Rewriting for Cryptographic Protocol Verification

Author(s):  
Thomas Genet ◽  
Francis Klay
10.29007/gpsh ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdulbasit Ahmed ◽  
Alexei Lisitsa ◽  
Andrei Nemytykh

It has been known for a while that program transformation techniques, in particular, program specialization, can be used to prove the properties of programs automatically. For example, if a program actually implements (in a given context of use) a constant function, sufficiently powerful and semantics preserving program transformation may reduce the program to a syntactically trivial ``constant'' program, pruning unreachable branches and proving thereby the property. Viability of such an approach to verification has been demonstrated in previous works where it was applied to the verification of parameterized cache coherence protocols and Petri Nets models.In this paper we further extend the method and present a case study on its appication to the verification of a cryptographic protocol. The protocol is modeled by functional programs at different levels of abstraction and verification via program specialization is done by using Turchin's supercompilation method.


2014 ◽  
Vol 644-650 ◽  
pp. 3181-3184
Author(s):  
Hai Lin

The design of cryptographic protocols is error-prone. People have found serious security flaws in major cryptographic protocols. In recent years, people use formal methods to guarantee the correctness of cryptographic protocols in a strong sense. Resolution-based theorem proving is a widely-used formal method, but there are other techniques as well. For example, the extension rule is another technique used to prove things formally. In this paper, we propose to prove the correctness of cryptographic protocols based on the extension rule. We show that this is an effective technique, which can help to find the security flaws in major cryptographic protocols.


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