"On the Definition of an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy in the Playing the Field Model" by V. P. Crawford

1993 ◽  
Vol 161 (3) ◽  
pp. 405 ◽  
Author(s):  
I.M. Bomze ◽  
B.M. Pötscher
Keyword(s):  
Field Model ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of player

1979 ◽  
Vol 16 (01) ◽  
pp. 76-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter D. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Male And Female ◽  
Mate Desertion ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

A definition of ESS (evolutionarily stable strategy) is suggested for games in which there are two types of player, each with its own set of strategies, and the fitness of any strategy depends upon the strategy mix, of both types, in the population as a whole. We check that the standard ESS results hold for this definition and discuss a mate-desertion model which has appeared in the literature in which the two types are male and female.

Evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of player

1979 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter D. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Male And Female ◽  
Mate Desertion ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

A definition of ESS (evolutionarily stable strategy) is suggested for games in which there are two types of player, each with its own set of strategies, and the fitness of any strategy depends upon the strategy mix, of both types, in the population as a whole. We check that the standard ESS results hold for this definition and discuss a mate-desertion model which has appeared in the literature in which the two types are male and female.

A dynamic programming approach to evolutionarily stable strategy theory

1980 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-5 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Cannings ◽  
D. Gardiner
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Programming ◽  
Density Function ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Programming Approach ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
War Of Attrition ◽  
Dynamic Programming Approach ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

In the war of attrition (wa), introduced by Maynard Smith (1974), two contestants play values from [0, ∞), the individual playing the longer value winning a fixed prize V, and both incurring a loss equal to the lesser of the two values. Thus the payoff, E(x, y) to an animal playing x against one playing y, is A more general form (Bishop and Cannings (1978)) has and it was demonstrated that with and there exists a unique evolutionarily stable strategy (ess), which is to choose a random value from a specified density function on [0, ∞). Results were also obtained for strategy spaces [0, s] and [0, s).

scholarly journals Intraspecific competition and coordination in the evolution of lateralization

2008 ◽  
Vol 364 (1519) ◽  
pp. 861-866 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Ghirlanda ◽  
Elisa Frasnelli ◽  
Giorgio Vallortigara
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Population Level ◽  
Neural Circuitry ◽  
Brain Lateralization ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Cooperative Interactions ◽  
Strategic Factors ◽  
Left And Right ◽  
Predator Interactions ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Recent studies have revealed a variety of left–right asymmetries among vertebrates and invertebrates. In many species, left- and right-lateralized individuals coexist, but in unequal numbers (‘population-level’ lateralization). It has been argued that brain lateralization increases individual efficiency (e.g. avoiding unnecessary duplication of neural circuitry and reducing interference between functions), thus counteracting the ecological disadvantages of lateral biases in behaviour (making individual behaviour more predictable to other organisms). However, individual efficiency does not require a definite proportion of left- and right-lateralized individuals. Thus, such arguments do not explain population-level lateralization. We have previously shown that, in the context of prey–predator interactions, population-level lateralization can arise as an evolutionarily stable strategy when individually asymmetrical organisms must coordinate their behaviour with that of other asymmetrical organisms. Here, we extend our model showing that populations consisting of left- and right-lateralized individuals in unequal numbers can be evolutionarily stable, based solely on strategic factors arising from the balance between antagonistic (competitive) and synergistic (cooperative) interactions.

constraints from handedness on the evolution of brain lateralization

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 603-604 ◽  
Author(s):  
maryanne martin ◽  
gregory v. jones
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Brain Lateralization ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

can we understand brain lateralization in humans by analysis in terms of an evolutionarily stable strategy? the attempt to demonstrate a link between lateralization in humans and that in, for example, fish appears to hinge critically on whether the isomorphism is viewed as a matter of homology or homoplasy. consideration of human handedness presents a number of challenges to the proposed framework.

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