Knowledge by Acquaintance and Description

1988 ◽  
pp. 26-30
Author(s):  
Brian Haymes
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge By Acquaintance

Genuine Names and Knowledge by Acquaintance

dialectica ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 44 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 99-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith S. Donnellan
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge By Acquaintance

Tye on materialism without phenomenal concepts

2010 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 597-606
Author(s):  
Yaron M. Senderowicz
Keyword(s):  
Review Article ◽  
Final Part ◽  
Phenomenal Concept ◽  
Phenomenal Concepts ◽  
Phenomenal Concept Strategy ◽  
Knowledge By Acquaintance

In this review article I examine Michel Tye’s recent reassessment of the phenomenal concept strategy. The phenomenal concept strategy is employed in the attempts to respond to the classical arguments that challenge materialism. I examine Tye’s reasons for abandoning the phenomenal concept strategy (a strategy that he himself advocated in his earlier writings), and I examine the elements of his new position according to which the materialist response should involve ‘singular when filled’ content schema, as well as a version of the Russellian distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. In the final part I criticize the adequacy of Tye’s theory not as a response to the dualists but rather as a response to opponents of representationalism from the materialist camp.

Symposium: Is There Knowledge by Acquaintance?

1949 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. L. A. Hart ◽  
G. E. Hughes ◽  
J. N. Findlay
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge By Acquaintance

Do We Have Knowledge-by-Acquaintance of the Self?

1944 ◽  
Vol 41 (25) ◽  
pp. 694
Author(s):  
Edgar Sheffield Brightman
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Knowledge By Acquaintance

A Re-Examination of the Russellian Theory of Descriptions

Philosophy ◽  
1960 ◽  
Vol 35 (132) ◽  
pp. 14-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Czeslaw Lejewski
Keyword(s):  
Logical Atomism ◽  
Classical Paper ◽  
Aristotelian Society ◽  
Knowledge By Acquaintance ◽  
Theory Of Descriptions

The theory of descriptions occupies a very prominent place in Russell's system of logic and indeed in his system of philosophy. Since the publication of the now classical paper “On Denoting” in Mind for 1905 the theory had been incorporated into Principia Mathematica, the first volume of which appeared in 1910. In 1918 Russell discussed descriptions in his lectures on the Philosophy of Logical Atomism, which subsequently were published in The Monist for 1919. A very lucid exposition of the main tenets of the doctrine is to be found in the Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy dating from the same year. Epistemological aspects of the theory of descriptions are examined in “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description“, in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for 1910–11, and also in Chapter V of The Problems of Philosophy, first published in 1912.

ΓΝΩΣΙΣ and ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ in Socrates' Dream in the Theaetetus

1969 ◽  
Vol 89 ◽  
pp. 72-78
Author(s):  
J. H. Lesher
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge By Acquaintance ◽  
Dream Theory ◽  
Intellectual Knowledge ◽  
The Many ◽  
Key Terms

It has been alleged by many commentators that Plato never developed a precise philosophical vocabulary, and this view is strengthened when one investigates the employment of many of Plato's key terms: εἶδος, ἰδέα, αἴσθησις, δόξα, to name but a few. In the early and middle dialogues, Plato uses these terms in a variety of contexts without giving the slightest indication of which of the many possible senses is to be understood. Indeed, in the Euthydemus, Socrates is represented as ridiculing those who attempt to draw precise distinctions for they ‘… would only be able to play with men tripping them up and oversetting them with distinctions of words’ (Jowett, 278). Yet one must be cautious in simply assuming that Plato never attempted to clarify the meaning of his central philosophical terms; in particular, one must note that the Theaetetus contains several attempts to mark off various senses of λόγος, and that the entire dialogue is directed toward a precise account of what is, or ought to be meant by ‘knowledge’. Thus while it is true to say that Plato usually fails to mark off distinctions between various senses of the same term, the Theaetetus shows that this is not always the case.In this paper, I shall argue (1) that Plato attempts to separate two distinct senses of the comprehensive Greek term for knowledge, εἰδέναι, reserving γνῶσις for what we should term ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ and employing ἐπιστήμη for ‘intellectual knowledge’ or ‘knowledge that something is the case’, and (2) that the statement and refutation of Socrates' dream theory in the Theaetetus show this.

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