Cooperative decision in a closed-loop supply chain considering carbon emission reduction and low-carbon promotion

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hui Li ◽  
Chuanxu Wang ◽  
Meng Shang ◽  
Wei Ou ◽  
Xiaohui Qin
Kybernetes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Na Wang ◽  
Yulin Zhang ◽  
Jing Li

PurposeOutsourcing remanufacturing is a major form of remanufacturing, and emission reduction is an important part of a manufacturer's production. This paper aims to investigate carbon emission reduction strategies in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with outsourcing remanufacturing and design a contract to coordinate the CLSC.Design/methodology/approachThe authors establish two-period game models between an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and third-party remanufacturer (TPR) in different scenarios, including decentralized decision, centralized decision and coordinated decision. Furthermore, the authors study the optimal decisions by maximizing the profit model. The authors also investigate the impact of a carbon tax and emission reduction on the optimal decisions through comparative analysis.FindingsEmission reduction increases the quantity of new products and the OEM's profit. However, emission reduction decreases the outsourcing fee, which is not conducive to remanufacturing; thus, the TPR's profit does not necessarily increase. Compared with a decentralized scenario, the output of remanufactured products and the total profit increase. When the acceptance level of remanufactured products is high enough or when emissions from remanufacturing are low enough, the total carbon emissions are reduced in the centralized scenario. For the coordination of the CLSC, the OEM needs to increase the outsourcing fee and the TPR needs to share part of the emission reduction costs.Research limitations/implicationsThe TPR can choose three different remanufacturing strategies, namely, no remanufacturing, partial remanufacturing or full remanufacturing. For the majority of firms, it is difficult to remanufacture all used products. Therefore, the analysis is based only on partial remanufacturing.Practical implicationsThe results provide insights for remanufacturing and emission reduction decisions, as well as a decision basis for the cooperation between the OEM and TPR.Originality/valueThe authors combine the OEM's carbon emission reduction with outsourcing remanufacturing, and investigate the impact of technological spillover on the TPR's profit.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Guangzhou Yan ◽  
Qinyu Song ◽  
Yaodong Ni ◽  
Xiangfeng Yang

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This paper studies the pricing and recycling decision problems in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) containing a manufacturer, a downstream retailer, and a third-party recycling left. The manufacturer is subjected to the cap-and-trade regulation and determines the wholesale price of products and carbon emission reduction rate. The retailer determines its resale price to meet customer demands. The third-party recycling left determines the collection rate of recycling and remanufacturing used products. The new product demands, total carbon emissions, and recovery of these products are characterized as uncertain variables due to lack of historical data or insufficient data collected for research. By constructing three decentralized game models, we explore the equilibrium solutions under the corresponding decision-making situation and the corresponding analytical solutions. Finally, numerical experiments are performed to show the total profit of supply chain members for each structure and some special insights are drawn.</p>


2014 ◽  
Vol 1073-1076 ◽  
pp. 2539-2544
Author(s):  
Yan Ju Zhou ◽  
Yu Qing Huang

For the existence of carbon emission reduction cost, the retail price of the products is so high that the market demand is low, which restricts the promotion of low-carbon products. On the background of a bilateral-monopoly supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, we establish Stackelberg models based on the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing. And we analyze the changes of the order quantity, the profits of each member and the whole supply chain before and after the implementation of the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing contract. According to the research, when the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing contract is introduced into the model, it leads to a good consequence that the optimal order quantity of the low-carbon product increases, the retail price decreases, and the manufacturer and the retailer will get Pareto improvement on certain condition. Then we derivate the necessary conditions that the profit of the retailer and the manufacturer could both increase.


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