Cost-Sharing Contract in Low Carbonization Supply Chain Based on Improving Demand for Low-Carbon Products

2014 ◽  
Vol 1073-1076 ◽  
pp. 2539-2544
Author(s):  
Yan Ju Zhou ◽  
Yu Qing Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Reduction Cost

For the existence of carbon emission reduction cost, the retail price of the products is so high that the market demand is low, which restricts the promotion of low-carbon products. On the background of a bilateral-monopoly supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, we establish Stackelberg models based on the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing. And we analyze the changes of the order quantity, the profits of each member and the whole supply chain before and after the implementation of the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing contract. According to the research, when the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing contract is introduced into the model, it leads to a good consequence that the optimal order quantity of the low-carbon product increases, the retail price decreases, and the manufacturer and the retailer will get Pareto improvement on certain condition. Then we derivate the necessary conditions that the profit of the retailer and the manufacturer could both increase.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Investment in Carbon Emission-Reducing Technology Based on Stochasticity and Low-Carbon Preferences

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Shan Yu ◽  
Qiang Hou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Dynamic Perspective ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

Due to excessive greenhouse gas emissions, carbon emission-reducing measures are urgently needed. Important emission-reduction measures mainly include carbon trading and low-carbon cost subsidies. Comprehensive consideration of these two policies is a research hotspot in the field of low-carbon technology investment. Based on this background, this paper considers the impact of consumer low-carbon preferences on market demand and the impact of uncertainty in carbon emission-reduction behaviour. We construct a stochastic differential game model with upstream and downstream enterprises based on cost-sharing coordination under a cost subsidy. From a dynamic perspective, this paper researches the optimal equilibrium strategy and evolution characteristics of the joint emission-reduction mechanism in a supply chain. This paper discusses the sensitivity of the parameters and uses numerical simulation to verify the impact of each parameter on the emission-reduction decision-making activities of stakeholders after introducing the cost subsidy. The results show that a cost subsidy policy can promote carbon emission-reduction investment and supply chain profit. Thus, it is important to strengthen technical cooperation and exchange among enterprises.

scholarly journals Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for A Wood Forest Product Supply Chain under Carbon Cap-and-Trade

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mingjun Sun ◽  
Hongjun Peng ◽  
Shuai Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Sink ◽  
Forest Products ◽  
Forest Product ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Emission Rights ◽  
Reduction Cost

We consider a wood forest product supply chain consisting of a forestry company and a wood forest products manufacturer, where the forestry company produces timber and forestry carbon sinks, and the manufacturer consumes timber and carbon emission rights. A Stackelberg model is adopted to investigate the forest scale and carbon emission reduction decisions of the supply chain. We design and analyze the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing (ERCS) mechanism and carbon sink cost-sharing (SCS) mechanism, respectively. The result shows that both contracts can help the wood forest product supply chain to achieve higher profits. The ERCS mechanism may encourage the manufacturer to increase emission reduction level and the forestry company to expand the forest scale. The SCS mechanism is beneficial to the expansion of carbon sink forests; however, it may lead to the manufacturer decreasing investment in carbon emission reduction measures.

scholarly journals Optimal Pricing Decisions for a Low-Carbon Supply Chain Considering Fairness Concern under Carbon Quota Policy

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 556
Author(s):  
Hao Zou ◽  
Jin Qin ◽  
Bo Dai
Keyword(s):  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Reduction Rate ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Close Attention ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Total Profit ◽  
Fairness Concern

This research investigates the effect of fairness concerns on a sustainable low-carbon supply chain (LCSC) with a carbon quota policy, in which a manufacturer is in charge of manufacturing low-carbon products and sells them to a retailer. The demand is affected by price and the carbon emission reduction rate. The optimal decisions of pricing and carbon emission reduction rate are analyzed under four decision models: (i) centralized decision, (ii) decentralized decision without fairness concern, (iii) decentralized decision with manufacturer’s fairness concern, (iv) decentralized decision with retailer’s fairness concern. The results indicate that the profits in the centralized LCSC are higher than those in the decentralized LCSC with fairness concern. If a manufacturer pays close attention to fairness, the fairness concern coefficient will reduce the carbon emission reduction rate and the profit of the LCSC and increase the wholesale price and the retail price of the product. If a retailer pays close attention to fairness, and the preference of consumers for a low-carbon product is low, the fairness concern coefficient of the retailer increases the total profit of the LCSC and decreases the carbon emission reduction rate and retail price of the product. Otherwise, if the preference of consumers for a low-carbon product is great, the fairness concern coefficient of the retailer would lead to a lower retail price compared with the retail price in the centralized decision and decrease the total profit of the LCSC.

