ABSTRACT
Firms usually employ nonfinancial performance metrics (NFPMs) to measure progress toward long-term outcomes. They also often evaluate current performance by comparing outcomes on financial measures with budgeted targets. Thus, they can motivate actions that sacrifice current profit for favorable future outcomes directly by increasing the rewards for such actions and indirectly by reducing their opportunity cost. Combining these arguments, we examine the relation between the properties (congruity and measurability) of NFPMs used in incentive contracting and the achievability of the current period budget target, where achievability is the probability of obtaining the incentive payment tied to current period performance. Survey data from 179 divisions in Chinese firms support our prediction of a positive (negative) association between the congruity (measurability) of NFPMs and budget achievability. We also document an expected positive interaction effect between congruity and measurability.
Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision