Monetary policy transparency, inflation and the sacrifice ratio

2002 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georgios Chortareas ◽  
David Stasavage ◽  
Gabriel Sterne
2015 ◽  
Vol 62 (s1) ◽  
pp. 85-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentina Mera ◽  
Monica Pop Silaghi

Abstract This study introduces some aspects regarding the link between monetary policy and economic growth, through a rule well known in the literature which is named Taylor’s rule and through the concept of sacrifice ratio which encompasses the impact of the cost of disinflation on the economic growth of a country. In this paper, we rely on estimates of the growth of potential GDP of the National Bank of Romania for the period 2003-2006 while for the period 2007-2012 we rely on the estimates reported by the International Monetary Fund. Thus, we carry a deterministic exercise for computing the interest rate on the period 2003-2012 as depicted from the Taylor’s rule and we compare it with the effective monetary policy interest rate used by the National Bank of Romania. In the same time, we calculate the sacrifice ratio for the period 1997-2013 so as to be able to form an opinion regarding the cost of disinflation and its comparison with the typical estimates for larger time spans and for other countries.


2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Down

It is widely believed that independent central banks produce costless low inflation. Yet a few recent studies indicate that more independent central banks are associated with higher output costs during disinflations. This carries the implication that there are indeed costs associated with autonomy. The author develops and extends those analyses in two important ways. First, he shows that central bank independence (CBI) affects both the output and the unemployment costs of disinflation. Because central banks control only monetary policy, they should not exert a differential effect on the two ratios, and there should be a positive relationship between independence and both the unemployment and the output costs of disinflations. Second, by including a range of potentially significant political and institutional controls, the author demonstrates both the importance of political and institutional determinants of the costs of disinflation and that CBI is a robust predictor of those costs.


Author(s):  
Mohammed M. Tumala ◽  
Babatunde S. Omotosho

This paper employs text-mining techniques to analyse the communication strategy of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) during the period 2004-2019. Since the policy communique released after each meeting of the CBN’s monetary policy committee (MPC) represents an important tool of central bank communication, we construct a corpus based on 87 policy communiques with a total of 123, 353 words. Having processed the textual data into a form suitable for analysis, we examined the readability, sentiments, and topics of the policy documents. While the CBN’s communication has increased substantially over the years, implying increased monetary policy transparency; the computed Coleman and Liau readability index shows that the word and sentence structures of the policy communiques have become more complex, thus reducing its readability. In terms of monetary policy sentiments, we find an average net score of -10.5 per cent, reflecting the level of policy uncertainties faced by the MPC over the sample period. In addition, our results indicate that the topics driving the linguistic contents of the communiques were influenced by the Bank’s policy objectives as well as the nature of shocks hitting the economy per period.


2019 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 368-393
Author(s):  
Ruttachai Seelajaroen ◽  
Pornanong Budsaratragoon ◽  
Boonlert Jitmaneeroj

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ravindra H. Dholakia ◽  
Kadiyala Sri Virinchi

2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Pickering ◽  
Héctor A. Valle

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document