The syntax of normal modal systems

2008 ◽  
pp. 25-48
Keyword(s):  
Modal Systems

scholarly journals Abnormal worlds and the non-Lewis modal systems.

1977 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-100
Author(s):  
G. N. Georgacarakos
Keyword(s):  
Modal Systems

An algebraic study of Diodorean modal systems

1965 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. A. Bull
Keyword(s):  
Discrete Time ◽  
Decision Procedure ◽  
John Locke ◽  
Original Model ◽  
Completeness Proof ◽  
Semantic Tableaux ◽  
Algebraic Treatment ◽  
Algebraic Result ◽  
Modal Systems

Attention was directed to modal systems in which ‘necessarily α’ is interpreted as ‘α. is and always will be the case’ by Prior in his John Locke Lectures of 1956. The present paper shows that S4.3, the extension of S4 withALCLpLqLCLqLp,is complete with respect to this interpretation when time is taken to be continuous, and that D, the extension of S4.3 withALNLpLCLCLCpLpLpLp,is complete with respect to this interpretation when time is taken to be discrete. The method employed depends upon the application of an algebraic result of Garrett Birkhoff's to the models for these systems, in the sense of Tarski.A considerable amount of work on S4.3 and D precedes this paper. The original model with discrete time is given in Prior's [7] (p. 23, but note the correction in [8]); that taking time to be continuous yields a weaker system is pointed out by him in [9]. S4.3 and D are studied in [3] of Dummett and Lemmon, where it is shown that D includes S4.3 andCLCLCpLpLpCMLpLp.While in Oxford in 1963, Kripke proved that these were in fact sufficient for D, using semantic tableaux. A decision procedure for S4.3, using Birkhoff's result, is given in my [2]. Dummett conjectured, in a conversation, that taking time to be continuous yielded S4.3. Thus the originality of this paper lies in giving a suitable completeness proof for S4.3, and in the unified algebraic treatment of the systems. It should be emphasised that the credit for first axiomatising D belongs to Kripke.

On finite and infinite modal systems

1938 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 77-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. West Churchman
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Symbolic Logic ◽  
Modal Operator ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Modal Systems ◽  
Complex Modal

In Oskar Becker's Zur Logik der Modalitäten four systems of modal logic are considered. Two of these are mentioned in Appendix II of Lewis and Langford's Symbolic logic. The first system is based on A1–8 plus the postulate,From A7: ∼◊p⊰∼p we can prove the converse of C11 by writing ∼◊p for p, and hence deriveThe addition of this postulate to A1–8, as Becker points out, allows us to “reduce” all complex modal functions to six, and these six are precisely those which Lewis mentions in his postulates and theorems: p, ∼p, ◊p, ∼◊p, ∼◊∼p, and ◊∼p This reduction is accomplished by showingwhere ◊n means that the modal operator ◊ is repeated n times; e.g., ◊3p = ◊◊◊p. Then it is shown thatBy means of (1), (2), and (3) any complex modal function whatsoever may be reduced to one of the six “simple” modals mentioned above.It might be asked whether this reduction could be carried out still further, i.e., whether two of the six “irreducible” modals could not be equated. But such a reduction would have to be based on the fact that ◊p = p which is inconsistent with the set B1–9 of Lewis and Langford's Symbolic logic and independent of the set A1–8. Hence for neither set would such a reduction be possible.

scholarly journals A note on modal systems.

1963 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-157
Author(s):  
Bolesław Sobociński
Keyword(s):  
Modal Systems

0249 Further Modal Systems

2017 ◽  
pp. 330-353
Author(s):  
Harry J. Gensler
Keyword(s):  
Modal Systems

Modal logic, philosophical issues in

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas J. McKay
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Natural Language ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Modal Claim ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Modal Semantics ◽  
Bull's Eye ◽  
Modal Systems ◽  
Richard Montague

In reasoning we often use words such as ‘necessarily’, ‘possibly’, ‘can’, ‘could’, ‘must’ and so on. For example, if we know that an argument is valid, then we know that it is necessarily true that if the premises are true, then the conclusion is true. Modal logic starts with such modal words and the inferences involving them. The exploration of these inferences has led to a variety of formal systems, and their interpretation is now most often built on the concept of a possible world. Standard non-modal logic shows us how to understand logical words such as ‘not’, ‘and’ and ‘or’, which are truth-functional. The modal concepts are not truth-functional: knowing that p is true (and what ‘necessarily’ means) does not automatically enable one to determine whether ‘Necessarily p’ is true. (‘It is necessary that all people have been people’ is true, but ‘It is necessary that no English monarch was born in Montana’ is false, even though the simpler constituents – ‘All people have been people’ and ‘No English monarch was born in Montana’– are both true.) The study of modal logic has helped in the understanding of many other contexts for sentences that are not truth-functional, such as ‘ought’ (‘It ought to be the case that p’) and ‘believes’ (‘Alice believes that p’); and also in the consideration of the interaction between quantifiers and non-truth-functional contexts. In fact, much work in modern semantics has benefited from the extension of modal semantics introduced by Richard Montague in beginning the development of a systematic semantics for natural language. The framework of possible worlds developed for modal logic has been fruitful in the analysis of many concepts. For example, by introducing the concept of relative possibility, Kripke showed how to model a variety of modal systems: a proposition is necessarily true at a possible world w if and only if it is true at every world that is possible relative to w. To achieve a better analysis of statements of ability, Mark Brown adapted the framework by modelling actions with sets of possible outcomes. John has the ability to hit the bull’s-eye reliably if there is some action of John’s such that every possible outcome of that action includes John’s hitting the bull’s-eye. Modal logic and its semantics also raise many puzzles. What makes a modal claim true? How do we tell what is possible and what is necessary? Are there any possible things that do not exist (and what could that mean anyway)? Does the use of modal logic involve a commitment to essentialism? How can an individual exist in many different possible worlds?

Weak liberated versions of T and S4

1975 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles G. Morgan
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Accessibility Relation ◽  
Independence Results ◽  
Modal Systems

AbstractThe usual semantics for the modal systems T, S4, and S5 assumes that the set of possible worlds contains at least one member. Recently versions of these modal systems have been developed in which this assumption is dropped. The systems discussed here are obtained by slightly weakening the liberated versions of T and S4. The semantics does not assume the existence of possible worlds, and the accessibility relation between worlds is only required to be quasi-reflexive instead of reflexive. Completeness and independence results are established.

New foundations for Lewis modal systems

1957 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 176-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. J. Lemmon
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Propositional Calculus ◽  
Modal System ◽  
New Foundations ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Classical Propositional Calculus ◽  
Modal Systems

The main aims of this paper are firstly to present new and simpler postulate sets for certain well-known systems of modal logic, and secondly, in the light of these results, to suggest some new or newly formulated calculi, capable of interpretation as systems of epistemic or deontic modalities. The symbolism throughout is that of [9] (see especially Part III, Chapter I). In what follows, by a Lewis modal system is meant a system which (i) contains the full classical propositional calculus, (ii) is contained in the Lewis system S5, (iii) admits of the substitutability of tautologous equivalents, (iv) possesses as theses the four formulae:We shall also say that a system Σ1 is stricter than a system Σ2, if both are Lewis modal systems and Σ1 is contained in Σ2 but Σ2 is not contained in Σ1; and we shall call Σ1absolutely strict, if it possesses an infinity of irreducible modalities. Thus, the five systems of Lewis in [5], S1, S2, S3, S4, and S5, are all Lewis modal systems by this definition; they are in an order of decreasing strictness from S1 to S5; and S1 and S2 alone are absolutely strict.

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