scholarly journals Intraspecific competition and coordination in the evolution of lateralization

2008 ◽  
Vol 364 (1519) ◽  
pp. 861-866 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Ghirlanda ◽  
Elisa Frasnelli ◽  
Giorgio Vallortigara
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Population Level ◽  
Neural Circuitry ◽  
Brain Lateralization ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Cooperative Interactions ◽  
Strategic Factors ◽  
Left And Right ◽  
Predator Interactions ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Recent studies have revealed a variety of left–right asymmetries among vertebrates and invertebrates. In many species, left- and right-lateralized individuals coexist, but in unequal numbers (‘population-level’ lateralization). It has been argued that brain lateralization increases individual efficiency (e.g. avoiding unnecessary duplication of neural circuitry and reducing interference between functions), thus counteracting the ecological disadvantages of lateral biases in behaviour (making individual behaviour more predictable to other organisms). However, individual efficiency does not require a definite proportion of left- and right-lateralized individuals. Thus, such arguments do not explain population-level lateralization. We have previously shown that, in the context of prey–predator interactions, population-level lateralization can arise as an evolutionarily stable strategy when individually asymmetrical organisms must coordinate their behaviour with that of other asymmetrical organisms. Here, we extend our model showing that populations consisting of left- and right-lateralized individuals in unequal numbers can be evolutionarily stable, based solely on strategic factors arising from the balance between antagonistic (competitive) and synergistic (cooperative) interactions.

constraints from handedness on the evolution of brain lateralization

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 603-604 ◽  
Author(s):  
maryanne martin ◽  
gregory v. jones
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Brain Lateralization ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

can we understand brain lateralization in humans by analysis in terms of an evolutionarily stable strategy? the attempt to demonstrate a link between lateralization in humans and that in, for example, fish appears to hinge critically on whether the isomorphism is viewed as a matter of homology or homoplasy. consideration of human handedness presents a number of challenges to the proposed framework.

forming an asymmetrical brain: genes, environment, and evolutionarily stable strategies

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 615-623 ◽  
Author(s):  
giorgio vallortigara ◽  
lesley j. rogers
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Population Level ◽  
Brain Lateralization ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Evolutionary Account ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Alternative Hypotheses ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Present Response ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

the present response elaborates and defends the main theses advanced in the target article: namely, that in order to provide an evolutionary account of brain lateralization, we should consider advantages and disadvantages associated both with the individual possession of an asymmetrical brain and with the alignment of the direction of lateralization at the population level. we explain why we believe that the hypothesis that directional lateralization evolved as an evolutionarily stable strategy may provide a better account than alternative hypotheses. we also further our discussion of the influence of stimulation and experience in early life on lateralization, and thereby show that our hypothesis is not deterministic. we also consider some novel data and ideas in support of our main thesis.

the trade-off between symmetry and asymmetry

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 594-595 ◽  
Author(s):  
michael c. corballis
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Population Level ◽  
Bilateral Symmetry ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Directional Bias ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Balanced Polymorphism ◽  
Bias Stability ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

population-level asymmetry may be maintained, not by an “evolutionarily stable strategy” pitting a dominant bias against its nondominant opposite, but rather by a genetically based system pitting a directional bias against the absence of any such bias. stability is then achieved through a heterozygotic advantage, maintaining balanced polymorphism. this model may better capture the fundamental trade-off between lateralization and bilateral symmetry.

A dynamic programming approach to evolutionarily stable strategy theory

1980 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-5 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Cannings ◽  
D. Gardiner
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Programming ◽  
Density Function ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Programming Approach ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
War Of Attrition ◽  
Dynamic Programming Approach ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

In the war of attrition (wa), introduced by Maynard Smith (1974), two contestants play values from [0, ∞), the individual playing the longer value winning a fixed prize V, and both incurring a loss equal to the lesser of the two values. Thus the payoff, E(x, y) to an animal playing x against one playing y, is A more general form (Bishop and Cannings (1978)) has and it was demonstrated that with and there exists a unique evolutionarily stable strategy (ess), which is to choose a random value from a specified density function on [0, ∞). Results were also obtained for strategy spaces [0, s] and [0, s).

Strategy stability in complex randomly mating diploid populations

1982 ◽  
Vol 19 (03) ◽  
pp. 653-659 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. G. S. Hines
Keyword(s):  
Convex Hull ◽  
Lyapunov Functions ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Convergence In Mean ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable ◽  
Diploid Populations ◽  
Better Than

A class of Lyapunov functions is used to demonstrate that strategy stability occurs in complex randomly mating diploid populations. Strategies close to the evolutionarily stable strategy tend to fare better than more remote strategies. If convergence in mean strategy to an evolutionarily stable strategy is not possible, evolution will continue until all strategies in use lie on a unique face of the convex hull of available strategies. The results obtained are also relevant to the haploid parthenogenetic case.

The behaviour of strategy-frequencies in Parker's model

1980 ◽  
Vol 12 (01) ◽  
pp. 5-7
Author(s):  
D. Gardiner
Keyword(s):  
Finite Number ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Expected Payoff ◽  
Pure Strategies ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Parker's model (or the Scotch Auction) for a contest between two competitors has been studied by Rose (1978). He considers a form of the model in which every pure strategy is playable, and shows that there is no evolutionarily stable strategy (ess). In this paper, in order to discover more about the behaviour of strategies under the model, we shall assume that there are only a finite number of playable pure strategies I 1, I 2, ···, I n where I j is the strategy ‘play value m j ′ and m 1 < m 2 < ··· < m n . The payoff matrix A for the contest is then given by where V is the reward for winning the contest, C is a constant added to ensure that each entry in A is non-negative (see Bishop and Cannings (1978)), and E[I i , I j ] is the expected payoff for playing I i against I j . We also assume that A is regular (Taylor and Jonker (1978)) i.e. that all its rows are independent.

scholarly journals Individual-Level and Population-Level Lateralization: Two Sides of the Same Coin

Symmetry ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 739 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisa Frasnelli ◽  
Giorgio Vallortigara
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Population Level ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Theoretical Point ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Functional Roles ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Social Species ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Lateralization, i.e., the different functional roles played by the left and right sides of the brain, is expressed in two main ways: (1) in single individuals, regardless of a common direction (bias) in the population (aka individual-level lateralization); or (2) in single individuals and in the same direction in most of them, so that the population is biased (aka population-level lateralization). Indeed, lateralization often occurs at the population-level, with 60–90% of individuals showing the same direction (right or left) of bias, depending on species and tasks. It is usually maintained that lateralization can increase the brain’s efficiency. However, this may explain individual-level lateralization, but not population-level lateralization, for individual brain efficiency is unrelated to the direction of the asymmetry in other individuals. From a theoretical point of view, a possible explanation for population-level lateralization is that it may reflect an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) that can develop when individually asymmetrical organisms are under specific selective pressures to coordinate their behavior with that of other asymmetrical organisms. This prediction has been sometimes misunderstood as it is equated with the idea that population-level lateralization should only be present in social species. However, population-level asymmetries have been observed in aggressive and mating displays in so-called “solitary” insects, suggesting that engagement in specific inter-individual interactions rather than “sociality” per se may promote population-level lateralization. Here, we clarify that the nature of inter-individuals interaction can generate evolutionarily stable strategies of lateralization at the individual- or population-level, depending on ecological contexts, showing that individual-level and population-level lateralization should be considered as two aspects of the same continuum.

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