Role of Political Violence in Foreign Direct Investment Decisions

2000 ◽  
pp. 83-96
Author(s):  
H. Singh
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Direct Investment ◽  
Political Violence ◽  
Direct Investment ◽  
Investment Decisions

scholarly journals THE INFLUENCE OF IMPLICIT TAX IN MAKING PROFITABLE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DECISIONS: EVIDENCE OF INDONESIAN LISTED COMPANIES IN ALL SECTORS

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 192
Author(s):  
Angelina Tiffany Iskandar ◽  
Melinda Haryanto
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Direct Investment ◽  
Multiple Regression ◽  
Direct Investment ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Investment Decisions ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Positive Influence ◽  
Tax Planning ◽  
Significant Positive Influence

Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah menguji apakah implicit tax memiliki pengaruh terhadap explicit tax dalam konteks Foreign Direct Investment untuk perusahaan-perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia periode 2010-2013. Sampel penelitian ini sebanyak 34 perusahaan, setelah dikurangi outlier sebanyak 6 data, sampel penelitian menjadi 130 data. Penelitian ini menggunakan regresi berganda. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa implicit tax memiliki pengaruh positif yang tidak signifikan terhadap explicit tax. Hal ini disebabkan karena peranan dari perencanaan pajak dan friksi pasar di Indonesia yang memperlemah pengaruh tersebut.The aim of this study was to test whether the implicit tax has an influence on tax explicitly in the context of Foreign Direct Investment for the companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 2010-2013. The study sample as many as 34 companies, net of outlier as much as 6 data, the sample to 130 data. This study uses multiple regression. The results showed that the implicit tax that does not have a significant positive influence on the explicit tax. This is because the role of tax planning and friction market in Indonesia, which weakens the influence.

Economic Actors' Lobbying Influence on the Prospects for War and Peace

2013 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 863-888 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen G. Brooks
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Direct Investment ◽  
Direct Investment ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
Economic Globalization ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
War And Peace ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Government

AbstractPolitical scientists and economists have long been interested in the role of special interests in the policymaking process. In the past few years, a series of important new books have argued forcefully that the lobbying activities of economic actors have an important influence on the prospects for war and peace. All of these analyses claim that whether economic actors enhance or decrease the likelihood of conflict ultimately depends on the domestic political balance between economic actors who have a strong vested interest in pushing for peace versus those that do not. I advance two contrary arguments. At least among the advanced states, I posit there are no longer any economic actors who will be favorable toward war and who will lobby the government with this preference. All of the identified mechanisms that previously contributed to such lobbying in these states have been swept away with the end of colonialism and the rise of economic globalization. In particular, I show that the current structure of the global economy now makes it feasible for foreign direct investment to serve as an effective substitute for conquest in a way that was not possible in previous eras. My second argument concerns those economic actors in advanced states with a preference for peace. I posit that it has become unnecessary for them to directly lobby the government to avoid war on economic grounds because economic globalization—the accumulation of decisions by economic actors throughout the globe—now has sufficiently clear economic incentives for leaders.

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