scholarly journals Homeland security and information control: A model of asymmetric information flows

Author(s):  
Terrence A. Maxwell
2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vasiliki E. Athanasakou ◽  
Norman C. Strong ◽  
Martin Walker

2021 ◽  
Vol 311 ◽  
pp. 04010
Author(s):  
Andrei Aleinikov ◽  
Daria Maltseva ◽  
Vladimir Miletskiy ◽  
Olga Safonova ◽  
Aleksandr Strebkov

The article problematizes a range of issues related to the emergence of new mechanisms of risk-reflective legitimization / delegitimization of information control over the spread of a pandemic in the context of Covid-19, taking into account the antagonistic definitions of its threats and dangers. The main substantive task of the study is to analyze the conceptual model of classification of various types of risk reflections - communicative, autonomous, critical, and disturbed, which adjust the hierarchies of the significance and social acceptability of risks. The authors focus on the features of the behavior of a modern social subject in the conditions of uncoupling of risky communications depending on the interpretation of information about risks. The conflict potential of information flows that impose forms of risk perception and risk behavior, the mechanisms of formation of information inequality of reflection of risks and social information exclusion in the policy of distribution and compensation of risk are revealed. The article argues that the inability to appropriate the constructive elements of risk reflections in the strategy of information management of threats destroys the security. The article proves that in the information field, the risk subspace is an asymmetric structure of production, reproduction, ranking and distribution of threats and risks, functioning simultaneously as a tool and a goal of struggle. The authors argue that incorrect attributive judgments and interpretations of the threats and dangers of the pandemic can escalate social and political conflicts.


2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-196
Author(s):  
Anthony D. Nikias

ABSTRACTThis paper examines the effects of providing information about coworkers' costs on binding, noncredible commitments and collusion in a capital budgeting setting with relative project evaluation. Two subordinates with asymmetric information regarding project costs report to a superior who pre-commits to funding rules that potentially ration resources. Rationing is credible only for the most restrictive rule, according to the wealth-maximizing model. When subordinates can observe each other's cost, it can increase collusion by facilitating coordination or potentially affecting equity motives. The results of my experiment reveal that noncredible commitments are generally effective at controlling information rents. Further, credible and noncredible commitments are more effective when subordinates cannot observe their peer's costs. When subordinates can observe costs, they condition reports on the higher costs of a peer. The results suggest the effectiveness of informal controls may depend on the information environment.JEL Classifications: M41; C72; C92.Data Availability: The data are available from the author on request.


2022 ◽  
Vol 412 ◽  
pp. 126544
Author(s):  
Qingyuan Qi ◽  
Zhenghong Qiu ◽  
Xianghua Wang ◽  
Zhijian Ji

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