Realism, constructivism, and liberal institutionalism share the assumption that states are rational and self-maximizing actors. While these theories disagree as to whether states prioritize military power or economic wealth, they converge around the notion that states pursue these goods rationally and predictably. Complaints against and threats of defection from prominent international security and trade regimes, including NATO and the EU, raise doubts about states’ rationality and predictability. Perhaps these theories’ shared assumption about rational action has become an impediment to understanding state behavior and institutional cooperation. To enrich and to expand the conversation within international political theory, my article turns to Rousseau’s international political thought. Rousseau anticipates central arguments in each of the major traditions of IR theory but locates political self-interest in the sub-rational passion amour propre rather than in reason itself. Rousseau exemplifies a more nuanced way to understand the irrational roots of political motivation and the limits of international order. My paper traces the international implications of amour propre through Rousseau’s key texts on international politics and turns to his “Letter to Philopolis” as a way to re-frame Rousseau’s account of political responsibility.
Environmental and Trade Regimes: Comparison of Hypergraphs Modeling the Ratifications of UN Multilateral Treaties
