Do monetary policy transparency and central bank communication reduce interest rate disagreement?

2019 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 368-393
Author(s):  
Ruttachai Seelajaroen ◽  
Pornanong Budsaratragoon ◽  
Boonlert Jitmaneeroj
Author(s):  
Mohammed M. Tumala ◽  
Babatunde S. Omotosho

This paper employs text-mining techniques to analyse the communication strategy of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) during the period 2004-2019. Since the policy communique released after each meeting of the CBN’s monetary policy committee (MPC) represents an important tool of central bank communication, we construct a corpus based on 87 policy communiques with a total of 123, 353 words. Having processed the textual data into a form suitable for analysis, we examined the readability, sentiments, and topics of the policy documents. While the CBN’s communication has increased substantially over the years, implying increased monetary policy transparency; the computed Coleman and Liau readability index shows that the word and sentence structures of the policy communiques have become more complex, thus reducing its readability. In terms of monetary policy sentiments, we find an average net score of -10.5 per cent, reflecting the level of policy uncertainties faced by the MPC over the sample period. In addition, our results indicate that the topics driving the linguistic contents of the communiques were influenced by the Bank’s policy objectives as well as the nature of shocks hitting the economy per period.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 76
Author(s):  
Haryo Kuncoro

Central bank communications play an important role in the monetary policy. In the inflation-targeting frameworks, central bank communications might guide public to shape inflation expectations and then determine actual inflation rates through which the policy interest rates policy would manage them. This paper studied the impact and central bank monetary policy communications on the policy interest rate. Unlike other studies, this paper uses two stages. First, we estimate the impact of central bank communication on the inflation expectation gap. Second, we use the estimated value of inflation expectation gap to predict the policy interest rate. The study found evidence that economic agents analyse the Governor Board of Central Bank of Indonesia meeting decisions every month to shape their inflation expectation. Therefore, the difference between inflation expectation and actual inflation tends to narrow. The inflation expectation gap affects the policy interest rates in Indonesia. In other words, the policy interest rates can control the inflation rate and anchor expectations as required by the inflation-targeting framework.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-32
Author(s):  
Jonne O. Lehtimäki ◽  
Marianne Palmu

Abstract Modern central banks increasingly value monetary policy transparency, and attempt to build credibility by communicating their decisions to the public. This paper studies whether the communication of central banks can be used to explain upcoming changes in their most important monetary policy instrument, the short-term refinancing rate, and whether the public can trust central bank communication during times of financial crisis. This is done by constructing an indicator to measure the predictability of monetary policy by calculating the median of the policy makers’ official comments. The performance of this indicator is studied with ordered probit methods. The results show that predictability was reached relatively well at central bank level during the financial crisis despite the rapid growth of economic uncertainty, and that communication can be a useful tool for central banks during uncertain times.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 18-46
Author(s):  
Andrea Cecrdlova

The latest global crisis, which fully erupted in 2008, can have a significant impact on central banks credibility in the long run. During the last crisis, monetary authorities encountered zero interest rate levels and, as a result, started to use non-standard monetary policy instruments. The Czech National Bank decided to use a less standard instrument in November 2013, when it started to intervene on the foreign exchange market in order to keep the Czech currency at level 27 CZK / EUR. However, the European Central Bank also adopted a non-standard instrument, when chose a path of quantitative easing in 2015 in order to support the euro area economy by purchasing financial assets. The question remains whether the approach of Czech National Bank or the approach of European Central Bank in the crisis and post-crisis period was a more appropriate alternative. With the passage of time from the global financial crisis, it is already possible to compare the approaches of these two central banks and at least partially assess what approach was more appropriate under the given conditions. When comparing the central banks approaches to the crisis, the Czech National Bank was better, both in terms of the rate of interest rate cuts and the resulting inflation with regard to the choice of a non-standard monetary policy instrument. The recent financial crisis has revealed the application of moral hazard in practice, both on behalf of the European Central Bank and the Czech National Bank, which may have a significant impact on their credibility and independence in the coming years.