scholarly journals Optimal Pricing, Ordering, and Coordination for Prefabricated Building Supply Chain with Power Structure and Flexible Cap-and-Trade

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (19) ◽  
pp. 2426
Author(s):  
Wen Jiang ◽  
Menglin Liu ◽  
Lu Gan ◽  
Chong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Supply Chain Performance ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Prefabricated Building

Under the increasing pressure of global emission reduction, prefabricated buildings are becoming more and more popular. As prefabricated building manufacturers and assemblers are emerging in the market, how do they make decisions of pricing, ordering, and emission reduction? In this paper, game theory is used to make the decisions for the prefabricated building supply chain with flexible cap-and-trade and different power structures, i.e., using prefabricated building manufacturers as the leader, using the vertical Nash equilibrium, and using prefabricated building assemblers as the leader. The two-part tariff contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain and to improve the supply chain performance. Moreover, we discuss the influence of different power structures and the two-part tariff contract on the optimal decisions and profits. Finally, numerical analysis is used to verify the conclusions. This indicates that the supply chain leaders will gain a higher profit and that the power structure has a significant influence on the two-part tariff contract, which will result in an unfair distribution of profit. High carbon trading prices benefit carbon emission reduction. Consumer low-carbon awareness has a positive effect on carbon emission reduction and supply chain performance.

scholarly journals The Impact of Government Subsidies on the Low-Carbon Supply Chain Based on Carbon Emission Reduction Level

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (14) ◽  
pp. 7603
Author(s):  
Biao Li ◽  
Yong Geng ◽  
Xiqiang Xia ◽  
Dan Qiao
Keyword(s):  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

To improve low-carbon technology, the government has shifted its strategy from subsidizing low-carbon products (LCP) to low-carbon technology. To analyze the impact of government subsidies based on carbon emission reduction levels on different entities in the low-carbon supply chain (LCSC), game theory is used to model the provision of government subsidies to low-carbon enterprises and retailers. The main findings of the paper are that a government subsidy strategy based on carbon emission reduction levels can effectively drive low-carbon enterprises to further reduce the carbon emissions. The government’s choice of subsidy has the same effect on the LCP retail price per unit, the sales volume, and the revenue of low-carbon products per unit. When the government subsidizes the retailer, the low-carbon product wholesale price per unit is the highest. That is, low-carbon enterprises use up part of the government subsidies by increasing the wholesale price of low-carbon products. The retail price of low-carbon products per unit is lower than the retail price of low-carbon products in the context of decentralized decision making, but the sales volume and revenue of low-carbon products are greater in the centralized decision-making. The cost–benefit-sharing contract could enable the decentralized decision model to achieve the same level of profit as the centralized decision model.

scholarly journals Game Theoretic Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction and Sales Promotion in Dyadic Supply Chain in Presence of Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liangjie Xia ◽  
Longfei He
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Sales Promotion ◽  
Side Payment ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Cost

The paper studies how the combination of the manufacturer’s carbon emission reduction and the retailer’s emission reduction relevant promotion impacts the performances of a dyadic supply chain in low-carbon environment. We consider three typical scenarios, that is, centralized and decentralized without or with side-payment. We compare measures of supply chain performances, such as profitabilities, emission reduction efficiencies, and effectiveness, in these scenarios. To improve chain-wide performances, a new side-payment contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain and numerical experiments are also conducted. We find the following. (1) In decentralized setting, the retailer will provide emission cutting allowance to the manufacturer only if their unit product profit margin is higher enough than the manufacturer’s, and the emission reduction level of per unit product is a monotonically increasing function with respect to the cost pooling proportion provided by the retailer; (2) the new side-payment contract can coordinate the dyadic supply chain successfully due to its integrating sales promotion effort and emission reduction input, which results in system pareto optimality under decentralized individual rationality but achieves a collective rationality effect in the centralized setting; (3) when without external force’s regulation, consumers’ low-carbon awareness is to enhance consumers’ utility and decrease profits of supply chain firms.

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