict immigration also support a prima facie right to restrict liberal freedoms generally, there are differences that render immigration restrictions – but not restrictions on speech, religion, etc. – justified all things considered. In closing, we suggest that the theoretical price of supporting immigration restrictions – viz., compromising a commitment to liberal principles – is too steep to pay.

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