2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (6) ◽  
pp. 1159-1174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel Caldas Montes ◽  
Cristiane Gea

Purpose The evidence concerning the effects of the inflation targeting (IT) regime as well as greater central bank transparency on monetary policy interest rates is not conclusive, and the following questions remain open. What is the effect of adopting IT on both the level and volatility of monetary policy interest rate? Does central bank transparency affect the level of the monetary policy interest rate and its volatility? Are these effects greater in developing countries? The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature by answering these questions. Hence, the paper analyzes the effects of IT and central bank transparency on monetary policy. Design/methodology/approach The analysis uses a sample of 48 countries (31 developing) comprising the period between 1998 and 2014. Based on panel data methodology, estimates are made for the full sample, and then for the sample of developing countries. Findings Countries that adopt the IT regime tend to have lower levels of monetary policy interest rates, as well as lower interest rate volatility. The effect of adopting IT on both the level and volatility of the basic interest rate is smaller in developing countries. Besides, countries with more transparent central banks have lower levels of monetary policy interest rates, as well as lower interest rate volatility. In turn, the effect of central bank transparency on both the level and volatility of the basic interest rate is greater in developing countries. Practical implications The study brings important practical implications regarding the influence of both the IT regime and central bank transparency on monetary policy. Originality/value Studies have sought to analyze whether IT and central bank transparency are effective to control inflation. However, few studies analyze the influence of IT and central bank transparency on interest rates. This study differs from the few existing studies since: the analysis is done not only for the effect of transparency on the level of the monetary policy interest rate, but also on its volatility; the central bank transparency index that is used has never been utilized in this sort of analysis; and the study uses panel data methodology, and compares the results between different samples.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-313
Author(s):  
Wondemhunegn Ezezew Melesse

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to compare business cycle fluctuations in Ethiopia under interest rate and money growth rules. Design/methodology/approach In order to achieve this objective, the author constructs a medium-scale open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. The model features several nominal and real distortions including habit formation in consumption, price rigidity, deviation from purchasing power parity and imperfect capital mobility. The paper also distinguishes between liquidity-constrained and Ricardian households. The model parameters are calibrated for the Ethiopian economy based on data covering the period January 2000–April 2015. Findings The main result suggests that: the model economy with money growth rule is substantially less powerful or more muted for the amplification and transmission of exogenous shocks originating from government spending programs, monetary policy, technological progress and exchange rate movements. The responses of output to fiscal policy shocks are relatively stronger under autarky which appears to confirm the findings of Ilzetzki et al. (2013) who suggest bigger multipliers in self-sufficient, closed economies. With regard to positive productivity shock, however, the model with interest rate feedback rule generates a decline in output and an increase in inflation, which are at odds with conventional empirical regularities. Research limitations/implications The major implication is that a central bank regulating some measure of monetary stocks should not expect (fear) as much expansion (contraction) in output following currency devaluation (liquidity withdrawal) as a sister central bank that relies on an interest rate feedback rule. As emphasized by Mishra et al. (2010) the necessary conditions for stronger transmission of interest-rule-based monetary policy shocks are hardly existent in emerging and developing economies targeting monetary aggregates; hence the relatively weaker responses of output and inflation in the model economy with money growth rule. Monetary policy authorities need to be cautious when using DSGE models to analyze business cycle dynamics. Quite often, DSGE models tend to mimic the proverbial “crooked house” built to every man’s advise. Whenever additional modification is made to an existing baseline model, previously established regularities break down. For instance, this paper documented negative response of output to technology shock. Such contradictions are not uncommon. For example, Furlanetto (2006) and Ramayandi (2008) have also found similarly inconsistent responses to fiscal and productivity shocks, respectively. Originality/value Using DSGE models for research and teaching purposes is not common in developing economies. To the best of the author’s knowledge, only one other Ethiopian author did apply DSGE model to study business cycle fluctuation in Ethiopia albeit under the implausible assumption of perfect capital mobility and a central bank following interest rate rule. The contribution of this paper is that it departs from these two unrealistic assumptions by allowing international risk premium as a function of the net foreign asset position of the country and by applying money growth rule which closely mimics the behavior of central banks in low-income economies such as Ethiopia.


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