scholarly journals The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

1988 ◽  
pp. 65-80
Author(s):  
William P. Rogerson
Keyword(s):  
Social Costs ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretic

scholarly journals A game theoretic approach reveals that discretizing clinical information can reduce antibiotic misuse

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maya Diamant ◽  
Shoham Baruch ◽  
Eias Kassem ◽  
Khitam Muhsen ◽  
Dov Samet ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Antibiotic Prescription ◽  
Clinical Information ◽  
Social Optimum ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Optimal Output ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

AbstractThe overuse of antibiotics is exacerbating the antibiotic resistance crisis. Since this problem is a classic common-goods dilemma, it naturally lends itself to a game-theoretic analysis. Hence, we designed a model wherein physicians weigh whether antibiotics should be prescribed, given that antibiotic usage depletes its future effectiveness. The physicians’ decisions rely on the probability of a bacterial infection before definitive laboratory results are available. We show that the physicians’ equilibrium decision rule of antibiotic prescription is not socially optimal. However, we prove that discretizing the information provided to physicians can mitigate the gap between their equilibrium decisions and the social optimum of antibiotic prescription. Despite this problem’s complexity, the effectiveness of the discretization solely depends on the type of information available to the physician to determine the nature of infection. This is demonstrated on theoretic distributions and a clinical dataset. Our results provide a game-theory based guide for optimal output of current and future decision support systems of antibiotic prescription.

Getting to Peace: Roger Fisher's Scholarship in International Law and the Social Sciences

2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 1061-1080
Author(s):  
ANDREW MAMO
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Social Scientists ◽  
Subsequent Work ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Basic Assumptions ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Cold War

AbstractThis article examines Roger Fisher's scholarship in international law in the decades prior to the publication of Getting to Yes. Fisher engaged with the same major questions as other international law scholars during the Cold War, but his scholarship was distinguished by the degree to which he grappled with the cutting-edge social science of the mid-century. Even as Fisher collaborated with game theorists and nuclear strategists to understand the theory of conflict, he maintained a critical view of the basic assumptions of game theoretic analysis – defending certain normative elements of the methodology even as he denied its descriptive claims. Subsequent work sought to generate robust descriptions of the role of law in international decision-making during crises. Fisher's normative and descriptive studies of the role of law in such crises led directly to Getting to Yes, creating a body of ‘meta-game theory’ that situated formal studies of conflict within a lawyer's understanding of dispute resolution. Fisher's engagement with social scientists helps illuminate current methodological debates in international law by highlighting the stakes of these theoretical questions and the tensions between scholarship and practice in international law.

A Game-theoretic Analysis of Hybrid Threats

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Pieter Balcaen ◽  
Cind Du Bois ◽  
Caroline Buts
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Hybrid Threats
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