Computing the Arrow-Debreu Competitive Market Equilibrium and Its Extensions

2005 ◽  
pp. 3-5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yinyu Ye
Keyword(s):  
Market Equilibrium ◽  
Competitive Market

Entrepreneurial First Movers, Brand-Name Fast Seconds, and the Evolution of Market Structure

2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
George Norman ◽  
Lynne Pepall ◽  
Daniel J Richards
Keyword(s):  
Market Structure ◽  
Market Equilibrium ◽  
Competitive Market ◽  
Brand Name ◽  
New Markets ◽  
Optimal Amount ◽  
Early Entry ◽  
Entrepreneurial Entry ◽  
Efficient Level ◽  
Initial Entry

Abstract We analyze the interaction between entrepreneurs who open new markets and established, `fast second' firms to develop them. We use a spatially differentiated model in which early entry is traditionally excessive. However, the anticipated later entry by the `fast second' brand can potentially reverse this result. We show that conditions that make for the most initial competitive market are precisely those that result in the least optimal amount of initial entry and in which entrepreneurial entry is typically well below the efficient level. We also show that asymmetric oligopoly is a natural market equilibrium.

scholarly journals DIRECT EXCHANGE IN LINEAR ECONOMIES

2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (04) ◽  
pp. 1240006 ◽  
Author(s):  
SJUR DIDRIK FLÅM ◽  
KJETIL GRAMSTAD
Keyword(s):  
Market Equilibrium ◽  
Competitive Market ◽  
Direct Exchange

Considered here is direct exchange of production allowances or input factors. Motivated by practical modeling and compution, we suppose every owner or user of such items has a linear technology. The issue is whether competitive market equilibrium can be reached merely via iterated bilateral barters. This paper provides positive and constructive answers.

scholarly journals Searching for Service

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 188-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maarten C.W. Janssen ◽  
T. Tony Ke
Keyword(s):  
Service Provider ◽  
Service Provision ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Market Equilibrium ◽  
Competitive Market ◽  
Social Optimum ◽  
Search Frictions ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Cost

Since Telser (1960), there is a well-established argument that a competitive market will not provide service due to freeriding. We show that with search frictions, the market may well provide service if the cost of doing so is not too large. Any market equilibrium with service provision has two or more firms providing service, implying overprovision of service as the social optimum mandates at most one service provider. Firms that provide service and those that do not can coexist, where consumers direct their search to service providers first to obtain service, and to nonservice providers later to enjoy lower prices. (JEL D11, D21, D83, L42, L81)

Dynamic Risked Equilibrium

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ferris ◽  
Andy Philpott
Keyword(s):  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
Optimization Problems ◽  
Risk Measures ◽  
Risk Measure ◽  
Market Equilibrium ◽  
Competitive Market ◽  
Social Optimum ◽  
Social Risk ◽  
Water Control ◽  
One Step

We study a competitive partial equilibrium in markets where risk-averse agents solve multistage stochastic optimization problems formulated in scenario trees. The agents trade a commodity that is produced from an uncertain supply of resources. Both resources and the commodity can be stored for later consumption. Several examples of a multistage risked equilibrium are outlined, including aspects of battery and hydroelectric storage in electricity markets, distributed ownership of competing technologies relying on shared resources, and aspects of water control and pricing. The agents are assumed to have nested coherent risk measures based on one-step risk measures with polyhedral risk sets that have a nonempty intersection over agents. Agents can trade risk in a complete market of Arrow-Debreu securities. In this setting, we define a risk-trading competitive market equilibrium and establish two welfare theorems. Competitive equilibrium will yield a social optimum (with a suitably defined social risk measure) when agents have strictly monotone one-step risk measures. Conversely, a social optimum with an appropriately chosen risk measure will yield a risk-trading competitive market equilibrium when all agents have strictly monotone risk measures. The paper also demonstrates versions of these theorems when risk measures are not strictly monotone.

Dynamic Spectrum Management with Competitive Market Equilibrium

2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ming Zhao ◽  
Tao Luo ◽  
Changchuan Yin ◽  
Guangxin Yue ◽  
Xiaojun Wang
Keyword(s):  
Market Equilibrium ◽  
Spectrum Management ◽  
Dynamic Spectrum ◽  
Competitive Market ◽  
Dynamic Spectrum Management
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