scholarly journals Asymmetric information control for stochastic systems with different intermittent observations

2022 ◽  
Vol 412 ◽  
pp. 126544
Author(s):  
Qingyuan Qi ◽  
Zhenghong Qiu ◽  
Xianghua Wang ◽  
Zhijian Ji
Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (20) ◽  
pp. 2544
Author(s):  
Igor Sinitsyn ◽  
Vladimir Sinitsyn ◽  
Eduard Korepanov ◽  
Tatyana Konashenkova

This article is devoted to the development of methodological supports and experimental software tools for accuracy analysis and information processing in control stochastic systems (CStS) with complex shock disturbances (ShD) by means of wavelet Haar–Galerkin technologies. Basic new results include methods and algorithms of stochastic covariance analysis and modeling on the basis of the Galerkin method and wavelet expansion for linear, linear with parametric noises, and quasilinear CStS with ShD. Results are illustrated by an information-control system at ShD. New stochastic effects accumulation for systematic and random errors are detected and investigated.


2014 ◽  
Vol 631-632 ◽  
pp. 684-687
Author(s):  
Cheng Wang

Stochastic systems with Markov jump is a new type of stochastic system in recent years, which is a new field integrated by information, control and Markov process. This paper introduces the research history and the newest research trends of stochastic systems with Markov jump, and presents many widespread theoretical and application problems. Moreover, some new research topics and directions related to stochastic systems with Markov jump are proposed.


2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-196
Author(s):  
Anthony D. Nikias

ABSTRACTThis paper examines the effects of providing information about coworkers' costs on binding, noncredible commitments and collusion in a capital budgeting setting with relative project evaluation. Two subordinates with asymmetric information regarding project costs report to a superior who pre-commits to funding rules that potentially ration resources. Rationing is credible only for the most restrictive rule, according to the wealth-maximizing model. When subordinates can observe each other's cost, it can increase collusion by facilitating coordination or potentially affecting equity motives. The results of my experiment reveal that noncredible commitments are generally effective at controlling information rents. Further, credible and noncredible commitments are more effective when subordinates cannot observe their peer's costs. When subordinates can observe costs, they condition reports on the higher costs of a peer. The results suggest the effectiveness of informal controls may depend on the information environment.JEL Classifications: M41; C72; C92.Data Availability: The data are available from the author on request.


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